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FORE,'/ORD 
The objective of thi~ thesis is to examine Austria's 
role in the 1938 Anschlugs with Germany. While that Anschluss 
clearly was a result of Nazi aggression and Western appease-
ment, nonetheless certain aspects of Austria's political life 
led to the logical, if unpremeditated, acquiescence in the 
German invasion March 11, 1938. 
Anschluss, literally, is the German word for a joining-
up. It implies consent of both parties, has the connotations 
of the English "union. 11 Between the world wars, it came to be 
used to designate the political unification so long ardently 
sought by Austria between that country and Germany. 
The major part of this study relates the bearing of 
specifically political factors to Anschluss by describing the 
roles of the Social Democrat and Christian Socialist parties 
in Austria and the civil strife engendered by rivalries between 
' the t~ro. The political chapters are prec:1ented initially in the 
~tudy to provide a loosely chronological framework for the rest 
of the paper and to recall Austria' s turbulent political life 
of the past ·thirty years. 
Following the political are chapters discu~sing economic 
factors and pathopolitical factors of the Anschluss. Generally, 
the economic factor is considered to be an important one in 
Anschluss; however this investigation seems to show that the 
Vii 
question of Austrian viability without incorporation into 
Germany was answered in favor of Austrian independence before 
1938. Another chapter describes steps leading to the 1938 
Anschlus s itself. 
Materials used in validating the thesis range from 
statistical documents and treaty texts to periodical articles 
and news items. Articles are used quite extensively for two 
reasons--because many Austrian politicians and scholars wrote 
for magazines during the interwar years and because less auth-
oritative articles are useful in determining undercurrents of 
popular feeling and national sentiment. 
The Statistical Yearboo; of the League of Nations and 
report s of the League commissioner-general for Auqtria, pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the Council of the League of 
Nations, proved useful in substantiating economic findings. 
Daily newspaper items were used in indicating the growth of 
anti-Semitism and fascism in Austria for the pathopolitical 
chapter. Understandably, but unfortunately, most writings , 
on Austriafs interwar political life are biased. Many of t he 
writers were or are connected wi th the Austrian government 
and hence owe allegiance to one political alignment or another. 
Their motives show. s upposedly impartial newspaper corres~ 
pondents are even more intemperate than the politicians. In 
view of this, a cro~s-checking proces~ Rerved to weed out 
material patently warped and to verify highly editorialized 
accounts. 
Viii 
CHAPTER I 
AUSTRIA: THE PAST-TENSE; THE FUTURE-IMPERFECT 
On March 11, 1938, the curtains closed on Vienna. On 
that day Hitler re-entered his native land. His coming por-
tended Anschlus~ longtime dream of many Austrians. Not a 
I 
hand was uplifted to stop his coming. Instead many were 
raised to greet him with his own peculiar salute. 
But, although no army massed to stop the unwelcome 
prodigal, the Vienna government worked frenetically for five 
years to delay the seemingly inevitable finale, even though 
many Austrians longed for Anschluss more ardently and more 
articulately than did the Germans themselves during the inter-
war period. 
The Anschluss iron was hottest immediately after the 
1918 Armistice. Then, convinced the shrunken Austria which 
emerged from the war did not possess the means of economic 
viability, the Social Democratic and German Nationalist 
parties led a general move toward union with Germany. 
The terms of the Treaty of Saint Germain abruptly 
proscribed the Anschluss solution but did not stop the pro-
union agitation. Austria, verbally adept, managed to convert 
a considerable body of opinion in League of Nations circles 
to her contention that she 11 could not live" under the 
territorial restrictions of the treaty. Her plaint was that, 
minus Anschluss with her brotherland, she would starve within 
her new boundaries, that the new Austria hadn 1 t enough food , 
and hadn 1 t enough raw materials to support her population. 
STATEMENT OF THESIS 
Nevertheless, it was political dissension within 
Austria that finally paved the way for the 1938 Anschluss. A 
divided Austria faced Germany, an Austria divided between the 
right and the left and already corrupted by the moral taints 
characteristic of Nazism. 
If Austria had risen to defend herself against Germany 
in 1938, she would not have been fighting either an alien 
system or an alien people, but fighting her own system carried 
to its ghastly and logical extreme and her own Teutonic 
brother whose militarism was aggressive externally rather than 
displayed in internal conflicts, as in Austria. 
Although Austria labored under economic disadvantages 
between the wars and these disadvantages were in part caused 
by her diminished status under the terms of the 1919 peace 
treaty, by 1938 this was not a cause for Anschluss. Austria 
could have maintained her independence if Germany had not 
"attacked 11 her, or if the Western nations, either individually 
or as members of the League of Nations, had backed up her 
attempts to remain independent. Austrian indenendence 
. . 
2 
crumbled under external pressure. 
The 1938 Anschluss was an evil flower nourished by a 
variegated mixture of nutrient loams, some of them formed far 
back in Austrian history, some of them still ominously present 
in Austria today. 
PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ANSCHLUSS 
Observers of the European scene must feel these days 
that they are caught in some nightmarish cycle. The 11 thi s 
is where I came in" sensation of one watching Europe, espec-
ially Germany and Austria, is recurrent. Some of the partic-
ipants are different from those of 1919 and 1920, but the same 
leitmotiv is with us again. We read that Adenauer avers, as 
did Ludendorff, that the Germans weren't really defeated and 
that Austrians are irked by delay of their treaty. The title 
1 
of an article in The Fortnightly is 11 Can Austria Survive?" 
But the periodical's date is 1947, not 1927 or 1919. 
Actually, Anschluss isn 1 t mentioned often in Austria 
these days other than by the fanatic few. If it were, the 
Austrian might well ask, "Anschluss with which zone? 11 Still, 
when Allied occupation ends, when the memory of German occu-
pation dims a little, when political theorists cast about for 
lp. o. Lapie, 11 Can Austria Survive?" The Fortnightly, 
167:105-10, February, 1947. Lapie speaks of political rather 
than economic issues. 
3 
a political solution to Austria's problems, the Anschluss 
issue may recur. 
Growth of ~-~ groups. Already there are reports 
that neo-Nazi groups are unexpectedly strong in the occupied 
2 
country. Most important of these is the ~ der 
Unabh!ngigen (Union of Independents), more commonly known as 
the VDU, which harbors a miscellaneous political following 
3 including former Nazis and undisguised pan-Germans. 
Possible effectR of ~ occupation. While Nazi occu-
pation may well have sated the majority of Austrians with pan-
Germanism, after a time these same Austrians, remembering the 
full employment, the thriving industries that accompanied the 
German conquest, might again succumb to pan-German propaganda. 
Economic conditions~ favor independence. There are, 
however, hopeful harbingers of a truly independent Austria. 
The country is economically in much better shape than after 
World War I, when military defeat and disintegration of the 
political order came simultaneously. Then, Austria was 
thought to have virtually no coal or oil. Now, the Zisterdorf 
oil, discovered in the interwar period, is a major resource 
2Richard Mowrer, "New Auatrian Party Tinged by Nazis," 
Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1949; Christian 
Science Monitor, January 21, 1950. 
3Mowrer, 11 Austrian 1 s Grimace at Nazi-Hued Joke,'' 
Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 1949. 
4 
of the country. Austria will also be able to take advantage 
of German wartime expansion of her hydroelectric facilities, 
will even be able to export electrical power. 
Political atmosphere imnroved. From the political mis-
takes of the interwar years, Austria's right and left may have 
learned the value of compromise. The political groupings at 
present are not materially different from those of prewar 
times, with many of the same figures at the same old stands. 
The leaders• respective lines, however, are changed. Apparent 
rejection of Anschluss by Dr. Karl Renner, Socialist president 
of Austria, may be cited. The "voluntary retirement" of Dr. 
Schuschnigg, identified in the eyes of the West with his 
fight against Hitler but in the eyes of Austrians with his own 
brand of fascism, is another case in point. Dr. Renner reports 
that the Social Democrats and Conservatives pledged union of 
action against extreme elements on the day of Austria's liber-
ation. 4 
Soviet power is unknown quantity. An entirely new 
factor in Austrian affairs, one which may nullify the hopeful 
outlook for prosperity and political amity, is the position of 
the Soviet Union today. Russia throws her awesome shadow in 
Austriars path, obscuring the glass for would-be political 
prognosticators. In the interwar period, the Soviet Union 
4Karl Renner, "Austria: Key for War and Peace," Foreign 
Affairs, 26:589-603, July, 1948, p. 603. 
5 
played but a negligible pro~t in Austrian affairs. Now, 
Russian troops occupy East Austria, Russian obdurancy is de-
laying the Austrian state treaty, Austria has common borde rs 
with Russian satellites and her capital is minutes from red-
dominated Hungary. 
Summary. On the whole, there is considerably more hope 
for a prosperou~, independent Au~tria now than in 1918. Dis-
covery of oil and industrial and agricultural developments 
have adv~nced Austrian prosperity. Her past record of polit-
ical instability may well provide her politicians with the 
needed object lesson in compromise. Meanwhile, the power of 
the German magnet has been halved. 
Whereas, in 1919 German union was clutched at hyster-
ically as the straw which might save a nation which surely 
thought she was drowning, now Anschluss is discussed coV"ertly, 
if at all. Only disquieting consideration is Russia's new 
role. Austria is situated preci sely at the east-west cross-
roads, geographically and politically. Her neighbors are 
tvestern-oriented Italy and \'lest Germany, neutral Switzerland, 
Soviet satellites Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the sometime 
friend of Moscow, Yugoslavia. 
AUSTRIA'S PAST 
Austria 1 8 geography. Austria's present fate-fruaght 
position between east and we~t i8 not a new one. In her 
6 
early, glorious days, as now, Austria stood at the crossroads 
between East and t.Yest. With the 11 east mark" of Germany began 
the Tr&mmerzone (zone of debris)--the fragmentary hodgepodge 
of lands stretching eastward to Russia, south to the Adriatic 
and Aegean, often called the 11 crush zone" of Europe. The 
flow of migration and conquest passed through Austria. Twice, 
at Vienna, the vanguard of attacks from the Orient was hurled 
back. 
Austria has a long, varied history during much of which 
Germany was merely a part of her domain. Vienna was the cap-
ital city of the Holy Roman Empire, Austria the apex state of 
Europe. Hapsburg sway then extended over most of Italy, 
Burgundy, the Nethe·rlands, Germany, Bohemia, Hungary and the 
Adriatic coast down to Belgrade. 
The · dual monarchy. The powerful dual monarchy, 
Austria-Hungary, like Austria herself after the first world 
war, comprised only a remnant of a once wider realm. But, 
even without Germany, the Hapsburgs claimed an empire of 
56,000,000 subjects. Spatially, Austria-Hungary was the 
second largest European country, demographically third. The 
empire extended from Bregenz on the Lake of Constance to 
Czernowitz in the Carpathians, from Lemberg in Poland to 
Ragusa on the Adriatic. However, the dual monarchy was to be 
of shorter duration than the Holy Roman Empire. 
Many predict fall. · Discernment of the seeds of 
7 
dissolution had been general long before 1918. Malbone Graham 
writes: 
The character of the Holy Roman Empire ••• 
served to impart to Habsburg policies an inter-
national, or rather a non-national character, and 
the Habsburg Empire continued, throughout its 
course, to ignore or forget the influence of 
nationality. Having come to power in an age that 
know not nationality, its policy of Hausmacht 
concerned itself little with the racial character 
of the new subjects, fortuitously or deliberately 
acquired; in its expansion lines of language, race, 
or religion for a long time played no part.5 
Grillparzer, one of Austria's great poets, predicted 
dissolution in 1830 and wrote: 
The whole world will be strengthened by the 
unexpected change, only Austria will go to pieces 
by it. The shameless Machiavellism of the leaders 
who, in order that the reigning dynasty should 
remain the only connecting tie of the state, have 
fomented and nourished the •.• national antipathies 
of the separate provinces, is responsible for it. 
The Hungarian hates the Bohemian, the Bohemian 
hates the German, and the Italian hates them all, 
and as horses absurdly harnessed together, they 
will scatter in all directions as soon as the 
advancing spirit of the times will weaken and 
break the bonds.6 
5Malbone w. Graham, Jr., and Robert C. Binkley,~ 
Governments of Central Europ~ (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 19241, p. 111. 
6oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of ~ Habsburg Monarchy 
(London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1929), p. 11. 
8 
Even Metternich, perhaps Metternich especially, foresaw 
the end of the monarchy. 7 
War spurs minority revolt. The onslaught of Allied 
troops during World War I provided the deathblow to the out-
dated structure. Otto Bauer, Social Democratic leader tells 
of the disintegration: 
In this manner the circle was drawn. The 
Habsburgs began the war against the Jugo-Slavs, 
passed through it in the most vehement conflict 
with the Czechs, lost the Poles during the War 
and were incapable of winning the Ukrainians. 
All the Slav peoples now stood against the 
Habsburgs. All hoped for victory of the Allies. 
Austria-Hungary led the war not only against 
external enemies, but against almost two-thirds 
of its own citizens. 8 The destiny of the Habsburg monarchy was sealed. 
Toward the war's end, Austria's food supply neared 
depletion. She faced famine and wholesale troop desertion. 
Polish, Yugoslav and Czech brigades appeared in the ranks of 
the Allies. 9 In peace negotiations with the Ukraine, Austria 
7His wife's journal for January-June, 1840, records 
that he remarked to her, 11 God alone can save this old monarchy." 
Jaszi declares that Metternich was haunted by portents of 
Hapsburg doom. (R.B. Mowat, The States of Europe, 1815-1871. 
New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1932, p. 47; Jaszi, ~· 
cit., p. 10.) 
8otto Bauer, The Austrian Revolution (Translator, H. J. 
Stenning; London: Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 1925), p. 24. The 
translation used here is that of Oscar Jaszi, preferred by 
this writer to the Stenning version. The Stenning version is 
used unles.s otherwise indicated. 
9Graham, .Q.P. cit., p. 126. 
9 
bartered portions of Galicia and Bukovina for food. 10 The 
grain shipments, however, failed to reach Austria. 
Wilson 1 s Point Ten, expounded in 1918, gave impetus to 
independence moves of the rebellious minorities: 
The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place 
among nations we wish to see safeguarded and 
assured, should be accorded the freest opportun-
ity of autonomous development.ll -
Austro-Hungarian Empire officials sent word to Wilson 
in October, 1918, that they were willing to negotiate on the 
basis of the Fourteen Points. :Meamr.rhile, however, the United 
States had recognized the belligerency of the Czechoslovaks 
and the justice of the Yugoslav efforts to obtain freedom. 
In these last days, military rout, blockade-produced 
famine . and civil strife accompanied the 11 revolutionsn with 
which, one by one, nationalist leaders established new states 
in Danubian Europe. Austria-Hungary's last emperor, Karl, 
made a belated offer of federalization to the minority groups. 
When it became apparent the,t the minorities would not be thus 
lOLoc. cit. These negotiations were remarkable in many 
ways. On the eastern front Austria was a nominal victor; yet 
she relinquished territory to the vanquished so desperate was 
her food situation. Additionally, the status of the Ukraine ; 
was not clear. Russia, mid-revolution, questioned the Ukrain&s 
right to negotiate its own t~eaty. A good account is that of 
Gustav Gratz and Richard Schuller, The Economic Policy of 
Austria-Hungary During the~ in its External Relations (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1928~ 
llsir William Beveridge, ~ Price of Peace (New York: 
VI. W. Norton & Company, 1945), p. 134. 
10 
appeased, he amenably released officials of the dual monarchy 
from their oaths of allegiance to him.12 
~ of the Hapsburgs. So, between the internal stress 
of nationalism and the external one of military rout, the 
Hapsburg house was pressed--into exile, not death. Its heirs 
rove hopefully about Europe today, comforted, perhaps, by the 
small monarchist movement still alive in Austria, well-informed 
about world affairs, apparently sincerely concerned for the 
welfare of their one-time country--seeming anachronisms un-
13 
willing to relinquish entirely the fading dream of the scepter. 
Today the centuries-long Hapsburg adventure in empire 
is over. The Treaty of Saint Germain cannot be blamed for 
breaking up the dual monarchy. It merely confirmed a status 
quo reached before the treaty was negotiated. The treaty did 
not force Austria to give up anything. 14 It confirmed, rather, 
the established fact that she had lost much. 
12Graham, Q.P• cit., p. 128. 
13There are still monarchists in Austria. Between the 
wars, the monarchist movement was sometimes strong. French 
occupation authorities are accused of flirting with the 
current heir. (H. C. Fleisher and Dyno Lowenstein, "Austria: 
Liberated Problem- Child," Harpers Monthly, 193:136-43, 
August, 1946, p. 140.) 
14The formation of the Succession states preceded the 
treaty by several months. The Allies could scarcely have 
forced the dispara te areas of the empire to stay together. 
The Allies did play a decisive part, of course, in determining 
exact location of frontiers and in settling possession of 
disputed areas. 
11 
Gains Qf ~ ~tate~. The old empire spawned three new 
stateg, yielded appreciable lands to four other neighboring 
states. Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in toto were 
carved from the old domain. Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy and 
Romania gained large areas from her. When the totaling was 
finished, Austria had loqt Bohemia, Galicia, Austrian Si lesia, 
Moravia, Bukovina, Carniola, Southern Styria, southern Tyrol, 
much of Carinthia, Trieste, I~tria, Gorizia and Dalmatia. 15 
CONDITIONS IN THE NEW AUSTRIA 
Of all the new states, the infant republic Austria wa~ 
perhaps the weakest. And one of the first things ~he did was 
to seek her brother, Germany, in Anschluss. And small wonder, 
In 1919, Vienna was literally starving. Armies became mobs, 
and the troops streamed home from a fluid front in anger and 
disorder. The long-rotting empire was finally falling. The 
Allied blockade prevented replenishing of dwindling food 
supplies. The Succession ~tates, with none too tender senti-
ments for Austria, banned shipments in their onetime capital. 
There was strife in borderlands where territorial claims of 
the new nations conflicted. Bela Kun took over in Hungary, 
and Viennese communists, encouraged by the proximity of the 
15 Emmanuel Urbas, 11 How Hungary's Chickens Came Home to 
Roost, 11 Current History, 16:239-257, May, 1922, p. 256. 
12 
revolution, agitated with renewed vigor. 
Disorderly demobilization, heavy~ costs. Austrian 
war casualties numbered 800,000 dead, 4,000,000 wounded. The 
fiscal war cost, exclusive of indemnities, mounted to over 
21 billion dollars. 16 Demobilizing Austrians, repatriating 
prisoners of war and troops of the newly-free succession 
states caused tremendous confusion in Austria. There was no 
gradual demobilization. Armies simply broke up and rushed 
home. 
Czech, Polish and Hungarian soldiers marched home 
through Austria, inhibitions dispelled by the newly-minted 
independence of their homelands. A million Russian and 
Italian prisoners of war were also on the move through the 
country, bound for home and willing to take out on Austria 
some recompense for their imprisonment. 
Mounting unemployment. Austria's own troops consider-
ably aggravated the already serious unemployment situation. 
Many of these jobless soldiers went to Hungary, where the 
never-never land of communism was reputedly established under 
Bela Kun. In April, 1919, a thousand men and their officers 
marched to a Viennese railway station, demanded a special 
train to Budapest. Undaunted by refusal, they amiably waited 
17 
until they could take regular trains out of the country. 
16New ~ Times, January 2, 1919. 
17New ~ Times, April 28, 1919. 
13 
Soaring unemployment figures climbed even higher. 18 
For years military discipline had driven the undernourished 
populace to produce, but when military power crumbled, so did 
the stimulus to work. 19 
Rioting within Austria. The jobless formed mobs easily 
stirred by pleadings of communist agitators. 11 Violent out-
pourings" against the governmentwere expostulated at a 
meeting in Vienna at which fifteen crowns a day were asked for 
20 support of the unemployed. At another assembly in February 
5,000 unemployed listened as communists assailed the govern-
ment for not giving sufficient support to the unemployed. 
Agitators urged crowd members to refuse to pay their rent. 
11 The crowds then proceeded towards the parliament house, 
committing acts of violence and plundering until subdued by 
the police. 1~1 In March the government narrowly averted a 
22 
communist-prompted general railroad strike. 
18see Chapter v. 
l9navid Mitrany, The Effect of the War in Southea$ter~ 
EuroP@ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936}7 p. 171. 
For additional factors contributing to unemployment, see 
Chapter V. 
20 New~ Times, January 28, 1919. 
2lrbid., February 3, 1919. 
22rbid., March 31, 1919. 
14 

An English writer observed, "The only progress is a 
headlong rush into bankruptcy 1 the only mental exercise an 
incessant lamentation because no one is prepared to pour money 
into a bottomless pit. 11 He attacked the "chaotic and ridicu-
lous" constitution of the new republic; criticized a "lunatic" 
law prohibiting a profit of over thirty per cent to merchan-
disers; referred to the all-too-German Austrians as "Orientals;' 
implied that cafes are too full to give credence to stories of 
famine, and declared that the people looked fat enough to him. 
He is the one visitor who was not entranced by the Austrian 
II 
gemutlichkeit. 11 I have now spent over a year among theg:11" he 
wrote resignedly, 11 and never cease to be astonished by the 
extent of their fecklessness. 1126 However, the feverish gaiety 
of Vienna, the hectic night life that prompted this sort of 
2? 
criticism concealed dire poverty. 
In January, 1919, the first relief food from the 
British arrived, but subsequent shipments came slowly. Dr. 
Victor Brauneis, of the Austrian Treasury department, said in 
Paris that of 24,000 tons of relief food shipments expected 
26Herbert Vivian, 11 The Embers of Austria," Fortnightl;r, 
117:321-31, February, 1922. 
2?shops were open and, except for food stores, well 
stocked. Theaters were crowded; football games drew record 
crowds. But beggars expressed extravagant gratitude for a 
twenty-heller piece, which was only a little over a cent, and 
a coffee- house waiter was making less than ten crowns daily. 
The cost ·of living at a moderate hotel was about 150 crowns 
per day. (New~ Times, April 28, 1919.) 
16 
from the Allies in February, only 8,000 arrived. 28 Sir 
William Beveridge, British representative on an interallied 
commission investigating conditions in Austria, estimated an 
800,000 ton cereal deficiency which would last until harvest 
time. He urged that the Allies regard the war with Austria 
as over, not because of any special claim of Austrians on 
\iestern benevolence, but because the country was so completel y 
smashed that wartime standards could no longer apply. He 
suggested that Austria be assisted in obtaining a minimum of 
supplies until the harvest and that everything possible be 
done to restore an interchange of commodities. 29 
In March, 1919, the Supreme Allied Council voted to 
advance Au s tria $30,000,000, with France, Great Britain and 
Italy contributing. The money wa s slow in coming, the amount 
insufficient. In early summer the minister of food supply 
tried to obtain grain from Yugoslavia and Argentina-- in vain. 
By the end of 1919, the food situation was still deteriorating. 
In December, Dr. Renner's efforts in Paris to obtain food and 
30 
credits met with limited succe s s. 
28Brauneis was a member of a delegation sent to Paris to 
confer with Britain, France and the United States on economic 
problems of Austria. (~ York Times, February 22, 1919.) 
29New ~ Times, March 15, 1919. · 
30M. Margaret Ball, ~-War German-Austrian Relations, 
The Anschluss Movement, 1918-~ -r8tanford University, Cal-
ifornia: St anford University Press, 1937), p. 27. 
17 
Conflict QE Austria's borders. Although food was the 
most critical of Austria's economic problems in 1919, it was 
not the only difficulty. Lack of coal and transport tie-ups 
31 
also hindered revival of industry. In addition, animosity 
of other Succession states toward Austria complicated transport 
and raw material problems. This tension sometimes flared into 
armed conflict, particularly in Carinthia, whose ownership was 
disputed by Yugoslavia, and in the Burgenland, awarded to 
Austria at Saint Germain but long a Hungarian territory. 
Czechoslovakig. Most of Austria's neighbors were also 
passing through unsettled times; all of them saw in the post-
war crisis an ideal opportunity to extend their frontiers as 
far as possible. In the melee, they battled not only Austria 
but also each other. The confusion failed to expedite coal 
to Austria. Czech Premier Kramarcz rationalized: 
The Poles have occupied the mining districts 
of Silesia, and have seized the Haschau-Oderberg 
railroad. We are accused of not sending enough 
coal to Vienna, but soon we ourselves will be 
depleted of coal.32 
Kramarcz, quoted in an interview to Le Temps, also 
declared, with one eye on Austria, "Bohemia needs a strong 
33 
army to defend itself against its enemies. 11 
3lsee Chapter V. 
32New Yor~ Times, January 1?, 1919. 
33Ibid. 
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The Czechs used rifles and bayonets to prevent would-be 
Austrians from holding elections for the Austrian national 
assembly in lands Czechoslovakia claimed. Karlsbad, Sternberg, 
34 Reichenberg, Aussig, Bruex and Eger reported fatalities. 
Austria reciprocated: Czechoslovakia charged that 400,000 
Czechs in Vienna were prevented from voting in the first elec-
tions to the Austrian assembly and that; moreover, Vienna mobs 
victimized sympathizers with Czech independence. 35 On the 
whole, however, Austria maintained better relations with the 
Czechs during the immediate postwar period than with either 
Hungary or Yugoslavia. 
Yugosla~ia. Carinthia, where Austrian and Yugoslavian 
territorial ambitions conflicted, had a rural Slav, and an 
urban German population. The fight raged over possession of 
the Klagenfort basin. 36 Yugoslavs charged Austrian atroci-
ties against Slavs, particularly against priests, nuns, 
children, women. Impassioned prose appealed to world opinion 
to save 11 Slovene Carinthia, which is dying under the German 
34Ibid., March 7, 1919. 
35Ibid., March 1, 1919. 
36 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the ~vorld 11J'ar, 
~ ~ Collection of Official Documents, I ,(Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), pp. 163-205. 
Pages 171-205 are particularly good for the manifestations of 
Yugoslav-Austrian rivalry in the area. 
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yoke, but which wishes to live, to be liberated, and united 
with their brothers in race.n37 Eventually, after a plebiscite 
in the Klagenfort area, Austria received this part of 
Carinthia. 38 
Hungary. Ideological, as well as territorial, diffi-
culties hampered Austria 1 s relations with Hungary. A neutral 
observer of the revolution in Hungary, Austria earned the 
amity of neither communists nor counterrevolutionaries as each 
successively used Vienna as a little Switzerland and succes-
sively accused Austria of harboring its enemies. Guerrilla 
warfare between the two countries erupted over award of the 
Burgenland to Austria. 39 In a moment of enthusiasm for the 
oft-flagging principle of national self-determination, the 
Western Powers gave this Hungarian territory with a German 
population to Austria. 
Provincial rebellions harass Socialists. Internal 
strife added to the Social Democrats 1 task of keeping order. 
37New York Times, May 25, 1919. 
38 \'fambaugh, .212· cit., p. 200. 
39Allied and Associated Powers, Traite de~ ent~e 
les puissances alliees et associees et L1 autriche, protocple 
~ declarations, signes ~ Saint-Germain-~-Laye, le 10 
septembre ~. 1919. (Subsequently cited as Treaty with 
Austria. ) Article 27, part 5, "Avec la Hongrie, 11 p. 29. 
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The national constitution left great power in the hands of 
the laender ~ (states). Evidently anticipating union with 
Germany, the framers considered that institution of a highly 
organized national government would be wasted effort. 
The provinces took advantage of the situation. Salzbur 
even established an autonomous government and refused to hand 
.over taxes to Vienna. 40 Vorarlberg, disheartened by the 
prospect of being tied to a debt-ridden, unproductive state, 
attempted, after a plebiscite, to join Switzerland. Only the 
reluctance of the l~tter country prevented consummation of the 
move. Tyrol joined the separatist move, choosing Germany 
rather than Switzerland, but with no more success than 
41 Vorarlberg. 
Summary. Austrians looked to Anschluss in 1919. They 
looked to union with Germany to save them from starvation, 
unemployment and the confusion of demobilization, internal 
revolts and guerrilla fighting. Anschluss became the primary 
objective of Austria's dominant postwar party, the Social 
Democrats. 
40 New York Times, May 20, 1919. 
41 Wambaugh, ~· ~., pp. 545 f. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICu AND ANsCHLUSS: SOCIALISTS FAIL AUSTRIA 
To an American, Austria Rugge~ts Straus~ waltzes and 
Hapaburg emperor~. He think~, when he hearR that country 1 g 
name, of ~idewalk cafes, of coffee house6 and. of adroitly-
garbed women. The connotation~ of Vienna are for him sweeter 
than those of Paris and only slightly less compelling. A bar 
or so from a Straus~ waltz can bring an unidentifiable 
nostalgia to someone who haq never left Indiana. Here is an 
11 
extension, perhaps, of the celebrated Vienne~e gemutlichkeit. 
This untranslatable word implies gaiety, carefreeness, frater-
1 nity--and laziness. M. W. Fodor writes, "The secret of the 
Viennese is that they have discovered how to combine a minimum 
of work with the maximum of the amenities of life.n2 
Such a pleasant objective seemed chimerical to Au8tri-
ans during the interwar years. Only with difficulty can one 
" a s sociate the concept of gemutlichkeit with the AuRtri a to 
which the Socialist party fell heir in 1919. 
1M. W. Fodor, Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937) p. 3; G. E. R. Gedye, 
Betrayal in Central Europe (Fourth edition; New York: Harper 
and Brother~, 1939) p. 8. 
2Fodor, lac. cit. 
In 1919, the death rattle of the dual monarchy seemed 
to drown out the weak cries of the newborn republic. The 
:socialists were to head an Austria whose citizens were starv-
ing, whose industries had ground to a near stop and whose 
morale was shattered. 
RISE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
Leaders inexperienced politically. Hesitatingly, 
earnestly, the Social Democrats moved into Austria's political 
vacuum. Politically inexperienced party leaders faced a 
challenge that would test the experienced politician and 
parliamentarian. 3 With virtual anarchy confronting them, thei 
first political task was to set up a democratic constitution, 
their most immediate pragmatic concern--the food shortage. 
Karl Renner, Karl Seitz, Julius Deutsch, Dr. Otto Bauer 
and the Adlers, Victor and Friedrich--these are the prime 
names of the non-communist, Marxist movement in Austria. One, 
Friedrich Adler, was a political assassin pardoned in a gen-
4 
eral amnesty in the last days of the imperial regime. Victor 
Adler and Deutsch were journalists. Bauer was a theoretician 
and historian. Seitz was to become the beloved . mayor of 
3Germains, QQ. cit., p. 45. 
4Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse. of ~ 
Aus!£Q-Hungarian Empire (Translator, Ian F. D. Morrow; 
London: Dent, 1930), p. 5. 
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V. 5 :t.enna. Of all, Renner most nearly combined devotion to 
socialism with political acumen. 
To these men fell the mantle of Austrian leadership in 
autumn, 1918. Although unused to the toga, they contributed 
substantial achievements to the 't-.relfare of the republic before 
they lost control in 1920. 
Leadership confirmed in 1919 elections. From a per spec-
tive of ten elapsed years, Dr. Karl Renner 't.Yro te, 11 Hi story will 
one day record that alone the Social Democratic Labor party did 
not lose its head, but found a way out of the chaos and took 
the lead. 116 The party took the lead under conditio ns of ap-
palling difficulty as the first election in the new republic, 
in February, 1919, confirmed the party 's assumption of leader-
ship by giving it seventy-two seats in parliament . The Social-
ists' nearest rivals, the conservative Chri stian Socialists , 
obtained sixty-nine seat<=~. 7 The Sociali s ts, not having an 
absolute majority , entered into a coalition with the Christian 
Socialists. Karl Renner headed the cabinet as chancellor, 
Karl Seitz assumed the pre sidency and Dr. Otto Bauer held the 
ministries of foreign affairs and of socialization. 8 
5s eitz died in Vienna in February, 1950. {Newsweek , 
February 13, 1950, p. 54.) 
6Karl Renner, quo ted in 11 Austr1a, an runsolved Problem,ru 
Literary Digest, 99:19, December 15, 1928, p. 19. 
?Graham, QQ. cit., p. 145. 
8New York Times, March 18, 1919. 
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Role Q! the Socialists. The newly-elected parliament, 
later known as the constituent assembly, faced two tasks--
writing a constitution and making the peace. It achieved both, 
under Socialist leadership. These were not the only Socialist 
achievements. In the face of threatened anarchy, the Social 
Democratic party managed not only to institute a democratic 
constitution, but al.so to hold together the weak state, to 
give relief to the unemployed, to obtain at least a modicum : of 
food relief and to initiate a foreign policy which presented 
Austrian views to the world with some eventual success, al-
though without immediate tangible result. 
But the party they led failed Austria.9 Its cardinal 
error seems to have been pan-Germanism, its main weakness 
political naivete. Pan-Germanism committed the Socialists to 
a policy of Anschluss. They opposed vital League of Nations 
loans to Austria because of anti-Anschluss provisos on two 
occasions when the need for foreign aid seemed obviously 
critical. 
The Socialist Anschluss plank rendered them eminently 
unfit for reconstructing Austria. By it they were dedicated 
to the proposition that Austria was economically unviable. 
That there was little point in trying to save a state that 
9corroborative material for this statement appears 
later in the chapter. This chapter deals mainly with the 1918-
1920 period when the Socialists were in power, but some of 
their activities which extended into later periods are also 
covered. 
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could not live in any case seemed elementary logic. 
SOCIALISTS' DOMESTIC PROGRAM 
The constitution. Nevertheless, the Socialists set 
about the institution of a state they fondly expected to be 
temporary. The Austrian deputies drafted a constitution 
modeled rather directly on the Swiss cantonal system. The 
federal government's powers were limited. The Nationalrat 
(lower house) was comprised of members elected proportionally 
by equal, direct, secret suffrage of men and women over twenty 
years of age. The Bundesrat (upper house) was elected by 
laender assemblies. The party polling the second highest 
number of laender votes was permitted to send at least one 
representative to the upper house. The federal assembly 
elected the president. 10 
Disposing of the monarchy. With discretion, the Social 
Democrats disposed of the problem of the abdicated emperor • . 
Many of the Socialist leaders themselves felt a certain 
loyalty to Karl. At one time there was even debate as to 
whether the crown should not be ma1nta1ned. 11 
1°Graham, QQ. cit., pp. 166 ff. 
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11Germains wrote, "It is significant of Charles• · char-
acter that, whilst his Empire was · crashing in ruins about him, 
he had to face little personal hostility. Even the Socialists, 
anti-monarchist by conviction and principle, hesitated a great 
deal before putting forward the demand for a Republic." 
(Germains, .£12· cit., p. 48.) ---+==== 
I 
However, the ex-monarch's mere presence stimulated die-
hard monarchist movements, and in January, 1919, the govern-
ment reportedly informed Karl that unless such movements at 
home and abroad were quelled, the ex-emperor would be unwel-
come in the capita1. 12 A few days later Renner called on Karl 
and personally advised him to leave Austria. 13 The Socialist 
victory in the spring elections seemed to indicate that 
Austrians had had enough of this last Hapsburg. 14 Four months 
after his November 11, 1918, abdication, Karl went to Switzer-
land. The republic then abolished the rights and privileges 
of the Hapsburgs and proclaimed itself the owner of the real 
and personal estates of the former imperial house. 15 The 
monarchist movement continued in Austria, even without the 
presence of the ex-monarch, but never represented anything 
strong enough to be called a political force. It was, rather, 
a political whim. 16 
12New ~ Time%, January 21, 1919. 
13Ibid., February 3, 1919. 
14Ibid., March 18, 1919 
15Ibid., March 19, 1919. 
___,__. 
16see Chapter VIII. 
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VIENNESE REFORMS. Interwar Vienna itgelf was the signal 
achievement of the Social Democrat party. The Socialists rode 
to a decisive victory in the 1919 municipal elections and never 
lost their power.l7 The administration held powers unique for 
a municipality. Vienna was not a mere city; she was also one 
of the nine states of Austria. Hence, municipal functionaries 
doubled as state officials. The Socialist administration of 
Vienna achi:eved spectacular social reforms in the interwar era. 
The housing program. The Socialist housing program 
provided attractive homes at rentals of two to three dollars 
a month.l8 Parks surrounded the apartment buildings. Fifty 
per cent of all land acquired by the city was required to be 
left vacant. 
The SOcialists could scarcely have picked a better place 
to begin a housing program. The Vienna of 1917 had her 
Schoenbrunn, but at the same time, seventy-three per cent of 
her population lived in what may well be termed 11 slum 11 dwell-
ings, in a single room or a single room and an entryway. By 
1931, 64,000 apartment dwellings were constructed. The large 
17New York Times, May 8, 1919. The Socialists won 
every election in Vienna, went out only when the party was 
suppressed in 1934. 
18Rental fees were based primarily on maintenance costs. 
For details on operation of the program, see Emmy Freundlich, 
"Municipal Housing Development in Vienna," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 150:225-9, 
July, 1930. 
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gardens which surrounded them gave work to an army of city 
gardeners and play space to Vienna 1 s children. For the first 
time, many Viennese families had at least a minimum of privacy, 
a kitchen sink, gas stove, electric lights and laundry tubs. 
The city could buy land cheaply, and by 1927, Vienna owned 
26.51 per cent of all the land in the city exclusive of street~ 
public squares and rivers. 19 . 
The tax prografi\. In spite of major services, which in 
addition to the spectacular housing projects included such 
items as maternity payments and benefits to the aged and ill, 
the city budget remained solvent. An ingenious tax program 
kept per capita taxes down to within two dollars of those of 
pre-Socialist Vienna, whose slums had been among the worst in 
20 Europe. Typical were the servant tax, and the motor car tax, 
19owners of real estate were glad to get rid of their 
property, since rent ceilings, established during the war, 
were never lifted, making housing property almost valueless. 
An incidental benefit of the housing program was that it eased 
unemployment, provided work to the building trades. Most fam-
ous of the new, Socialist-built apartment dwellings was the 
Karl Marx Hof. (Freundlich, ..QJ2. cit. p. 228:; :. Morrow Mayo, 
11 Vienna 1 s Experience as a Socialist City, 11 Current Historx., 
33:667-72, February, 1931.) The virtually nominal rents gave 
the Socialists a commanding hold on "their urban followers. 
It was perhaps their greatest asset at the polls. 
20Taxes per capita, including federal taxes, totaled 
$21.25 in 1913, $23.33 in 1928. (Mayo, on. cit., p. 669.) 
It has been charged Vienna failed to recover because of the 
11 ruthless 11 tax policy of the Socialists. (A. E. Brettauer, 
11Reply to Schuschnigg, 11 Commonweal, 46:212-13, June 13, 1947, 
p. 212. ) 
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the latter based on horsepower. 21 
Participation in business. The city became one of the 
biggest businesses in Austria, holding some measure of control 
in sixty-six enterprises. It controlled ninety per cent of 
the Agriculture and Afforestation Company, largest agricultural 
enterprise in Austria and holder of most of the former imperial 
lands, and held monopolies in gas, electricity and transporta-
tion.22 There was, additionally, a municipal funeral service, 
municipal advertising agency and municipal brewery, the second 
largest in Austria. 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 
The Social Democratic foreign policy scored less un-
equivocal success than did the party's Viennese reforms. To 
a large degree, the Social Democrats succeeded in propagating 
21The servant tax worked in sharp progression. One 
female domestic was exempted from taxation. A second cost her 
employer $7.50 yearly. Each additional one cost $37.50 yearly, 
plus the tax total for those hired before her. (The tax on a 
third domestic would be $45, on a fourth $82.50.) The rate 
was doubled for males. The Rothschilds paid $46,550 on thirty-
eight dome~tics in 1927. Another mother lode of city revenue 
was a four per cent payroll tax for welfare measures, a tax 
which could not be passed off. The tax was eight and a half 
per cent for banks. Defaulters were liable for multiples of 
the original charge, sometimes for fifty times as much. Amuse-
ment taxes were high, especially on racing and similar items. 
The tax on opera tickets was relatively low. (Mayo,~· £11., 
pp. 668 f.) 
2~~ayo, 2R• ~., pp. 671 f. 
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their concept of Austrian foreign policy. tVhat was questioned, 
however, was the validity of the reasoning behind that concept. 
The Socialist based external policy on one principle--
the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination--and on 
two theses. 
The first thesis: Austria did not possess the means of 
economic viability. 
The second: Austria was not the true heir of the Austro-
Hungarian empire and had no responsibility for the misdeeds 
of that late state. 
The foreign policy that evolved from these three points: 
Since Austria could not live, she must perforce seek union 
either with the other states of the onetime monarchy or with 
Germany. The first alternative was impractical because of the 
animosity among the Succession states. Ergo, one solution was 
left, one to which Austria was entitled not only by the author-
ity of need but also by the Western-touted principle of self-
determination--Anschluss with Germany. So Anschluss became 
the dominant aim of the Social Democratic partyts foreign pol-
icy for most of the interwar pe~iod. 
Self-determination rationalizations. Although Austrian 
Socialists felt that self-determination entitled the~, first 
and foremost, to union with Germany, they also claimed, by the 
same authority, German Bohemia, southern Tyrol and Sudeten 
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lands along the Carpathians and German enclaves in Transyl -
vania.23 An Austrian note to the foreign diplomatic corps at 
Vienna in January, 1919, defined German Austria as including 
"internal Austria," German Bohemia, German Styria, German 
Tyrol and German Carinthia.24 
Renner, no strident expansionist, favored the union of 
both the South German Tyrol and German Bohemia to Austria. 25 
Justifying this view on the basis of self-determination, he 
wrote in 1928: 
In this notable assembly '(the provisional assembly) 
sat also the representatives of the German South 
Tyrol and of the German territory of the present 
day Czechoslovakia. These territories also, by the 
free voice of their people, declared their adher-
ance to German Austria. Had the 11 Right of Self-
De termination" ••• been allowed to have effect, 
this territory would today form part of A~gtria 
with a population of at least 10,000,000. 
Renner also fought vigorously at Versailles for posses-
sion of lands to which Austria could lay claim on linguistic 
23Gra.ham, .Q:Q. cit., p. 138. 
24New York Times, January 3, 1919. 
25New York Times, March 8, 1919. 
2611 Austria, an •unsolved Problem~!! 11 .Q.Q. £il., p. 19. 
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the industrial areas in Upper Silesia, claimed by both the 
Czechs and the Poles on racial grounds, should constitute an 
interstate possession with tripartite administration. The 
Austrians reasoned, seemingly, that when self-determination 
would result in an advantage, it made a potent ideological 
argument; if it would not, and economic interests were at 
stake, interstate possession was advanced. 30 
Austria's new boundaries enclosed virtually no racial 
minorities other than those in long-cosmopolitan Vienna. Many 
Austro-Germans, contrarily, were excluded from Austria . 31 
Protests of the Austrian Socialists resulted in an embarrassing ! 
scrutiny of Allied intents and prompted sympathy for Austria. 
Socialists disown empire. Austria also converted a 
large share of informed world opinion to her contention that 
she should not be blamed for the misdeeds of the old regime. 32 
German Austria, the Socialists averred, never declared war and 
never allied with Germany, but had been at peace with the 
whole world during her brief life. 33 She was yet in the womb 
30Graham, .Q.P. cit. , p. 138. 
31In addition to the 250,000 Germans in the Tyrol, there 
were 3,000,000 settled in Czechoslovakia. (Scott, QQ. cit., 
p. 213. ) 
3~. Margaret Ball writes, for instance, that establish- ! 
ment of the republic of Austria as the legal successor of the 
old empire was a 11 purely arbitrary step on the part of the 
Allied and Associated Powers. 11 (Ball, .Q.P. cit., p. 19.) 
33Graham, op. cit., pp. 138 f. 
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of the empire and no more to blame than her siblings when the 
great war started. If 1 indeed, the Czechs and South Slavs 
could be called Allies, ~urely German Au~tria and Hungary 
were at least neutrals. 
Social Democrat Karl Seitz tried to explain to a 
seemingly den~e France the innocence of Au~tria: 
A misunder~tanding regarding the pre~ent status 
of German Austria is apparent in the outside world •.. 
The belief is general that it is merely the shrunken 
remains of the old monarchy minus the States which 
have e~tabli~hed their own governments. German 
Au~tria today is no more the shrunken remains of 
the old State than Czeghoslovakia or Hungary. It 
i~ simply an entity ..• 4 
Au~trian pleas of innocence to any part in doing~ of 
the dual monarchy became even more impassioned at the prospect 
of being saddled with the war debts of the old duo-domain. 
Austria wanted a pro rata sharing of war loan debts with the 
other Succesqion qtates. A former finance mini~ter argued that 
during the war the Slav politicians professed loyalty to the 
Austrian war policy and did not attack validity of the obliga-
tions at that time. Moreover, olavs enjoyed immen~e war 
profits, and Slav banks applied for war loan ~ubscriptions a~ 
promptly as German in~titution~.35 
Seitz protested in May, 1919: 
34~ York Time~, January 29, 1919. 
35New York Time~, March 5, 1919. 
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If the Allie~ give our German provinces to 
the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs without making 
the new owner~ take up the burden in the way of 
taxation and war debt~, it will mean bankruptcy.36 
Although Austria was made to as~ume the war debt for the em-
pire, qualifying provisions lightened the burden greatly.37 
QueRtion of Sociali8t pacifism. The Socialist~ 
Pilate-like disclaimer of responsibility for aggressions of 
the monarchy might hav·e been more becoming had not Socialist 
elements them~elves supported the war. But reports of the 
extent to which Socialists lent their arm and voice to the 
military effort vary all the way from Steg's declaration that 
11 
••• the Social Democrats 'tvere a11~rays eager to attack the pol-
icies of the government. They were •.. ardent pacifist8, work-
ing openly for withdrawal of Austria from the war, 11 to 
Germains' a~sertion that the 11 Au1=1trian Socialist~ •.. howled for 
war just as loudly as any other party in Austria. 'll38 
Explanation for this divergence seems to be that the 
party switched policies mid-war. Renner and the older Adler 
(Victor) defended the venture in the early stages, but as Dr. 
Otto Bauer and the younger Adler (Friedrich) gained influence 
in the par t y, the Social Democrats became an active revolution-
ary force, working with nationalist groups for abolition of the 
36Ibid 
-· 
37scott, gn. cit., pp . 221 f. 
38Benjamin Steg, 11 Underlying Causes of Political Cri~is 
in Austri~, 11 translator, Charles Plotkin; Current History, 
31 :514-519, December, 1929, p . 515; Germains, ~· £11., p . 69. 
36 
dynasty and the end of the war.39 
At any rate, in January, 1918, the Arbeiter Zeitung, 
a Socialist organ, published an official manifesto of the 
party declaring that the people would not continue the war for 
the sole purpose of setting the emperor of Austria on the 
throne of Poland or of making it possible for the king of 
Prussia to establish an economic and military dictatorship 
40 
over Lithuania and Courland. The Socialist leaders conven-
iently forgot that most of them were 't'rell tainted by the 
11 imperialist 11 war, that the Arbeiter Zeitung originally de-
fended it editorially and that some of the inconstant 11 paci-
fists11 had even been volunteer soldiers fighting in it. 41 The 
fact is that Socialist policy switched to forthright criticism 
1 of the war only after Austrian defeat appeared probable. 
Possibly Austrian socialism's pacifist ideals were not clearly 
defined before World War I. 
~economic unviability complex. The party attained 
even greater success in propagating the idea that Austria 
"could not live 11 within her curtailed boundaries than in 
spreading her disclaimer of Hapsburg wrongdoings. Economic 
39c. A. Macartney, The Social Revolution 1n Austria 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1929), p. 73. 
40navid F. Strong, Austria, October 1918-March, 1919 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 19391 p. 77. 
41Germains, ~· ~., p. 70. Bauer is mentioned par-
ticularly. 
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difficultie~ stemming from her shrunken status provided a 
rationalization for the Anschluss move. 
Most of the prominent Austrian Socialists went on record 
for the thesis that the new Austria was not economically viabl~ 
Dr. Karl Renner wrote in 1928: 
Thus, there was created a State-form unfitted to 
live at all, with a State capital--the fourth largest 
in Europe--having prac tically no economic hinterland ••. 
It is precisely as tho Paris, with a few neighboring 
departments, were to be surrounded with high customs 
walls and declared to be an independent state. 
The state thus created was forbidden in the Treaty 
of Saint Germain to unite with other Germans of Europe 
in a common state, despite the fact that for centuries 
Vienna herself was the capital of the Empire of the 
Germans • . 
All the greater difficulties with which the 
Austrian Republic has had to contend during these ten 
years can be traced back to these unhappy provisions 
of the Treaty of Saint Germain ••• 42 
Averred Seitz, in 1919: 
We interpret President : Wilson's statement re-
garding the right of self-determination in the 
sense that we can join our mother country, Germany, 
because only in that way can our national and 
economic conditions of existence be assured and 
future wars avoided.43 
Later the same year he was more vehement: 11 I wish to say in 
the most solemn manner that Austria is doomed to die if she is 
not permitted to join Germany. \ve cannot live alone.n44 
42 11 Austria an 'Unsolved Problem, 1 11 Q12.. cit., p. 19. 
43New York Times, January 29, 1919. 
44 Ibid., May 28, 1919. 
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Dr. Bauer in 1919 ~Tote of the An~chluss movement: 
~ve had to convince the statesmen of the Entente 
powers tha t German Au~tria, thrown back on herself, 
was incapable of life; that a confederation of the 
Succesqion States waq bound to break down over the 
oppo~ition of Czechoslovakia and Yugo Slavia; and 
that consequently union with Germany wa~ the only 
pos ~ible way to avert the complete economic collapse 
of Austria and the severe ~ocial convul~ions and 
~erious danger of war in Central Europe.45 
Gradually the thesis of Austriats economic incompetence 
permeated the Western a~ well aCJ the Austrian world. Professor 
Gottfried Haberler, former Austrian and League of Nations 
economist now at Harvard, says that the doctrine of Austria's 
economic nonviabili ty gained general acceptance in responsible 
European circles. Notably the English, who feared Anschlu ss 
less than the French, took this view. 46 Kurt von Schuschnigg, 
laqt chancellor of Austria before the Nazi invasion, declares 
that League state~men generally considered the Treaty of 
Saint Germai n a "glaring blunder. 047 
Wes tern journalists took up the theme. The Manchester 
Guardian corre~pondent wrote: 
The reasons for Austri a 's unhappy conditions 
are many. But they nearly all go ba ck, directly 
or indirectly, to the Treaty of Saint Germain, 
which gave the best and richest part of the old 
Austrian Empire to Czechoslova~ia, Italy and Jugo-
Slavia, leaving the new Austrian republic with 
45Bauer, ~· cit., p. 115. 
46Gottfried von Haberler, interviewed, December 3, 1949 
47Kurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requie~ (Translator, 
Franz von -Hildebrand; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons , 1946), 
p . \. 138. 
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only the barren, tho beautiful Alpine lands and 
a huge capital city cut off from its markets and 
sources of raw materials.48 
G. E. R. Gedye, London journalist, also joined the chorus: 
Had we of the victorious Entente shown le s s 
vindictiveness toward the German subjects of the 
Hapsburgs, and less extreme generosity at their 
expense to tbe Hapsburg's Slav subjects--and 
toward Italy--had we either seen that they had 
as fair a chance of economic health as Czechoslovakia 
or Jugoslavia--or even Hungary--instead of throwing 
the Austro-Germans the bone of present day Austria 
to live on when the meat had been cut away by 
others, and on top of that, forbidden them to seek 
sustenance at the table of the German Reich ..• 
Austria would never have become a danger spot in 
Europe •.• 49 
Much more recently we have the view of Howard K. Smith: 
The cardinal fact about Austria is that she 
cannot possibly be an independent nation in any 
real sense. Before Anschluss she lived on dole s 
from the West and her figances were a virtual 
branch of Western banks. 0 
THE SOCIALIST HAND IN ANSCHLUSS 
Although Austria eventually convinced many in the ~vest 
that she was not viable economically, she was unable to win 
her case a t the time she most wanted Anschluss, i. e., immed-
lately after World War I. Initially, Austria did not doubt 
48 nAustria as the Sick \'loman of Europe, 11 Literary 
Digest, 103:14-15, December 14, 1929, p. 14. 
49Loc. cit. 
50Howard K. Smith, The State of Europ9 (New York: Knopf 
Publishers, 194~, p. 135. 
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Anschluss would come about. Immediately after establishment 
of the republic in 1919 she took steps to"torard the merger. 
The assembly resolutions. On November 12, 1919, the 
proviAional assembly resolved that: 
German-Austria is a constituent part of the 
German republic. Special laws shall regulate the 
participation of German-Austria in the law-making 
and administration of the German republic, as 
well as the extension of the sphere of validity 
of the laws and institutions of the German repub-
lic to German Austria.51 
The following spring, the constituent assembly incor-
porated the November 12th resolution as part of the organic 
law of Austria.: 
· The Constituent National Assembly repeats, 
confirms and formally establishes the resolution 
of the Provisional National Assembly ..• as follows: 
1. German-Austria is a democratic republic. 
All public authority is instituted by the People. 
2. German-Austria is a constituent part of the 
German Reich.52 
The constitution further provided that departments of 
foreign affairs, army, food and traffic would continue only 
until union with Germany could be achieved. 53 
Popular feeling !Q! Anschluss. Sentiment throughout the 
country overwhelmingly favored Anschluss; its achievement was 
51Ball, QQ. cit., pp. 8 f. 
52 Ibid. I pp. 10 f. 
53 New York Times, May 15, 1919. 
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taken almost for granted. The French ascribed Austrian 
Anschluss sentiment to German propaganda, butthis seems to 
have been but wishful thinking. 54 The estimate of Baron Haupt, 
Austrian minister to Switzerland, who considered sentiment in 
his homeland evenly divided between independence and union wit 
Germany, seems distinctly conservative. 55 Edmund von Glaise-
Horstenau claims that the starving Austrians forgot their 
cares in anticipation of union with Germany, that Anschluss 
was the only bracing factor in their dark vista of the future~6 
The Socialists considered the 1919 election a popular mandate 
for union with Germany, although the campaign was not waged 
exclusively on the Anschluss issue. 57 
Technical progress. Actual technical planning for the 
union progressed. The countries reached agreement on questions 
of principle regarding integration of railroads, introduction 
of the mark as the Austrian currency unit and indemnities. 58 
Versailles ~ QU Anschluss. Eventually, the anxious, 
anti-Anschluss voices in the West 11vere heard in Austria, 
54Ibid., January 26, 1919. 
55 New York Times, January 7, 1919. 
56Glaise-Horstenau, 22• cit., p. 285. 
57 ~ York Times, February 20, 1919. 
58
rbid., March 6, 1919. 
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disrupting her serenity over the merger plans. By late spring, 
Austrian leaders realized that the Entente opposition made 
immediate Anschluss highly unlikely. France, particularly, 
opposed the union. 
With the news that the treaty with Germany virtually 
banned Anschluss, Austrian Socialists despaired of early 
achievement of their pet project. Article 80 of the Versaille. 
pact provided that: 
Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly 
the independence of Austria within the frontiers 
which may be fixed in a treaty between that State 
and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; 
she agrees that this independence shall be in-
alienable, except with the consent of the Council 
of the League of Nations.59 
Even terms of the Versailles treaty not explicitly 
aimed at quashing Anschluss dampened Austrian politicians• 
sentiment for the project. The French wish to make Germany's 
indemnities severe enough to proscribe Austrian agitation for 
Anschluss came close to achievement. A speaker in the Austria 
assembly commenting on the Versailles terms said, 11 I t would 
II 60 be madness to unite with a nation subject to such measures. 
Nonetheless, several ardent pro-Anschluss politicians 
61 
made up the Austrian delegation to Saint Germain. Some 
59Allied and Associated Powers, 11 Treaty of Peace \Vi th 
Germany," International Conciliation, No. 42, September, 1919, 
p. 995. 
60New York Time~, May 10, 1919. 
61Ibid. 
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Socialists, incensed by the Versailles prohibition of 
Anschluss, had demanded a boycott of the peace conference. 62 
1vhen it became certain Anschluss would be prohibited, Dr. 
Otto Bauer resigned his post as foreign minister, thus throw-
ing the burden of treaty negotiations on Dr. Renner. 
Article 88 bans Anschluss. Chancellor Renner, pro-
Anschluss but more moderate than some of his political com-
rades, relinquished his hopes for union with Germany even 
before the conference opened: 
The Austrian people must suffer for the mis-
deeds of their rulers. We never wanted the war 
and we were not guilty of bringing it about. I 
will do my best to secure better terms (than 
Germany's) for ourselves.63 
The ban on Anschluss comprised Article 88 of the Saint Germain 
treaty: 
The independence of Austria is inalienable 
otherwise than with the consent of the League 
of Nati. ons. Consequently, Austria unde r takes in 
the absence of the consent of the said Council, 
(League of Nations Council) to abstain from any 
act which might directly or indirectly or by any 
means whatever compromise her independence, 
particularly, and until her admission to the mem-
bership of the League of Nations, by ~articipa­
tion in the affairs of another Power. 4 
~ teps to·ward Anschluss retraced. Docile Austria took 
62Ibid., May 11, 1919. 
63Ibid. 
-64Allied and Associated Powers, Treaty With Austria , 
~cit., Article 88, p. 49. 
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the necessary legal steps to conform to the Allied decision. 
The Austrian assembly passed a law, October 21, 1919, inval-
idating the resolution of November, 1918, and the law of March 
12, 1919, which had proclaimed Austria a part of the German 
republic. The assembly also ackno\orledged the boundaries 
determined by the treaty and changed the name of the new re-
public from German Austria to the Republic of Austria. 65 
. The provincial plebiscites. This might have been ex-
pected to end the Anschluss movement, but it did not. Immed-
iately after the treaty was signed, strong, strident Anschluss 
movements sprang up in Tyrol and Salzburg. 66 Beset Chancellor 
Renner discouraged leaders of these illicit movements, point-
ing out that any attempt to soon revise the treaty would have 
6? little success. Undampened by the Renner advice, the merger 
advocates continued to agitate. Resultant demonstrations 
ruffled the Allies, but, despite pressure from them, the gov-
ernment found itself incapable of controlling the Anschluss 
sentiments it had so long fomented. 
Tyrol held an Anschlus s plebiscite April 24, 1921, in 
68 
which 98.6 per cent of those voting favored union with Germany. 
Syria and Salzburg, spurred by this venture, made plans for 
65Ball, .Q.P. cit., p. 18. 
66Ball, QP. cit. , pp. 29 ff. 
67Ibid _., p. 32. 
68Ibid. I p. 35. 
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their own plebiscites. Temperate Socialist leaders at this 
time were trying to contain, if not halt, the Anschluss move-
ment. They realized it was a political impracticality in 
view of Austria's need for Entente aid. But neither the 
Renner cabinet nor two successive ones of Dr. Mayr could cope 
with Anschluss agitation. The movement abated eventually when 
Dr. Johann Schober, police president of Vienna, became chan-
cellor.69 
Anschluss organizations. Anschluss agitation recurred 
throughout the 20 1 s and the early 30 1 s. During the 20•s, 
several organizations carried on Anschluss activity in defiance 
of the Allied edict. The Deutsch-Oesterreichische 
Arbeitsgemunschaft (German-Austrian Labor Association) made 
studies of the technical problems of Anschluss. 70 Its five 
functioning committees dealt with subjects ranging from edu-
cation and art to legal codes and journalistic practice. 
Unification of legal codes progressed most rapidly. 71 
The Deutsch-Oesterreichische Volksbund (German-Austrian 
Popular Union) concentrated on pro-Anschluss propaganda. Its 
principal triumph was the conversion of a Vienna music 
69Ibid., p. 38. 
70pasvolsky, "Obstacles to the Union of Austria with 
Germany," Current History, 31:520-8, December, 1929, p. 526. 
71Harry J. Carman and Samuel McKee, Jr., The Teutonic 
Countries: 11 The Anschluss Movement, Union of Austria with 
Germany," Current History, 30:1153-54, September, 1929, 
p. 1153. 
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their homeland, ridiculed her postwar extremities. They 
opposed a League loan in 1923 because of its anti-Anschluss 
proviso. Even the tactful, moderate Renner sounded dogmatic 
in his oppo sition: 
Of course we all know that as things are now, 
Austria has no future. We can keep ourselves 
a l ive jus t until the hour of liberation strikes; 
that is, until we as Germans can decide in 
favour of the state to which we belong by the 
na ture of thing s . 73 
Currently , Dr. Renner has forgotten, apparently, the early 
stand of the Socialists for Anschluss. He maintains that the 
Anschlus s ceased to be an issue in the late 20 1 s, but in 1928, 
he himse l f was attributing many of Austria's ills to the ban 
74 
on union 't'li th Germany. 
To t he postwar aura of disillusion and decayed hopes 
that gripped Austria, the Socialists added their own dis sonant 
pessimism, further worsening a faltering morale. Strangely, 
their pe s si mism did not extend to their one-time ally, Germany. 
Socialis t writings devoted strangely little criticism to the 
northern brother's past, which was surely as imperialist as 
any. 
Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg ha s declared that it was not 
enough t o be against the Nazis, that one must have been 
73schuschnigg, Mx Au s tria (Translator, John Segrue; New 
York: A. A. Knopf, 1938), p. 74. 
74 Renner, 11 Austria, Key for ilfar and Peace, 11 .912.· cit., 
p. 596; Renner, 11 Ten Years of the Austria's Republic," "ffiition, 
127:583-584, November 28, 1928, p . 583. 
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against Anschluss, too. 75 Possibly he is right. Certainly 
the Anschluss agitation made union even with Nazi Germany 
attractive to many people who otherwise would not have 
favored a Hitlerian regime. To this agitation, the Socialists 
contributed more than their share. 
Wasted leadership. What is most stultifying and dismal 
about the Socialist Anschluss position, though, is that it 
diverted the most virile source of political leadership from 
consideration of maintaining a separate political existence 
for Austria. Blindly committed to the 11 could not live 11 thesis, 
the Socialists were eminently unfitted for leading a recon-
struction program. And yet, they were the Austrian element 
best fitted to maintain democracy and social progress in 
Austria. Their principal political opponents, the Christian 
Social~ s ts, were weighed down with conservative, monarchial 
elements , which eventually captured that party. Whereas the 
young emperor, Karl, abdicated from the Austrian throne when 
he was no longer needed, the Socialist party in effect abdi-
cated when the need for them was greatest. 
Socialists' enigma. Strangest facet of Socialist 
Anschlus s agitation is that the move seemed completely naive. 
No one in interwar Austria had any way of knowing 'whether 
Anschlus s would aid the country economically. Like Germany's, 
75
schuschnigg, 11 Austrian Apologia, 11 CommomN"eal, 
45:606-10, April 4, 1947, p. 610. 
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Austria' s was an industrial economy. It is at least as log-
ical to a ssume that Austria and Germany would compete with 
each other as it is to assume they would complement each other 
in the e conomic sphere. 
Socialists evidently never considered that any union 
between the two states could scarcely be on equal terms be-
cause of the overwhelming preponderance of Germany in size, 
resource s , population. Prussia, not Austria, would in all 
probabi li ty have dominated any such union. 
Socialist clamor for Anschluss , was a spectacle more 
than faintly akin to a Little Red Riding Hood courting a Wolf. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICS AND ANSCHLUSS 
CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS FAIL AUSTRIA 
The s tory of the Christian sociali s t regime in Austria 
i~ the story of three men, ~ucces~ively the leaders of their 
party. One Waq a prie~t, one a farmer, another a professor. 
Under the prie~t, Auqtria re-entered the community of nations 
and staged an almoat ~pectacular financial recovery. Under 
the farmer, Austria became an authoritarian state. Under the 
profeq~or , Austria continued aq a dictatorqhip and became the 
first victim of Nazi aggression. 1 
Because all three men are controversial figures, so is 
the partyte record. Though their personalities differed 
sharply, all were Catholics, all Christian Socialistq. The 
devotion of all to the ideals of democracy iq, however, open 
to question. Two were heirs rather than ordinary political 
successors. The physically tiny husbandman, Engelbert Dollfuss, 
was a protege of the cleric, Ignaz Seipel, and when Dollfusq 
1Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg has diqclaimed being a dicta-
tor. speaking of the regime in which both he and Dollfuss 
qerved ac.o headq of state, he writes, 11 Some label the regime as 
a 1Burocra.tic semi-Dictatorship. 1 This may approach the truth, 
even "~~<Then a minor prerequisite quite definitely waq lacking--
there was actually no dictator. 11 (Kurt von Schuschnigg, 
letter to this writer, February 10, 1950.) 
lay dying of a Nazi-inflicted wound, he suggested the professor, 
Kurt von Schuschnigg, for the chancellorship. 
Their party, the Christian Socialists, took power in 
the extreme economic depression of 1920 and obtained an inter-
? 
national loan saving Austria from bankruptcy.~ The Christian 
Socialis t s shifted the orientation of Austria's foreign policy 
from the unrealistic goal of Anschluss toward friendship with 
the West and the other Succession states. When Austria again 
mired in the economic sloughs of the postwar world in 19321 the 
Christian Socialists obtained a new League-backed loan. 
Prime entry on the credit side of the party's ledger is 
its five - year resistance to the Nazis. From 1933 until 1938 1 
this party, which previously alienated almost half its poten-
tial support against Hitler, stood alone against German 
aggression. However, as fatefully as had the Socialists, the 
Christian Socialists failed in Austria~ They brought the re-
public to fascism before Nazism and to dictatorship before 
Hitler. 
THE SEIPEL DECADE 
The Seipel personality. When Monsignor Ignaz Seipel 
took over the chancellorship of Austria in 1922, mounting 
national debt faced him and national bankruptcy threatened. 
2see Chapter v. 
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Two years later, however, Austria's budget was balanced. The 
priest chancellor who largely achieved this is one of the 
enigmatic figures of interwar Austria. From 1922 until 1932, 
both in and out of the chancellorship, he dominated Austrian 
politics. Although both Dollfuss and Schuschnigg are better 
known, they were merely his lieutenants in the Christian Sociar · 
1st party. A cleric, an ascetic, a diabetic, he capably guided 
the infant republic through its most difficult years, and, some 
think, down the road toward a fascist dictatorship he never 
lived to see. 
~ political a8sets. Called a "monarchist by convic-
tion and a republican by resignation, 11 Seipe 1 had enormouR 
political talent and a firm grasp of political realities. 3 
Ris contemporaries nicknamed him 11 Austrichelieu 11 (Austria's 
4 Riche lieu) and other sobriquets even less flattering. Dr. 
Martin Fuchs of the Austrian Foreign Office considered him a 
political genius whose talent was wasted on the tiny stage 
interwar Austria provided. 5 
3seipel had been a member of the dual-monarchy 
government. 
4 G. E. R. Gedye, QQ.~., p. 29. Gedye also reports 
that Seipel came to be known as the 11 cardinal without mercy" 
because of a speech in w.hich he declared there would be 
"no mercy" for rioters who set fire to the hall of justice. 
( loc. ci t . ) 
5 Loc. cit. 
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If Seipel was a personal enigma, he was even more a 
political one. G. E. R. Gedye tells of his adroitness at 
begging a political question. 6 The fact that one can find 
conflicting reports on his attitude toward Anschluss, perhaps 
the prime political question of the day for his country, 
evidence s his talent for politic ambiguities. 7 The monsignor : 
possessed the diplomat 1 s asset--a poker face. This was for-
· tunate, for when he came into the chancellorship Austria held 
a wretched poker hand. 
Conditions in Austria before the first League loan. As 
the Social Democrats left the government coalition after 
6Ibid., p. 32. Gedye interviewed the monsignor and · 
when politiCal difficulties arose over Gedye 1 s story, Seipel 
blamed Gedye's unfamiliarity with the language. 
7Possibly Seipel was anti-Anschluss, but so often he 
counted on the Pan-German party to bolster his coalition that 
he thought it inexpedient to openly flout the idea. Both pro 
and anti-Anschluss groups claimed the monsignor favored their 
solution after this 1929 speech: 11 There are poli ticie.ns who 
believe the only way out for Austria is Anschluss, and others 
who believe Anschluss would ruin Austria. Both are wrong 
because they identify the Austrian idea with politics. Austria 
is determined by race, geography , culture and economic life, 
not by frontiers. Austria carried culture to its Eastern 
neighbor s . It must remain open always for the influx and 
efflux of men and ideas. 
"Germany failed in 1866, '\'.rhen, misled by the example of 
Italy, she tried to form a purely national State, leaving out 
Austria. It may be easily understood that the present 
economic negotiations betv.reen Austria and Germany are different 
as their economic life never was based on collaboration but on 
parallel ac ti vi ty. 11 (Carman and McKee, .QJ2. cit. , p. 1154. ) 
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autumn elections in 1920, the country faced a darkening 
economic vista. 8 Conditions had retrogressed since the immed-
iate postwar period. · The hardships and afrlictions of peace 
seemed worse, if possible, than those of war, particularly to 
Austrians on fixed incomes. Inflation effectually wiped out 
their savings. Cost of living figures rapidly became multiples 
of themselves. Most retail prices doubled during the single 
month of November, 1921--and this was but the early pha se of 
the inflat ion spiral. 9 
For some time, a government subsidy kept bread prices 
below the cost of production. However, in 1922 the government, 
with bankruptcy portending, halted the subsidy. Employers in-
creased wages to prevent bread costs from affecting the worker, 
but even this failed to help the large Viennese white collar 
8 The elections of October 17, 1920, brought no change in 
the chancellorship despite the fact the Christian Socialists 
replaced the Socialists as the large s t party in parliament. 
Since the previous June, when the second Renner cabinet re-
signed, Dr. Michael Mayr, a Christian Socialist, had headed 
the gover nment, and he continued to hold the reins after his 
party's vi ctory. Unable to hold in check the pro-Anschluss 
sentimen t of some provinces, whose agitation occasioned Allied 
threats tha t they would allow Slav occupation of Carinthia , 
Mayr resigned in June, 1921. Dr. Johann Schober, police pres-
ident of Vienna, succeeded him and was himself replaced by 
Seipel. The Schober cabinet fell over opposition to the Treaty 
of Lana wi th Czechoslovakia, a trea t y flouting pan-German 
sentiment. (Graham, QR._£lt., pp. 184 ff., Ball, QQ• cit., 
pp. 35 ff. ) 
9Charles Upson Clark, 11 Hope Versus Despair in Central 
Europe, 11 Current HLctory, 16:781-8, February, 1922, p. 785. 
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class materially. 10 Twenty-two members of the Vienna Academy 
of Science, some with world-wide repu ta.tions in their fields , 
were amo ng signers of a memorial pleading for the means to 
11 purchase clothes and food at cost prices. Austrian children 
were sent to countries which could afford to feed them. 1 2 
Viennese workers initiated a rural re settlement program aimed 
at attaining partial food self-sufficiency. 13 
\vi t h her exchange rate rapidly soaring to 100,000 
crowns to the dollar, Austria desperately needed foreign cap-
ital.14 The chaotic conditions of the country, however, re-
pelled would-be investors. The Leagu~ additionally, had 
failed t o act on an Austrian appeal for aid made back in 
March, 1921. 
10Edgar L. G. Prochnik, "Pos sibilities of the Economic 
and Financial Reconstruction of Austria," Annals of~ 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 102:20-26, 
July, 1922, p. 22. 
l l c l ark, QQ. cit., p. 786. 
1 2About 125,000 children were sent to other countrie s , 
mainl y to Switzerland and the Scandinavias. (J. L. Crane, Jr. 
"The Making of a New Austria," Current History, 16:258-63. 
May, 1922 , p. 259.) 
13 Crane, QQ. cit., pp. 261 ff. 
14Joseph Redlich, 11 Austria and Central Europe, 11 ~ 
Review, 12:335-44, January, 1923, p. 338. 
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THE FIRST LEAGUE LOAN. Vibrant, hard-driving Seipel 
took steps to get action. He made clear to the world the nadir 
reached in Austrian affairs, appealing to the Interallied 
Supreme Council regarding the proposed League loan in somewhat 
unvarnished terms: 
If against all expectations, this last hope were 
also to prove chimerical, the Austrian government 
knowing that to save the situation they have tried 
in vain all means which lay in their power and 
~rhich constituted the utmost exertion of the people, 
would have to call together •.• the Austrian parl-
iament and to declare, in agreement with i~ that 
neither the present nor any other government is in 
a position to continue the administration of the 
state.l5 
Tour of capitals in quest of~. Seipel then traversed 
Czechoslovakia, Germany and Italy in an attempt to arrange 
for extraordinary economic concessions from one or more of his 1 
neighbors.l6 The tour of the capitals brought Austria sympathy 
but no immediate concrete aid from the canvassed neighbors. 
The Little Entente was hostile to an Austrian alignment with 
Italy. Italy, contrarily, opposed Austrian rapprochment with 
the Little Entente. 17 However, Seipel's conferences with 
rival states made a nervous Italy and Czechoslovakia receptive 
to propo sed League aid for Austria. 
15Leo Pasvolsky, QP. cit., pp. 523 f. 
16 b I id., p. 524. 
17Redlich, QQ. cit., p. 339. 
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For the \vest, however, the chancellor• s pilgrimage 
dramatized Austria's need. The reaction was prompt. Redlich 
says, 11 I t wa s realized there (the West) that any act of des-
pair by t he Austrian government or any threat of dissolution 
of the Austrian ••• republic could seriously disturb the peace.~~ 
The ques t ion of aid to Austria, on the League agenda for more 
than a year, came up for immediate action. 
Seipel ~ Geneva. Seipel appeared before the League 
September 6, 1922, asserting that both the prestige and pro-
fits of t he Western world were at stake in his small country. 
Austrian ruin would cut the We~t•s direct communication with 
eastern markets. Austrian bankruptcy would post the Western 
creditors their investments permanently. 
Additionally, he warned that an Au s trian disaster would 
•.• be a serious blow to the Treaties of Peace, 
f or it would afford a proof that the new Austria 
which they created is incapable of existence, 
e i ther now or in the future. A wide gap would be 
formed in the centre of the map of Europe which, 
by force of attraction, would drag all its neigh-
bors down into the same aby ss and would thus upset 
t he balance which, apart from Auy~ria, i s even now 
only with difficulty maintained. 
Seipel pointed out that Austria had alre ady made stren-
uous efforts to avert the pending catastrophe, taking steps 
18Loc. ill· 
19League of Nations, Restoration of Austria, Agreements 
Ar~anged ~ the League of Nations. and Signed at Geneva Q!1 
October~~ 19221 with the Relevant Documents and Public 
Statement s, 1922, p. 20.(Subsequently cited as Restoration 
of Austria. ) · 
58 
to trim t he budget and halt inflation. The government stopped 
sorely ne eded food subsidies, he said, and now planned a new 
bank of is sue. 20 He asked for credits sufficient to allay 
depreciat ion of the crown, thereby balancing the budget and 
lowering the cost of living. Seipel wanted a loan that would 
give the state a breathing space so that reforms already init-
iated could become effective, a loan large enough to further 
industri al development and agricultural reforms. Austria had 
the economic potenti al to repay the investments, he asserted, 
citing hi s country's latent water power facilities and geo-
graphical position.21 
The chancellor realized that some League jurisdiction 
of loan use would be necessary, but believed it should inter-
fere as l ittle as possible with Austrian sovereignty. Control 
would be intolerable, he warneq, unless the volume of credits 
22 
advanced were sufficient to jus tify Austria 1 s humiliation. 
Finally Monsignor Seipel spoke of his round-robin trip 
to neighboring capitals. He justified it with the statement 
that he did not want to appeal to the League before he had an 
20nr. Emmanuel Hugo Vogel of the University of Vienna 
says that during 1921 food subsidies amounted to twenty-one 
per cent of total government expenditures. ( 11 The Public 
Finances of the Republic of Austria," Austria of ~oday, 
suppleme nt to the Annals of~ American Academy of Political 
~Social Science, 98: supplement, November, 1921, p. 21.) 
21Restoration of Austria, QQ. cit., p. 22. 
22 Loc. cit. 
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understanding with his neighbors. Additionally, the trip had 
••• another object. The Austrian people, rather 
than perish in isolation, will do everything in 
their power to make a last effort to break the 
chains which are oppressing and strangling them. 
It is for the League of Nations to see that 
this effort does not endanger the peace of the 
world or our relations with our neighbors.23 
Arrangemel'l;~ for .§; loan. Seipel 1 s play left the ball 
I in the League's hands, and the League acted with ·some dispatch. 
The Geneva protocols of October, 1922, arranged for a maximum 
loan of 650,000,000 gold crowns, to be guaranteed by Great 
Britain, France~ Czechoslovakia and Italy. 24 The League 
deemed the sum sufficient to cover Austrian budget deficits 
two years. By that time, it was thought, League-required re-
forms would be carried through and the budget would be bal-
anced. A commissioner-general, appointed by the League, would 
insure implementation of budgetary reforms. 25 
The string attached: ban on Anschluss. The guaranteeing 
powers inserted an anti-Anschluss proviso in Protocol One of 
the agreement, assuring that Austria would undertake 
23 ~., p. 23. 
24Great Britain, Foreign Office, Agreement for Guaran-
teeing.§ !:.9..ru:! to Austria. Signed, .Ql. Representatives of Great 
Britian, France, ItaJy, Czechoslovakia and Austria, October ,.1, 
1922 (Geneva: 1922. 
25nr. Alfred Zimmerman, burgomaster of Rotterdam, was 
appointed commissioner general. 
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••• in accordance with the terms of Article 88 
of the Treaty of Saint Germain, not to alienate 
its independence; it will abstain from any nego-
ti a tions or from any economic or financial engage-
ment calculated directly or indirectly to com-
promise this independence. 
This undertaking shall not prevent Austria 
from maintaining, subject to provisions of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain, her freedom in the matter 
of customs, tariffs and commercial or financial 
agreements, and, in general, in all matters pro-
vided always that she shall not violate her 
economic independence by granting to any State a 
special regime or exclusive adva~~ages calculated 
to threaten this independence... . 
Once more, then, the Allied powers deferred possible 
Anschluss. 
Success of the ~. The loan was a brilliant success. 
Even before its actual floating, the confidence that nego-
tiations inspired led to a marked improvement in Austrian 
economic conditions. Seipel could radio Baron Leopold Popper, 
an Austrian banker visiting New York in January, 1923: 
One. 
Austrian crown stabilization lasting. Cost 
of living dropping. Savings banks deposits in-
creasing. Government's majority firm •.• No 
reason for inquietude. 
Seipel2? 
26Great Britain, Foreign Office, QQ. cit., Protocol 
27New York Times, January 24, 1923. The loan was not 
actually floated until mid-1923. 
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CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY 
From 1922 to 1931, banned by the League· loan, Anschluss 
agitation went underground. Anschluss remained, however, the 
cardinal facet of the opposition policy, remained the fire-
brand of Austrian nationalism. The Christian Socialists under 
Seipel, shunning mention of Anschluss, evolved a foreign policy 
emphasizing payment of Austrian obligations and urging rap-
prochemen·t with the lvest, Italy and the Succession states. 
Relations with Danube Europe. More than any of the 
Succession states, Austria was dependent on their mutual good 
will and its tangible corollary, trade. As a consequence, 
Seipel energetically set about restoring normal trade relations 
with hi s immediate neighbors, furthering a policy initiated 
under previous cabinets. 
As early as 1921 Austria negotiated the Treaty of Lana 
with Czechoslovakia, providing for a Czech loan to Austria, 
for mutual reaffirmance of territorial provisions of the Treaty 
of Saint Germain and for a mutual non-aggression pact. 2B tVi th 
Hungary, resumption of cordiality was more difficult but no 
less imperative. Despite the fact that the Burgenland contro-
versy had soured relations between Austria and her one-time 
28League of Nations, Treaty Series I.X, "Political 
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Austria and the 
Czechoslovak Republic Signed at Prague December 16, 1921, 11 
No. 257, 1921. 
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duo-domain partner, Seipel in 1923 was able to arrange a 
commercial treaty with Hungary. By the end of the 20's, 
Austria had friendship and arbitration treaties with all of her 
neighbors and all other former Empire states.29 
Relations with Italy~ gamut. Disturbant element in 
Austro-Italian relations was the question of the largely 
German Alto Adige (the former South German Tyrol) which was 
shorn at Saint Germain. Italy's part in guaranteeing the 1922 
loan mitigated ill feeling over the Tyrol issue, however. 
During the 30's Austro-Italian relations were cemented, un-
officially, by the personal friendship of Dollfuss and 
Mussolini and, officially, by the Rome Protocols of 1934. 30 
These protocols, providing for economic cooperation and cul-
tural exchange among Hungary, Austria and Italy, appeared to 
both Austria and Italy as a counteractive to Nazi infiltration 
into Austria's economic life. 
Austria~ the League of Nations. In the 20 1 s, 
official Austrian policy firmly rejected circumvention of the 
League ban on Anschluss. An early member of the League, 
Austria was aware of her position, gained through the 1922 
loan, as ward and prize exhibit of the Council. Ofttimes, 
29Austria, Austrian~~~ 1931. pp. 29-39. 
30 Ball, QQ. cit., pp. 270-74, Appendix A, Text of 
the Rome Protocols. 
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however, Seipel had to propound the anti-Anschluss theme 
against many of his own party. When in 1925 a member of the 
Christian Socialists joined the Social Democrat and Pan-German 
parties in a resolution favoring merger with Germany, Seipel 
declared that the Christian Socialist representative had no 
right to speak for the party. 31 His view on the merger: 
I am not against a union, but I do not see a 
solution of Austria's problems in ~uch a union •.• 
There is no question of Austria . appealing to the 
League to permit a union. As long as treaties 
exist there can be no discussion of a union. 
My ideal is a United States of the whole of 
Europe without tariffs and both union with 
Germany and a mid-European confederation can only 
be intermediary steps leading up to a United 
States of Europe, if not in a political, at least 
in an economic sense.32 
Actually, the Socialists initiated the policy of def-
erence to the League. That party, however, stressed per-
missive aspects of Anschluss under Article 88 of the Treaty--
aspects which the French, at least, dismissed. 
CHRI STIAN SOCIALI ST FLA\vS 
In itemizing positive achievements of the Christian 
Socialists, one can cite their astute foreign policy, their 
achievements in shoring up the Austrian fiscal structure and 
their virtually unaided resistance to the Nazis. 
31New York Times, April 17, 1925. 
32 Loc • .£J:j. 
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Unhappily the party's domestic policies , aside from the 
fiscal reforms, met no measure of the success of its external 
achievements. Christian Socialist attacks on the Social 
Democrats as communists were not only inaccurate, ideologically 
speaking, but also fomented a civil war. The Chri stian 
Socialists first tolerated and then abetted fascist elements 
in Austria; established an authoritarian corporative state 
after bloody suppression of a revolt the party itself is some-
times accused of instigating, and carried on the campaign 
against a political group supported by nearly half of the 
Austrian population until the eve of Austria's surrender to 
the Nazis. 
RED HERRING IN AUSTRIA. First failing of Christian 
Socialist domestic policy was the oft repeated, seemingly un-
founded, communist charge against the Social Democrats, prob-
ably a calculated stratagem. This policy helped alienate 
varied sectors of the Austrian populace against the Socialists, 
and the charges appear patently untrue. 
Early cooperation between communists and Socialists. 
Austrian socialism, in common with all European socialism, 
owed much to Marxian thought. Austrian Socialists used much 
of the jargon of communism. They formed in 1919 Workers and 
Soldiers Councils modeled after the Soviet system. The 
Austrian Communist party and So cial Democrat s did establish a 
65 
! 
working arrangement of sorts, but it collapc;ed very early, 
before 1920. 33 
Bauer speaks ou t against communism. Bauer himself, 
often thought of as the arch-leftist of the Socialists, s tumped 
the country in 1919 to prevent the "revolution" from getting 
34 
out of hand and into the hands of the communists. One of the 
few Austrians who visited Russia, Bauer remained anti-communist 
until his death. 
Moscow attacks Austrian socialists. Innately sen sing 
the implacable divergence bet'\\reen the Social Democrat and 
communist courses, Moscow denounced Bauer, Renner and Adler as 
11 social traitors, 11 in a violent letter to Austrian communists~5 
Christian Socia.lists step EJ2 campaign. After the July 
15th, 1927, firing of the Vienna hall of justice by a mob, 
attacks on the Socialists as communists intensified. The 
capital city became known a.s "Red Vienna 11 to rightist elements. 
The Social Democrats 1 Linzer Program of 1926, in particular, 
was cited as proof that the Socialists, once in power, would 
set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. However, the day 
following Otto Bauerrs Linz speech propounding the program, 
the clerical Reichspost itself reported that Bauer rejected 
33Macartney, QQ. cit., pp. 132 f; Bauer, QP. cit. 
pp. 83-108. 
34Graham, QP. cit., p. 158. 
35 Macartney, QQ. cit., pp. 132 f. 
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terror and violence as a means of obtaining power in the 
state. 36 
Bauer 1 s actual statement at Linz: 
The Austrian workers established the democratic 
republic and forced the bourgeoise to accept it. 
We are going to use this democratic republic in 
order to secure power by democratic means and 
spiritual weapons. If the bourgeoisie dares, it 
will try to overthrow democracy and establish a 
Fascist dictatorship ..• Only if we have to defend 
democracy against the counter-revolution would we 
be left with no other choice than to fight with 
violent means. Violence in our programme has 
only a defen~ive role. By violence we mean civil 
war. We know that the Fascist danger may confront 
us with the choice of defending ourselves by force 
of arms or surrendering. Therefore we say: 11 If we 
are attacked you will find us armed, and ready for 
self-defense if driven to it.n37 
Despite Bauer 1 s actual text, rightist communist charges con-
tinued to gain currency.38 
Results of~ Christian Socialist campaign. While the 
word 11 communist 11 has achieved expletive force in much of the 
world and while communism charges have long been standard 
equipment in politicos• arsenals, the Christian Socialist 
charges resulted in, even if they did not aim at, an armed 
mobilization of bourgeoisie and peasant against the Socialist 
workers. 
36G. E. R. Gedye, ~· cit., p. 45. 
37Ibid., pp. 44 f. 
38For a sample, see "July Revolt in Vienna," Quarterly 
Review, 249:363-78, October, 1927, pp. 372 f. 
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THE FASCIST MENACE. second and mo~t disastrous Chris-
tian Socialist failing 'tvas its acquiescent consortship with 
fascistic totalitarianism. In surveying the part Christian 
Socialists played in Austrian fascism, it is not absolutely 
valid to say that from the very beginning they conspired with 
the Heimwehr, the extraparliamentary military organ of con-
servatism, to destroy democracy and to establish an 11 author-
i tarian, German, Catholic and corporative state.n 39 Ho't"lever, 
the Christian Socialists did accept Heimwehr support, used 
this armed force as an supra-parliamentary weapon, failed to 
suppress its illegal activities and, finally, admitted its 
political wing into the government. 
Seipel balks at banning provocative march. In 1928, 
Seipelrs long suspected support of the Heimwehr became evident. 
When the Heimwehr scheduled a demonstration in Wiener Neustadt, 
a Socialist stronghold, the chancellor failed to stop the 
march. The Schutzbund, armed unit of the Socialist party, in 
retaliation planned a demonstration in Wiener Neustadt the 
same day.. \vhen Socialists offered to cancel their demonstra-
tion if the Heimwehr were prevented from moving in, Seipel 
refused. Half of the Austrian army was sent to the city to 
prevent a bloody clash. Barbed wire was strung between the 
39The Austrian government was so described in a con-
stitution promulgated by Dollfuss in 1934. 
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march routes of the groups. The world press conjectured on 
the possibility of a civil war. However, the affair passed 
off quietly enough. 
Seipel turns down nroposals for disarming. To Social-
ist offers to disarm the Schutzbund if Seipel would order the 
Heimwehr dissolved, Seipel gave a vigorous no: 
The Socialist peace offer would have led to a 
more rapid success did we not know them so well ... 
I was certain that there would be no civil war in 
Auetria ... for the reason that I had determined to 
employ the necessary number of police and gendarmes 
and of Herr Vaugoin 1 s (Vaugoin was minister of war) 
troops. If the Socialists desire a real peace they 
must first of all cease to be a party with a guard 
indulging in military ma.rches. Then they must 
abandon the war which they have aroused since July 
15th last year against the forces of the state 
police, gendarmerie and army. So long as I am not 
assured, not that the Socialists are not afraid, 
but that no one need fear them any longer, there 
will be no peace and no disarmament in Austria.40 
Later Seipel became anxious over anti-clericalism 
evidenced in some of the Heimwehr groups, but evidently he 
4l 
retained confidence in his ability to manage his Frankenstein. 
M. W. Fodor wrote that Seipel, ostensibly retired, used the 
Heimwehr to agitate for constitutional reform in 1929. 42 
Heimwehr organ commends Seipel. Further evidence of 
40Gedye, "Austria--Enter Fascismo, 11 Nation, 127:584-7, 
November 28, 1928, p. 587. 
41New York Times, August 11, 1929. 
42seipel did write a book expounding the need for con-
stitutional reform. 
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the Christian Socialist-Heimwehr link was the blessing given 
Seipel by the Heimwehr in the summer of 1929: 
In the Autumn we must make order, and Chancellor 
Seipel will participate i n this work directly and 
indirectly. He will save Austria for the third 
time, this time from sinking in the Red marsh. The 
present Streeruwitz Government has always been con-
sidered provisional and always has acted as such. 
If the government continues to accede to all the 
wishes of the Social i st~, Austria will be ruined. 
Austria needs the en.ergy of Monsignor Seipel, who 
alone can save her.43 
One-sided confiscation of ~· Another manifestation 
of Christian Socialist-Heimwehr collusion is the reported 
alacrity with which government forces confiscated illegal arms 
stores of the Socialists and the apathy they displayed toward 
seizure of similar Heimwehr equipment. 44 
Schuschnigg Qn the Heimwehr. Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, 
later Christian Socialist chancellor of Austria, admits that 
Seipel was naturally drawn toward Heimwehr leaders and that 
45 
they \N"ere men with whom he had much in common. Schuschnigg 
also says that the government 11 differed sharply with the 
political goals and methods" advocated by the Heimwehr at 
that time.46 At any rate, by 1929 there was considerable con-
fusion as to whether the Christian Socialist government was 
43Quoted in New York Times, August 18, 1929, from the 
Heimwehr organ, Tiroler Volksboten. 
44see Chapter IV. 
45Mx Austria, Q£· £1l., p. 133. 
4611 Austria'n Apologia," Commonweal, 45:606-10, April 4, 
19471 p. 608. 
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using the Heimwehr as a foil or whether the government itself 
was foil for the Heimwehr. 
Christian Socialist supnort of Heimwehr not unanimous. 
In any indictment of the Christian Socialist party for its 
endorsement of a fascist group, a countering element to be 
noted is that not all Christian Socialists supported the 
Heimwehr. Fascist trends in the Heimwehr split the party in 
1929. Leopold Kunschak spoke for many Austrian conservatives 
when he voiced misgivings over Heimwehr ideology and took 
issue with Seipel by forming the rightist Freiheitsbund, or 
League for Freedom. His credo: 11 I will say promptly that I 
will support the Heimwehr only so long as it is an instrument 
for democracy. n47 
Later Kunschak warned, editorially, that Austria might 
lose its liberty at the hands of the Heimwehr, and that Europe 
was watching Heimwehr demonstrations with consternation. 48 
Eventually he resigned his post as vice-chairman of the 
Christian Socialist party in protest against the party 1 s 
apparent approval of Heimwehr fascism . 49 He retained his post, 
however, as leader of the Vienna Christian Socialists. None-
theless, the most influential Christian Socialists supported 
the Heimwehr. While Kunschak 1 s protest indicates support was 
47 New~ TimeR, February 3, 1929. 
48Ibid., May 14, 1929. 
49Ibid., May 15, 1929. 
71 
not unanimous, nevertheless, a preponderance of Christian 
Socialist leadership approved the Heimwehr goals and made use 
of its following. 
THE DOLLFUSS TENURE 
In 1932, after an eleven-year dominance of Austrian 
politics and policies, in and out of the chancellorship, 
Monsignor Seipel died. A few months - before the priest's 
death, Engelbert Dollfuss, farm boy with protean political con-
" victions and Gemutlichkeit replete, became chancellor of 
Au s tria. 
Dol lfuss came into office when Christian Sociali s t 
s trength wa s waning. His coalition had a parliamentary 
majority of one. 
The Lausanne loan; the Nazi re sistance. Like his 
priestly predecessor, Dollfuss 1 first achievement wa s negotia-
tion of a League loan. He became chancellor of an Austria 
still in the grips of the economic depres sion of the early 
30 1 s, an Austria again saturninely engaged in deficit finan-
cing. 
The so-called Lausanne loan wa s as succe ssful a s the 
1922 venture, and before Dollfuss 1 death, Austria wa s again on 
the way to recovery. A one-time Anschluss exponent, he was 
fated to be chancellor of Austria during the fir s t years of 
Nazi agitati on. Hi s vigorous defense against Austrian 
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national socialism and German Nazi terrorism ended only with 
his death at the hands of an Austrian Nazi assassin, Otto 
Planetta, in July, 1934. 
The establishment of dictatorship. Dollfuss assumed 
dictatorial power in 1933 when parliament quit in a huff and 
the only two members constitutionally empowered to recall the 
body resigned, leaving the chancellor in sole authority. For 
more than a year, the mite of a chancellor ruled Austria by 
decree and then established an authoritarian state after 
crushing the Civil Revolt of 1934. Early in his chancellor-
ship, he allowed Heim-tvehr participation in his cabinet 11 to 
widen the government front.n50 
Passage of the~ constitution. From 1934 until 1938, 
Austria was ruled under a corporative constitution, promulgated 
by the Dollfuss government in May, 1934. A rump national 
council attended by only seventy-four of 155 authorized 
deputies, stamped its approval on the new law of the land. The 
new document became law April 30, 1934. The Social Democratic 
party, dissolved following the Civil Revolt, was unrepresented 
on the council. 51 Many of its leaders were in jail; others 
had been hung. 
The constitution proclaimed Austria a Christian, German, 
50
schuschnigg, Austrian Reauiem, p. 188. 
51Ball, on.£!!., p. 214. 
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federal state. Its preamble: 
The Austrian Nation receives, in the name of 
God Almighty, from whom all law emanates, this 
Consti~~tion •.. for its Christian, German, Federal 
state. 
Provisions of the constitution. With this legal back-
ing, Dollfuss set up a corporative state. Ball writes, "The 
concept of the constitution as an expression of the will of 
53 the peciple is utterly ignored~ 
The executive branch of the government was not respon-
sible to the legislative branch. The president appointed the 
cabinet and had almost unlimited emergency power. \IJ'hile there 
were elaborate guarantees of personal liberty, restrictions on 
such citizens' rights as privacy of postal, telephone and tele-
graph communication could be "determined by law. 1154 The fed-
eral diet, chief law-making body, could not initiate, amend or 
discuss bills. It was permitted only to affirm or vote nega-
tively on government proposals, after hearing but a single 
dissenting report. 55 
Schuschnigg's defense of tbe regime. Kurt von 
Schuschnigg, who fell heir to tre absolutist constitution 
after Dollfuss was killed, in defending its strange employment 
of ·'Augustinian and Mussolinian thinking, concludes: 11 Thus 
52Loc. cit. 
53Loc. cit. 
54Ibid., p. 216. 
55 
,llli., p. 215. 
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in Austria arose the state composed of states, 'tv-i th author-
itarian leadership, assuming to itself as a state no total-
itarian rights. 56 
r-n a postwar apologia for the government he headed, 
Schuschnigg declares that Austria always maintained an unpolit-
57 ical, independent court system. However, acts committed 
58 
under police authority were not subject to court review. 
Schuschnigg also points out that Austrian trade unions re-
mained free, although with government-appointed leaders. 59 
Frequently Schuschnigg takes pains to distinguish that Austria 
was an authoritarian state, but not a dictatorship, a nuance 
60 
remaining more than esoteric even after reading his arguments. 
SCHUSCHNIGG 1 S FOUR YEARS 
The growing Nazi threat. 3chuschnigg 1 s chancellorship 
is best remembered by the world for resisting the Nazis and 
by the Austrian Socialists for the continued ban on their part~ 
56My Austria, QQ. cit., p. 269. 
57 
"Austrian Apologia, 11 .Q.Q .. ill·, p. 610. 
58Norman Thomas, 11 A Reply to Schuschnigg, 11 Commonweal, 
46:114-116, May 16, 1947, p. 115. 
59Norman Thomas, elucidating the Socialist case, claims 
the government dissolved the federation of free Austrian unions 
confiscated their assets, and substituted a government labor 
front. (.IQ.lg., p. 115.) 
60schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 140 f. 
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and the protracted dictatorship. 
The Fatherland Front. Valiantly, Schuschnigg tried to 
build a popular government without benefit of elections--
elections he felt Austria could not afford to hold because of 
Nazi strength in Austria, and because of possible Nazi inter-
ference from Berlin. But Schuschnigg's attempts to popularize 
the regime handed him upon Dollfuss 1 death seem to have been 
largely futile. 11 The Republican masses remained sullen and 
indomitably hostile. •t61 
Schuschnigg dissolved all private armies in the country 
and called on loyal troops to join a new, mass, government-
backed organ. This organization, the Fatherland Front, was an 
apolitical body aimed at providing support for the government. 
Its membership was recruited from both the labor and bourgeoi-
sie classes, but this diversity and the high percentage of the 
Austrian population joining does not imply widespread approval 
of the regime. Much pressure was brought to bear on both 
business and labor to join. Nearly every Viennese middle 
class burgher wore the red-white-red ribbon of the Fatherland 
Front--but it was nicknamed the 11 existenzklammer 11 (existence 
clip). Workers who refused to join the Front often had their 
61\v. t'lalter Crotch, "Whither Austria?" Nineteenth 
Century, 117:409-420, April, 1935, p. 415. 
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Front dues paid for them by their employers, to preclude the 
assumed necessity of training new men for the recalcitrants• 
jobs. 62 
THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST LEDGER 
To the Christian Socialists, Austria owe s much of the 
credit for her internal recovery and for her international 
respectability. The party 1 s long flirtation with fascism, 
however, sowed a harvest of bitterness in Austria 1.o1hich, like 
the pro-Anschluss policy of the socialists, weakened the nation 
fatefully. 
Schuschnigg has written that 11 Both sides quite openly 
demanded the destruction of the opposition and dictatorship 
of their own side. 63 It remained, however, for his side to 
put the dictatorship into actual effect. Because of the 
Christian Socialist as~umption of authoritarianism, the Nazi 
regime brought Austria merely a change in direction and in 
degree, but not in kind. 
62 1.!?J:.Q.. 1 p • 413 o 
63 Austrian Requiem, QQ. cit., p. 184. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLITICS AND ANSCHLUSS: THE CIVIL STRIFE 
During the late 20 1 s and early 30 1 s, Europe surveyed 
with alarm the spectacle of one of her smallest states carry-
ing on like a little boy. Austrians, it seems, "torere playing 
soldiers. 
Few Austrians served in the republic's army itself. 
The Treaty of Saint Germain placed a 30,000 limit on the army, 
I 1 a limit not reached until the mid-30 s, But fifteen times 
that many Austrians served in ·· ·par.amili ta.ry organizations, 
and, by the late 20 1 s, Austrians could join any of seven or 
eight extralegal military bodies in the country. These organ-
izations were in addition to Austria's own small army, the 
well-trained Vienna police and the gendarmerie. In the mid-
20's, Socialists and Christian Socialists were not only shout-
ing each other down in increasingly disorderly parliamentary 
sessions and exchanging charge and counter-charge in immoderate 
newspaper squibs, but also were recruiting private armies from 
the ranks of the dissatisfied and unemployed and arming them 
l-11 th live ammunition. Inevitably the bullets found targets 
1Treaty ~Austria, op. cit., Article 120, p. 119. 
less insensate than those provided them during weekend 
bivouacs of the rival groups. What occasion~ gurprise is that 
the brief, bloody civil war of February, 1934, was so long 
averted. 
In view of the gutted, blazing Karl Marx Hot and the 
dead Austria counted that February, tributes to Austrian 
II Gemutlichkeit and tolerance seem ironic. There is, for a 
curio8a1 this 1921 polemic by Friedrich Hertz . 
• . • the Austrian chare.cter is averse to all forms 
of violence •.•• Vienna has always been a very inter-
national city •.• Nowhere else in Europe do so many 
cultural elements from different nations flow to-
gether, and this very confluence has formed the 
Viennese character with a certain instinctive tol-
erance and broadmindednese. 
There is no aggressiveness in the Austrian mind •.• 2 
Even as late as 1924, an Austrian scholar of politics 
lauded his country's capacity for compromise: 
p. xi. 
The character of Vienna is a consequence of its 
entire history. A center of ideas, of political 
currents and of civilization, Vienna inevitably 
became infuse~ with the spirit of tolerance ~nd 
compromise •.. ..., 
The ultimate tragedy of the political polarization of 
2Friedrich Hertz, forward to Austria of Today, QQ.~., 
3Josef Redlich, quoted in 11 How Austria Has Pulled 
Through," Literary Digest, 82:18-19, July 12, 1924, p. 18. 
?9 
Austria, of the widening breach between forces of the right 
and those of the left, came with the Civil War of 1934, but 
its effects extended beyond that date. Because of the blood-
sanctified schism between the political forces in Austria, that 
nation faced Nazi Germany as a house divided--as a small house 
divided. 
CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
Austria's civil war did not erupt suddenly in a serene, 
untroubled land. For years Austrians feared a coup by either 
the Socialists or the rightists. Differences between the two 
parties were more than ideological--they were rooted in older, 
nonparty rivalries. The parties disagreed violently over the 
relationship of Vienna to the hinterland, class relations, 
religious issues and education. 
Agrarian-urban rivalry. One of these rivalries was the 
ubiquitous interest conflict between country and city, a con-
flict considerably accentuated in interwar Austria. Vienna, 
virtually the only large city in Austria, in its signal pos-
ition provided an objective for all peasants to direct their 
prejudices toward. Vienna's status as a separate state, as 
well as the nation's capital, underscored urban-rural differ-
ences. Because of this arrangement, the huge revenue of the 
city of Vienna wa s spent largely in Vienna. It did not accrue 
to the benefit of surrounding provinces whose citizens felt 
they helped create the Vienna wealth. Since the Socialist 
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strength wa s concentrated in the capital, the party was 
equated with the city by many peasantR, and the ill will 
directed against the city was also lavished on the party. 
Additionally, there was some survival of the bad feeling 
engendered in the crisis years of 1919-20, when peasants 
withheld grain from the starving city. 
Another factor which widened the breach between Vienna 
and the other provinces was the extreme conservatism of the 
peasants. Central Europe was closer to the feudalistic age 
than Western Europe, so peasants of Central Europe, correspond-
ingly, were more conservative than those of the West. Vienna'~ 
socialism, thus, was anathema to the Austrian peasantry. 
Germains writes: 
••• There was not lacking a certain antagonism 
between Vienna and the provinces, intensified, no 
doubt, by the predominance and the policy of the 
Socialists but which existed apart from that. The 
dour, religious, plain-living, hardworking provin-
cial, was prone to regard the great city as the 
home of moral rottenne.ss, gay, licentious, destruc-
tive to those primitive virtues dear to the prim-
itive heart. To mobilize the urovinces against 
Vienna was never a difficult thing.4 
Class antagonism. The perennial worker-employer conflic 
added its spark to the inter-party feud. The Christian Social-
ist program usually appealed to the big industrialists and 
bankers, the small bourgeoise and the peasant. The Socialists 
4 Germains, QD• cit., p. 104. 
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drew a largely proletarian following, with Vienna itgelf the 
center of party strength. Austria 1 ~ industrial concerns did 
not confine their backing of the Christian Socialists merely 
to votes and contributions to party funds. Several, most 
notably the Alpine Montan Company, pressed employees to join 
the rightist Heimwebr and supplied that body with arms. 5 To 
them, the Heimwehr seemed an effective tool to destroy labor 
union power. 
Foreign interference. The Heimwehr had other backers 
than Austrian industrialists. For instance, there is evidence 
that Italian and German sources supplied arms to the organ-
ization. Still, Austria was not quite Spain in miniature 
during the 30 1 s, for both Italy and Germany confined their 
interests to supplying arms rather than troops. 
Socialists, too, obtained arms from abroad. Brother 
socialists in Germany sent small hand rifles, an efficient 
6 
weapon in street battles, Unlike heavy arms, these rifles 
could be legally imported. German contributions to the 
Heimwehr came mostly from Nazi groups, on the valid theory that 
the Heimwehr was a potential Trojan horse for Nazi infiltra-
? tion. 
5New York Times, August 11, 1920. Many othe.r sources 
also corroborate this. 
6New ~.Times, August 11, 1929. 
7Circa 1932, a bra.nch of the Heimwehr split off, became 
a Nazi unit. (New~ Times, May 10, 1929; Kurt von 
Schuschnigg, letter to this writer, February 10, 1950.) 
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The Mussolini fascist experiment seems to have affected 
the Austrian Heimwehr movement greatly. One wing of the 
Heimwehr definitely leaned toward Italy, and Heimwehr chieftain 
Prince Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg was a personal friend of 
the Duce. 8 Austro-Italian friendship was cemented firmly dur-
ing the Dollfuss regime when the chancellor took the Heimwehr 
into the government and himself became a friend of the 
Italian dictator. Certainly, the Heimwehr leaders, stirred 
by the Duce's example, borrowed fascist jargon. In 1929, 
there was a good deal of swashbuckling in Austria, and many 
threats of a march on Vienna in the manner of Mussolini 1 s 
spectacular march on Rome. 
Germany' 9 ·prime export to her neighbor r s fascist move-
ment was one Major Pabst, who has seldom been termed anything 
more complimentary that a "political desperado." Pab s t, pro-
tagonist of the Kapp Putsch, appeared in Austria when Weimar 
Germany became too unhealthy for him. He found t he · Heimwehr 
congenial. Under an assumed name, he became an Austrian 
citizen and joined a motley crowd of Heimwehr leaders vying for 
supremacy in the movement. 9 
8 Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, op. cit., p. 121. 
See also Ernst Rudiger von starhemberg, ~etween Hitler and 
Mussolin~ (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1942), 
pp. 89-93. 
9New York Times, August 11, 1925. 
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Religious conflict. Religious differences also added 
their fervor to the Socialist-Christian Socialist enmity. 
Austria, well over ninety per cent Catholic, would seem rather 
unfertile ground for such internecine controversy. 10 However, 
the Catholicism of many Austrians was apparently nominal, for, 
despite the near unanimity of confession, many responded to 
11 
a Socialist campaign urging Socialists to leave the church. 
This campaign may pos sibly have been conceived of as a polit-
ical weapon against Chancellor Seipel. 1 2 
Religion-tinged altercations in interwar Austria com-
prise a long list and range the gamut from ludicrous to vital. 
In 1923, not without a hint of glee, the Socialists opened a 
crematorium in Vienna, effectually scandalizing Catholics, 
whose church has long banned cremation. While the Socialist 
press hailed the innovation as a cultural facet indispensable 
. 
to a modern city, clerical efforts were bent to seeing that the 
crematorium was never used. 13 The clerical faction brought 
out an 18th century imperial decree, providing that 11 The dead 
shall be buried, 11 to fight use of the crematory. The fight, 
10Austria was 93.68 per cent Catholic. (Statesman's 
Year-book, 1931, p. 666.) 
11Many writers corroborate this, both pro-Socialist and 
pro-Christian Socialist. 
12schuschnigg, "Austrian Apologia, 11 Q:Q. _ill., p. 607. 
1~acartney, on. cit., pp. 161 f. 
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however, was lost eventually. Socialists triumphantly pointed 
out that the fll' st crematorium funeral was that of an aged, 
devout Catholic woman and the first officiator, a priest in 
good standing.l4 Socialists also resented clerical censor-
ship, saw an Austria well on the road to papal vassalage when 
clerical :pressure kept "Marriages Are Made in Heaven" from 
opening in Vienna. The Max Reinhardt play pictured God as 
a bearded old ma.n in carpet slippers. Evidently the carpet 
slippers were lese-ma.1este. 15 
Additionally to censorship and crematoriums, the civil 
prohibition of remarriage for divorced Catholics provided 
another focal point for dispute. 16 Although a parliamentary 
majority favored change in the stricture, Seipel's influence 
carried the day again~t any relaxation. The 1919 Socialist 
government had obtained some mitigation of the measure by 
authorizing local government heads to dispense with the pro-
hibition. However, Austrian courts disagreed on the validity 
of this procedure. 17 
14New York Times, February 25, 1923. 
15John MacCormac, "Austrian Conflict Shown by Play Ban," 
New ~ Times, March 24, 1929. 
16The church ban on such a remarriage is universal. 
However, Austria also had a civil ban. 
17John MacCormac, Ne~ Yq~~ Time8 correspondent in 
Vienna, says the Socialists i n troduced this permissive legis-
lation. C. A. Mac~rtney, author of ~ Social Revolution in 
Austria, says that the Socialists reactivated an old decree 
permitting local authorities to dispense with the ban. 
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Educational i8sue. The big fight centered on education, 
with the Burgenland as one of the prime storm centers. In 
that province, still under Hungarian laws, village priests 
were the direct superiors of teachers, a state distinctly 
inimicable to Socialist placidity. Three times Seipel pre-
18 vented parliament from paaeing revisionary legislation. 
Conflict over education of children of the 
Konfessionslosen ·~ (lapsed Catholics) raged even more fiercely. 
An Austrian child could not advance in school beyond a very 
· elementary point unless he showed promise in every branch of 
study. The Konfessionslosen refused to send their children 
for religious instruction. On the basis that such children 
lacked ability in all lines, the Seipel-dominated Ministry of 
Public Instruction judged them unfit for promotion. Socialist 
authorities in ·Vienna obtained a court decision declaring that 
compulsory religious instruction flouted Austrian law, but the 
Ministry of Instruction refused to acknowledge this as a test 
case and forced each Konfessionslose parent to fight a sep-
arate court action. Many parents couldn 1 t afford the expense 
of such a suit. 19 
Summary. In spite of wide disparity--between Catholic 
18MacCormac, 11 Austrian Conflict Shown by Play Ban," 
New York Times, . ..Q.Y. cit. 
19Ibid 
-· 
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and Marxist, fe.rmer a nd ur l:ani te, 1.vorker and employer--in spite 
of friction caused by foreign intervention, the Christian 
Socialists and Social Democrats joined in a coalition govern-
ment in 1919 and 1920. And in 1938, the end of free Au~tria, 
the socialists again offered their J..oy o.l ty to the Btate.2° But, 
in the period between these times~ intenRe crisis, they did 
not, seemingly could not, cooperate. From 1920 on, the social 
Democrats , although they ahvays held only a few less or a fe't\T 
more parliamentary seat~ than the Christian Socialistq , did not 
partlcipate in a single government.21 Attempts at compromise 
were often merely formal so that each party could blame the 
other for t he resultant impasse . Even in the face of obvious 
crisis, the par ties put political loyalty ahea.d of natio nal 
allegiance. 
PRELUDE TO CIVIL i<vk-"9. 
In 1923 the party differences , differences later resolv-
ed in open civil strife , became increa singly acrimonious , in-
creasingly public. 
Parliamentary storms. In the Austrian Assembly , debate 
centered on unemployment engendered by Chri stian Socialist-
sponsored budget reformq.22 So cialists fought for passage of 
20There wa~ no Social Democratic party in Austria be-
t ween 1934 and 1945. Thus, it is not technically correct to 
say the pa rty offered its support. Element s of the former 
party offered support. 
2l see Appendix for comparison of party strengths in 
parliament. 
22Di smi sRal of government employees \':as a prime feature 
of the economy drive. 
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a 100,000-crown daily minimum relief measure for the growing 
rosters of jobles~, while the Christian Sociali~t~ and pan-
German~ held out for a 87,000 maximum.23 The Socialist ~urn 
it~elf seems small, for, in ~pite of an increasingly Atable 
currency and the downspiraling cost of living, a loaf of bread 
at this time still cost 6 1 750 crowns. The government stand 
appears les~ ~evere when its efforts to trim expenditures to 
League dictates is considered. 24 At any rate, the quarrel over 
the 13,000 crowns engendered unprecedented heat. On February 
3, 1923, the &s~embly ~uspended ses~ions several hours because 
of the bitterness of the debate. Socialist legi~lators had 
~ided with 200 unemployed in the gallery ~houting 11 We are 
hungry; we wan't bread. n25 An enlarged cabinet council meeting 
renewed the altercation February 6th. Climax to the mis~ile-
throwing came when Karl Seitz attacked Vice-Chancellor Frank, 
attempting to strangle him--Seitz is u~ually ~poken of as 
among the mildest of the socialists. 26 
Despite thi~ display of pugili~tic talent and tempera-
ment, had the Chri~tian-SocialiRt~ and Socialists confined 
their bellicose tendencies to parliamentary halls, the civil 
war might have been averted. However, each faction had it~ 
23New York Time~, February 25, 1923. 
24At thi~ time, the League reform~ 1..rere ju~t going into 
effect. Auqtria waq in the middle of her reconstruction effort 
25New York Timeq, February 5, 1923. 
26New York Timeq, February 7, 1923. 
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own armed militia. The quarrel progressed from the parlia-
mentary halls to the country-at-large in the late 20 1 s. 
The Schutzbund. The Socialist militia, called the 
Schutzbund (Republican Defense Corps), was a body of "semi-
military character •.• formed •.. for the protection of there-
public ••• 1127 Dr. Julius Deutsch, onetime journalist and the 
minister of war in the Renner cabinets, headed the Schutzbund. 
Actual military leadership waR provided by Gener&Koerner, 
former general in the im~rial army.28 The Schutzbund strength 
~reported, varyingly, up to 200,000 men.29 
In early day8 of the republic, the Socialists needed no 
army because the republic 1 s army was composed l ·s.rgely of 
Socialists. Under Deutsch, the army was organized on the 
Soviet model. The enlisted man was the ultimate authority 
and voted for hi~ officers after candidates had served a 
month's probationary period. Tenure of officers depended on 
the continued approbative vote of the Soldiers' Councils.30 
Socialist interest in the Volkswehr (people's army) continued 
27Karl Renner, quoted in "Austria, an Unsolved Problem," 
.QJ2. cit. , p. 19. 
28steg, .QJ2. cit., p. 518. 
29 11 The Strong Man in Austria, 11 Literary Digest, 103:12, 
October 12, 1929, p. 12. Some report Schutzbund strength as 
low as 90,000. 
30 . Strong, QQ. £1j., p. 148. 
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after the party left the government coalition. The Sociali8ts 
urged unemployed followers to join the colors to insure the 
army against ever being used as an anti-republican instru-
ment.31 
~ Heimwehr. Rival of the Schutzbund was the Heimwehr 
(Home Defense League). Founded in the first days of the re-
public to resist Slav forces invading Carinthia, the Heinnvehr 
later became the instrument of Austrian extreme rightist 
elements. First head of the Heimwehr wa~ Dr. Richard Steidle, 
aristocrat and landowner. He had many members of the former 
i . 1 t ff t h. i 32 mperla s a a lS serv ce. Heimwehr leadership was 
ever-changing, ever-splintering. Dr. Steidle found rivals in 
Dr. Walter Pfriemer, Prince Starhemberg and Major Pab s t. 
Auxiliary military groups splintered from the Heimwehr; others 
sprang up to replace them. 
Other rightist military bodies. Although the Heimwehr 
was the most important of the military bodies supporting the 
Chri s tian Socialists, some of the others are of more than 
academic interest. They range from groups right of the 
Heimwehr to tho se deliberately founded to mitigate rightist 
tendencies in the parent body, from Nazism to republicanism. 
On the extremist side were the Hakenkreuzler (Army of the 
31New York Times, December 27, 1925. 
32 steg, QQ. cit., p. 518. 
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Hooked Cross), progenitor of · a Hitlerite wing of the Heimwehr, 
and the Frontkampfer (Fighters from the Front), whose youthful 
members bel ied the name of the organization. 33 
More moderate were the Sturmscharen (Storm troops) 
founded by Kurt von Schuschnigg in 1929 as "a kind of Political 
Youth Movement of the Christian-socialist Party, independent 
as to organization.n34 Although originally the troops were not 
on a paramilitary basis, eventually they were armed because 
they 'tvere 11 fel t necessary as an an-tidote (sic) to the 
Heimwehren with their radical trends •.• n35 In more open 
opposition to the Heimwehr, on the Christian Socialist side, 
was the Freiheitsbund (Freedom League). 36 
iU thin the Heimwehr itself there were many factions, 
one branch tending toward Italy, another inclining toward 
Germany, a third largely monarchist. One staunch defender of 
the Heimwehr admitted that the body had monarchist leanings, 
but he did not consider it a potential revolutionary force. 
"Monarchial-revolutionary ideas are not indulged by such 
peace-loving folk; their loyalty to the crown is purely 
33 nThe July Revolt in Vienna, 11 .Q.P. cit., p. 366. 
34schuschnigg, letter to this writer, .Q.P. ~-
35Ibid. 
36see Chapter III. 
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passive.n3? Peace loving or not, by 1925 Austria had two 
paramilitary organizations, clashing with disturbing frequency, 
spoiling for a bigger fight. 
JULY· 15TH INCIDENT. 1-~a tters came to a head July 15th, 
1927. Two persons, a war veteran and a child, were killed 
in the Burgenland village of Schattendorf when Heimwehr 
partisans and Socialists exchanged fire. The two bystanders 
were the only fatalities. Police arrested three Christi-an 
Socialist members of the Heimwehr, but the Viennese court 
where they were tried released them. Socialist ne1r1spapers 
rushed out extras denouncing the decision. Incensed workers 
' 
also recalled that a Christian Socialist student who had 
assassinated a Socialist leader had been acquitted, and that · a 
starving half-craze~ would-be assassin of Seipel had been 
sentenced to six years at hard labor. 38 Workers massed in 
the streets, marched to the Palace of Justice to which some 
mob members put fire. Police, after an ultimatumr,went un-
heeded, fired into the mob, killing many. 
Socialist version of the incident. Karl Renner told 
this story of the proletarian response: 
37 
"The July Revolt in Vienna, 11 QQ. cit., p. 36?. 
38 Steg, QQ. cit., pp. 518 f. 
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~vhen in July, 1927, the courts acquitted the 
Fascist murderers of Schattendorf, there was an 
entirely spontaneous and unexpected outburgt on 
the part of the working people of Vienna, who 
marched into the Inner City, surrounded the 
Palace of Justice, and could not be persuaded 
even by the Social-Democratic leaders to with-
draw. When the Palace of Justice was set alight, 
the police came into action and~ghot dead nearly 
a hundred of the demonstrators.~ 
Christian Socialist vereio.o. Another narrator defended 
the court which freed the Christian Socialists: 
The jury did not dare to pronounce the •.• accused 
men as guilty in the face of uncertainty and the 
contradictory testimony of the witnesses, but 
allowed them to go free. Although the dead victims 
had not been Schutzbundler, and the jury who de-
cided on the acquittal consisted chiefly of men 
from the people, their verdict was the signal for 
a riot such as Vienna had not experienced since ••• 
1848. The verdict '\'!Ta.s made public late in the 
evening of July 14. On the following morning, 
the Socialist papers published an inflammatory 
article, calling for revenge •.• 40 
Schuschnigg described the incident as follows: 
In 1927 the radicalized mass set fire to the 
building of the Supreme Court in Vienna in protest 
against a verdict handed down by an absolutely 
independent Jury ••• There were many casualties on 
both sides. 41 
After this incident, the Socialists proposed simultane-
ous disarmament of both the Heimwehr and Schutzbund, but, 
39Renner, "Ten Year 1 s of Austria's Republic, 11 .Q:Q. cit., 
p. 584. 
40 11 The July Revolt in Vienna, 11 QQ. cit., pp. 368 f .. 
41 11 Austrian Apologia, 11 op. cit., p. 607. 
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========~==============================================-==--~~~~======~========== 
according to Renner, 11 the government of the priest Seipel ••. 
avoided taking any action which might have modified the differ-
ences between the two groups." 42 
Significance of July incident. In retrospect, the 
July incident seems the point of no return in the civil strife 
that became civil war. After the incident, party differences 
became irreconcilable. Unfortunately, neither Christian 
Socialists nor Social Democrats heeded warnings of disaster. 
The plenitude of Austrian Cassandras were largely disregarded 
until 1929. In 1928, Renner wrote reassuringly that repub-
lican elements were gaining strength in the Christian Socialist 
43 group. 
TURBULENT 1929. A year later Austria found herself in 
quotidian crisis. Demonstrations became riots at the drop of 
an insult, and insults '{!-Jere not only dropped--they were 
hurled. Some of these riots received world publicity and had 
a depressive effect on the Austrian tourist trade. 
Socialist obstruction .1!1 parliament. Meanwhile in 
parliament, the Socialists used their strength quite delib-
erately to obstruct legislation. They aimed at making 
Seipel's position untenable. But they also succeeded in 
42Gedye, "Austria--Enter Fascismo, 11 .2.!2· cit., p. 587; 
Renner, 11 Ten Year 1 s of Austria's Republic, QQ • ..Qlj;., p. 584. 
4~enner, "Ten Years of Austria's Republic," QQ. cit., 
p. 583. 
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discrediting the efficiency of parliamentary democracy, and 
extreme right elements seized the opportunity to deride the 
democratic constitution. A vibrantly pro-Socialist writer, 
Charles Gulick, admits: 
As Renner indicated •.• the policy of being 11 as 
uncooperative in the parliament as possible" was 
in fact an accentuation of method that the Social-
ists had adopted after leaving the cabinet in 1920 
and that they had sharpened once before in 1922 
after Seipel had ended the inflation without their 
help. Among the disadvantages of obstructionist 
tactics, in Renner's judgment, were the tendencies 
to create among the less intelligent workers a 
belief that "obstruction" was omnipotent and, 
particularly when it was continued year after year, 
to foster in wide circles of the population the 
idea that the whole parliamentary system was dis-
credited, thus giving strength to Fascist argu-
ments. On the other hand, he vigorously insisted 
that it would be an injustice to his party to 
claim that its position had produced or provoked 
or alone even "made great" the Fascism of the 
Heimwehr.44 
Whether or not the Socialist recalcitrant attitude in 
the Nationalrat spurred discord, cla~hes in the street~ became 
increasingly frequent. 
Typical clash. An average incident was that of 
February, 1929, which police stopped only after twenty-five 
participants were injured. The action occurred at a Socialist 
meeting called to 11 discuss the lies of the Heimwehr. 11 Social-
ists invited the Heimwehr to attend, and some Heimwehr members 
44Charles A. Gulick, Austria From Habsburg to Hitler, 
II (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1948), p. 776, citing Die Gese1lschaft, I, 1930, pp. 130-140, 
e sp. 132, 135. 
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did--with truncheons in hand. After a vain attempt to seat 
their own chairman, the Heimwehr partisans used the truncheons 
to break up the meeting. 45 
Sometimes clash fatalit i es were used to whip party 
~entiment to fever pitch. Elaborate funerals, work stoppages 
and demonstrations would accompany the burial riteR of a 
Heimwehr or Socialist riot victim. 
Government accused Q! collusion. Much friction stemmed 
from Socialist accusations that the government was in collu-
sion with the Heirnwehr. In February,. 1929, a machine gun, 
rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition were seized at the he ad-
quarters of the Socialist party, and Seipel, nearing the end 
of his chancellorship, ordered the Socialist 11 ~vorkrnen 1 s 
Shooting and Sporting As so cia tion 11 dissolved. Sociali s ts re-
sented the raid and questioned the police failure to confiscate 
Heirnwehr stores. The Socialist newspaper, Arbeiter Zeitung, 
located in the same building as the Socialist party head-
quarters, commented pointedly: 
It is annoying that the government should single 
us out in this way to administer a pinprick to our 
improving relations and we should like to know why 
they fail to take action against the Heimwehr, the 
Austrian Fascists, who openly hold maneuvers with 
illegal arms and even allow themselves to be 
photographed with machine guns.46 
45 New York Times, February 25, 1929. 
46 New ~ Times, February 15, 1929. 
96 
Vexed Socialists then planned a protest march through 
Vienna. The bellicose Heim,,rehr scheduled a demonstration for 
the same day, routing the march past the Arbeiter-Zeitung 
building in a taunting gesture. Not to be outdone, the Social-
ists routed their march past the office of the Christian-
Socialist newspaper, Reichspost, and through the wealthiest 
residential sections. Police persuaded the two factions to 
moderate their plans and to re-route marches through more 
neutral areas. On the appointed day, the parades came off 
tamely. Socialists mustered 21,000 men and the Heimwehr, · 
including the Boy Scouts, only 4,000. Inflammatory oratory 
flowed from both sides. One Heimwehr leader declared, 11 The 
march on Vienna has become a fact at last and we will repeat 
it.n47 Dr. Pfriemer, another Heimwehr leader, called for a 
holy war on tbe Marxist terror and during a climactic moment 
of the demonstration shouted, 11Red Vienna must become German 
Vienna. 1148 Police arrested seventy persons for disturbing the 
peace, held five for trial. All in all, it was a typical 
late-20 1 s Viennese Sabbath. 
~ of coup. A Heimwehr coup d'etat was in the air 
during most of 1929. When a Heimwehr demonstrator was killed 
in one of the over-frequent clashes between Socialist and 
47New ~ Times, February 25, 1929. 
48Ibid. 
97 
rightist forces, Heimwehr Officers Steidle and Pfriemer called 
for revenge in provocative terms: 
Comrades, re~t assured that your leaders will 
not hesitate to take the most extreme steps in 
the direction of self-help if the authority of 
the State is insufficient to ~ecure satisfaction 
for •.. (the) crime. All officers of the Heimwehr 
are hereby ordered to stand by i~epared for any 
emergency until further orders. 
A local Heimwehr chieftain 1 s comment on the possibility 
of compromise with the Socialists was dismissive, violent: 
11 iVi th such folk we only talk with whips in our hands. n50 
Demands for constitutional reform. The stepped-up 
Heimwehr agitation appears to be tied in with Heimwehr demands 
for a new constitution. The organization sought curtailment 
of Socialist power by reducing the status of Vienna to a city 
rather than a federal state and by limiting suffrage. A pro-
vincial Heimwehr organ, Tirbler Volksboten, outlined the 
Heimwehr goals in an unveiled threat: 
Parliament will either carry out the reforms of 
our constitution which will make it impossible for 
some few radicals with red carnations to stop the 
entire work of Parliament, or we will change the 
ConAtitution without the co n ~ ent of Parliament.51 
A ~q'trong government will be:formed 1-\rhich 'tvill decree 
a new Constitution and carry it through with the 
help of the army, gendarmerie and Heimwehr •.. 52 
49New Yor; Times, August 21, 1929. 
50 The speaker was General Hess of tvaidhofen. (Ib.i£!.., 
September 18, 1929. ) 
51A red carnation was the emblem of Vienna Socialists. 
52Quoted in New York Times, August 18, 1929. 
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socialist statement. Following a Heimwehr-Socialist 
clash at St . Lorenzen in which casualties numbered fifty-seven, , 
the Socialistq issued this official party statement: 
The Socialist Party for years has been warning 
against the Putsch attempts of an irresponsible 
minority which would bring the country to the verge 
of civil war. Our voice has been unheeded when we 
have prophesied this overwhelming disaste r a,nd now 
the Putsch has come within measurable distance. 
The workers of Austria, therefore, are forced to 
proclaim the necessity of self-defense to prevent 
the overthrow of the workers and the democratic 
republic by a minority of irresponsible adventurers. 
The working class of Austria wishes to settle 
its differences by peaceful means, but should 'a 
Putsch be attempted they will defend themselves •.. 
with every available means. 
The Socialist party of Austria considers that 
the strength of the Austrian proletariat lies not 
in isolated actions , but in the united and care-
fully prepared resistance of the whole body of 
workers and in the strength of the Republican 
Schutzbund. 
The workers are called to prepare themselves to 
participate in this general defeng~ movement and 
allow nothing to intimidate them. 
Thus, the lines were definitely drawn. Leopold 
Kunschak 1 s Weltblatt, liberal Christian Socialist newspaper, 
warned of a Heimwehr , putsch, while the Reichspost, organ of 
rightist Christian Socialists, told Socialists that if they 
persisted in resisting Heimwehr attempts to reform the con-
stitution, parliament might be convoked outside of Vienna. 54 
53Text in New York Time~, Augu~t 20, 1929. 
54N~ York Times, August 18 a.nd September 18, 1929. 
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To most ob~ervers a coup seemed inevitable. The feared date 
was September 29th, 1929, at which time four Heimwehr units 
were slated -to march into Vienna from four suburbs and join 
in a giant demonstration. Heimwehr Catholics alluded somewhat 
blasphemously to the fitness of Saint Michael '~ feast, 
55 September 29th, for a putsch. 
Streeruwitz's nosition becomes untenable. The non-
parliamentary factions of both parties pushed the government 
into the background. An impotent government under Chancellor 
Ernst von Streeru11vi tz urged the Heim111rehr to be more moderate 
but could not or dared not move against it. Rumors of a 
putsch made matters doubly d.ifficul t for Streeruwi tz, for he 
was not only besieged on the domestic front, but also hard 
put to induce foreign capital into Austrian industry. In-
vestors, understandably, felt dubious about putting money into 
a country so evidently on the verge of civil war. The hard-
pressed chancellor wanly stated, after returning from an early 
September, 1929, meeting in Geneva where the question of 
Austrian credits 't-.ras discussed, 11 Al though I endeavored to 
correct the impression of foreign diploma.ts that the condition 
of Austria was very grave and bordering on revolution, I admit 
I did not altogether succeed. 115 6 The harassed Christian 
55 saint Michael waq ~ctually no revolutionary. He led 
the leg~ons of the good angels, according to tradition, in ex-
pelling the fallen angels from heaven. The fallen angels had 
rebelled. 
56 New York Times, September 19, 1929. 
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Socialist was under attack from right as well as from left. 
Dr. Steidle called Streeruwitz 1 s timid criticisms of the 
Heimwehr a "nuisance, which must cease. 1157 On September 20th, 
1929, the streeruwitz government announced it would in t roduce 
a constitutional reform bill, but the measure was a far cry 
from meeting Heimwehr specifications, and the cabinet fell. 
Schober takeA over. streeruwitz 1 s successor in the 
chancellorship was Johann Schober, oft-termed the strong man 
of Austria. The decisive Schober came into office like a lion, 
his belligerent re~entrance to the top post in the Austrian 
government averting the immediate threat of putsch. A repu-
tation stood behind him. It was Schober who had suppressed 
the July 15th, 1927, riot, earning the enmity of the Social-
ists, but winning applause from many others. 
11 I assert that all the forces of the state are strong 
and they are at the disposal of the , Government. They are 
quite sufficient to avoid any danger," he thundered in his 
acceptance of the chancellorship. 58 
Coup averted~ constitutional reform. By November, 
Schober reached a compromise with the Socialists on constitu-
tional reform, robbing the disgruntled Heimwehr of its excuse 
and much of its support for a putsch. The new constitution 
57Ibid., August 20, 1929. 
58New York Tim~s, September 28, 1929. Schober had been 
police president of Vienna. He was chancellor in 1920, suc-
ceeding Mayr. 
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left to Vienna her status as a federal state but provided that 
part of the municipal tax revenue would go to Lower Austria. 
The Vienna Municipal Guard, a Sociali~t police qrgan, was 
dissolved. The Austrian president was to be elected by the 
police instead of by the parliament and was given restricted 
emergency powers. 59 
The 1930 elections. The constitutional reform marked 
the end of another phase in the deteriorating relations of the 
two political factions. The 1930 parliamentary elections 
showed a sharp drop in Christian S~cialist support. The 
growing nationalistic groups, including the Heimatblock, a 
part of the Heimwehr, made major gains. Despite the fact 
that anti-Socialist forces got fifty-four per cent of the 
vote, the cardinal electoral trend was an increase in Social-
ist strength in relation to Christian Socialist Atrength.60 
Encouraged by the election returns, the Socialists throughout 
1932 joined tbe Austrian Nazis in demands for immediate disso-
lution of the parliament and for new elections. Says Dr. 
Schuschnigg: 
Perhaps it would have been right to accede to 
this demand from a purely theoretical, democratic 
point 6f view. But we were fully persuaded it 
would be a mistake. First of all, we did not 
59New York Times, November 24, 1929. 
60see Appendix. 
102 
want an election campaign managed from Berlin, 
secondly we did not want Nazi representation in 
parliament, and finally we could ill afford to 
run the risk of a heated and perhaps bloody 
election. The Nazi-Socialist maneuver was ob-
vious enough: to use democratic institutions to 
destroy democracy. 1ve were determined not to 
deliver our country6~ver to the Nazis, and hence we sought new ways. 
FINAL CO~~ROMI SE ATTEMPTS. The government then 
directed its efforts toward formation of a nonpolitical gov-
erning body, to be called the Fatherland Front, to replace 
parliament. Both the Chrisitan Socialist and Socialist partie , 
v.J'ere to be abolished, according to the government plan. The 
government envisioned such a nonpolitical body as an effective 
force against the Nazis. 
Schuschnigg emphasizes that throughout 1933 the 
government's fight was directed exclusively against Nazi ele-
ments. He states that "It was the foremost concern of the 
government to create a united front as large and as powerful 
as possible. Discussion with leaders of the Socialist party 
remained, however, fruitless.~62 
Some writers contradict Schuschniggrs rationalization 
of governmental activity in 1933 and imply that Dollfussian 
efforts to compromise were insincere. They declare that 
although Socialists may have displayed an unfortunate 
6111 Austrian Apologia, 11 .Q.:Q• ~-, pp. 607 f. 
62Ibid., p. 608. 
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intransigence prior to 1932, after Dollfuss became chancellor 
in that year, the Socialists made every reasonable effort to 
conciliate the Christian Socialists. 63 
Schuschnigg declares that the seemingly implacable 
Socialist demands voiced by Bauer were impossible to meet and 
that the party simply did not want to cooperate with a govern-
ment possessing emergency powers. 64 However, M. ~v. Fodor, 
Manchester Guardian correspondent, maintains that even the 
extremist Bauer wanted to be voted down by the more moderate 
elements in his own party and maintained his intractable stand 
only because he thought someone in the party should take the 
purely Socialist viewpoint--no compromise with iniquity. 
Fodor states, "Bauer thought that someone in the party had to 
represent an apparently irreconcilable and uncompromising 
attitude •.. 1165 
This may have been Bauer's attitude, but his followers 
had no way of knowing he was switching from his role as the 
Pied Piper of Austrian socialism to that of a Chamberlain. 
They backed him to the hilt in his firm stand, and the result 
was an impasse, with the Socialists refusing to yield an iota 
even on legislation they themselves favored. Parliamentary 
democracy was at a sta.lemate. 66 
63Fodor, QQ. cit., pp. 214 ff. 
64 11 Austrian Apologia," .2J2.• cit., p. 608. 
65Fodor, Q2. cit., p. 213. 
66some justification for Socialist obstructionist poli-
cies can be found. See Charles Gulick, Q2. cit., p~ 992-94. 
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CIVIL ~vAR 
The year 1934 was an eventful one for Europe and for 
Austria. It was the ·year of economic upsurge after a severe 
depression. It was the year that witnessed the flexing of 
Hitlerian Germany 1 s muscles in Austrian terroristic activity. 
Before 1934 ended, Hitler and Mussolini met for the first 
time and began to compose their differences, an ominous friend-
ship for Austria. 
At the beginning of the year, the long-awaited, long-
feared Austrian civil war erupted. 'vhy it broke out at that 
precise time remains a mystery. The Austrian situation was no 
more tense in February, 1934, than usual. Dollfuss had been 
ruling by decree for a year, and moderates in the Socialist 
and Christian Socialist parties were striving for a com-
promise that would mass Austrian support against the Nazis. 
Possibly, however, Dollfuss did not want to compromise. 
Perhaps Mussolini, upon whom Austria depended more and more 
for support against Germany, made elimination of the Socialists 
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the price of his shield. 67 
First nutsches. At any rate on February 1, 1934, a 
Heimwehr putsch at Innsbruck ended the elected local govern-
ment there and brought about establishment of a government 
consisting of Heimwehr, Young Peasant and Sturmscharen 
leaders.68 On February 6th, several Schutzbund leaders were 
inexplicably arrested in Vienna, a nd the next day put s ches 
similar to that of Innsbruck established Heimwehr government s 
in Styria , Upper Austria and the Burgenland. Meanwhile a 
French crisis dropped the Sociali~t cabinet in Paris from 
power. Do llfu s ~ had pledged this French government he would 
not move agai ns t the Austrian Socialists and now possibly f elt 
tha t he was not obligated to a fallen government. Or, 
67This is conjectured by many writers on Austria, in-
cluding Renner, Fodor, Butler and Lang sam. However, Schusch-
nigg maintains that Italy "never in 1934 or later made •.• an 
attempt to interfere in dome~tic politics of Austria." The 
Italian undersecretary of foreign affairs, Suvich, arrived in 
Vienna shortl y before the civil revolt, a circumstance to 
which some attach significance. Al t hough the possible rela-
tionship of Mussolini to the civil war remains merely a con-
jecture, there could be logic in such a move. Italy had 
something to offer Austria in 1934- -protection from the Nazis--
and caul~ therefore, reasonably make demands of her. Con-
tra r i ly, i n view of Mussolini 1 s a ssertion that fascism wa s not 
for export, it seems improbable that his interest would be 
overly aroused by a nearly impotent Sociali s t party in a 
neighboring country. (Fodor,~·~., p. 217; Renner, 
11 Austria: Key for War and Peace, 11 QQ. cit., p . 597; i'lalter 
Consuela La ngsam, The \vorld Since 1914. Fifth edition; . New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1947, p. 479; Ha rold Butler, The Lost 
Peace, _ _!: Per sonal Impression. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1942, p . 136.) 
68 Fodor, QQ. cit., p. 218. 
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possibly Dollfuss did not instigate the rebellion at a11. 69 
On February 11, Major Fey, vice-chancellor of the 
Austrian cabinet and a Heimwehr leader, ordered a search of 
the Socialist party headquarters in Linz. Radical SocialistR 
decided to resist, and, subsequently, fighting broke out in 
that city. News of the Linz battle had a catalytic effect on 
the anger of the tenge Vienna Sociali"lts. Radical Socialists 
talked of a general strike. Moderate Socialist leaders tried 
to calm their followers and made last minute efforts to re a ch 
a compromise with the government. 
The morning of February 12th wa~ the anni~ersary of the 
papal coronation, and Christian Socialist 8 leaders attended an 
elaborate commemorative mass. By the time they left the 
church, electricity had been cut off all over Vienna, and 
workers interpreted this move as the signal for a general 
strike. 70 Early in the afternoon, the government declared 
martial law, and soon Heimwehr members and Viennese police 
appeared in the streets. Then Austrian army detachments 
moved in. 
69Prince Starhemberg places all blame for the revolt 
on Major Fey. see Between Hitler and MusPolini, on. cit., 
pp. 118-132. 
7°There are some grounds for the theory that the strike 
was not Socialist-ordered, that radical electrical workers 
took the initiative and that other workers left their jobs 
under the mistaken impression a strike had been officially 
called. A ma.jori ty of workers stayed on their jobs. 
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First shots in Vienna. First shots in the Civil war 
were fired before the Reumann Hof. By whom they were fired is 
unknown. In any case, the fighting spread, continuing all that 
night and for the next two days. Socialist forces entrenched 
themselves in the Viennese apartment house blocks, but their 
resistance was futile, and they surrendered after three days. 
They were poorly armed, outnumbered and, because of the early 
arrest of their leaders by the government, leaderles s . For 
the most part, although fighting had begun in Linz, the battle 
was confined to Vienna. Schutzbund units were not even called 
out in some Au8trian cities. 
Aftermath. Some of the Socialist leaders were hung. 
Other~, including Bauer, escaped abroad. Later, an impartial 
investigation showed that the Socialist party leadership had 
not ordered the general strike and had not led the subsequent 
fighting. 71 In explaining the government role, Schuschnigg 
writes: 
Across the border ~n Germany) the Austrian Legion 
stood poised, awaiting the invasion order. We knew 
that and we also knew Hitler's obvious calculation.--
If the Government capitulated a Lefist dictatorship 
will be ..• in Vienna (Democracy or democratic forms 
were not the issue in 1934), Italy's support of 
Austria will drop out and Germany can "restore order" 
in Austria. If, however, the Government remains in 
control, Austria can be brought to terms by use of 
the strike movement.72 
71This has been corroborated by Schuschni~g, among 
others. ( 11 Austrian Apologia, 11 QI2. cit.' · p. 609.) 
72 11 Austrian Apologia, 11 QI2. cit., p. 609. Italics 
Schuschnigg 1 s. 
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Impartial account difficult. Summarily, it may be 
said that it is virtually impossible to obtain an impartial 
account of the civil war and the events that preceded it. 73 
The people who know are obviously, patently prejudiced. The 
participants perhaps do not see the over-all picture. The 
journalists seem to be equally ardvibrantly partisan. The 
most extreme anti-Christian Democratic viewpoint is that the 
government conspired with the Heimwehr to exterminate socialism 
and democracy in Austria. The most anti-Socialist theory is 
that the party planned establishment of a dictatorship and 
seized the Linz arms confiscation as an excuse for a putsch. 
Probably neither view is correct. The elusive truth would 
seem to lie somewhere between these poles. 
sm.n-lARY 
Both the Christian Socialists and Socialists failed 
their country. Moderate elements in each party permitted 
themselves to be led by radical minority wing8. Each party 
got out too far on limbs eventually fated to be cut off. Un-
compromising radicalism on both sides made effective conces-
sion improbable, then impossible. This extremism prevented 
Austria from being united when she most needed unity. Each 
73A good pro-government account is that of Schuschnigg 
in ·Austrian Requiem, pp. 187-190; a good pro-sociali~t 
version i s that of M. W. Fodor, QQ. cit., pp. 218-26. 
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party saw the need for cooperation against the Nazis 1 but, 
compared to the opposing party, the enemy from the outside 
seemed insignificant. This wrongmindedness enfeebled attempts 
to compromise. Thus, a divided Austria faced a behemoth 
Germany. 
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CHAPTER V 
ECONOMICS AND ANSCHLUSS 
When peace returned to Euro~ in 1918, it found Austria 
in a state of worsening economic anarchy. Austria did not 
have enough food to feed her populace. She did not have 
enough coal to 8Upply her factorie8. Tariff walls barred her 
exports to formerly free marketA. New territorial boundaries 
separated the constituent parts of many of her industries--
raw materials were cut off from processing plants and proces-
sing plants from assembly and distribution points. Trans-
portation and communication facilities had broken down. 
Austria's currency rapidly became worthless as the other 
Succession states stamped the once common exchange of the dual 
monarchy with their own state seals and refused to acknowledge 
unstamped bills. An unparal~eled spiraling inflation gripped 
the country. 
Interwar Austria's economic problems stemmed in large 
part , Austria maintained, from the Treaty of Saint Germain 
which severed the Austrian core of the dual monarchy from 
seven-eighths of itq former domain, cutting off Vienna from 
her hinterland and forcing the new republic to import two-
thirds of i ts food and two-thirds of itq coal. The new 
Austria allegedly received short measure at Saint Germain. 
Edgar L. G. Prochnik, an Austrian charge dfaffaires wrote of 
his country: 
She has, indeed, the rare but sad distinction 
of being a country without boundaries, i.e., 
without natural or ethnographic or economic bound-
aries, suggesting in her outlines rather the trac-
ing of a youngster •.• playing with a map of Europs 
and some colored pencils than the cartographic 
reproduction of a geographical unit.l 
An American scholar writing on the treaty seconded the condem-
nation of the new Austrian frontiers: 
Economically it (the treaty) is indefensible, 
for the fragment of the old empire which is left 
is not capable of self-support. Vienna., the eighth 
largest city in the world, and with a third of the 
population of the republic, cannot be supported b~ 
the reduced area of which it will be the capital.G 
The Inter-Allied Commission on Relief of German Austria in its 
report reinforced the impression that the nel~r Austria was not 
economically viable: 
Vienn~ with its two-and-a- quarter million inhab-
itants from being the capital of an Empire has be-
come the chief town of a State which outside it 
numbers less than six million inhabitants: it is 
an enormous head on the body of a dwarf. The ter-
ritory of _German Austria, moreover, even apart from 
quest i ons of size, is singularly little qualified 
to support a large capital; it contains only rel-
atively small industrial districts (chiefly in 
Styria and the neighbourhood of Vienna); even of 
the rural area~ large portions are mountainous and 
relatively unproductive ••• The part of Austria now 
claimed by the Czechs, while it contains only about 
lprochnik, QQ. cit., p. 20. 
2scott, QQ· £1!., p. 219. 
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one-third of the total population of Austria, 
accounted for 90 per cent of the coal production, 
80 per cent of the iron and steel, 90 per cent of 
the cotton, 95 per cent of the Rugar, and pract-
ically all the wool and ceramic trades. 
The principal industry of Vienna wes the manu-
facture of clothing and ornaments. Its importance 
lay in its position aA a centre of government, 
culture, finance, commerce and transport. For 
none of these services to be rendered by Vienna is 
there at present any demand. It is not clear to 
't'!That extent the "tomrld will have a use for Vienna 
in the future •.•. German Austria is a bankrupt 
with no assurance of ever being able to earn money 
again. 
1 t any rate the most hopeful outlook for Vienna 
(and so for its creditors) lies in restoring its 
importance as a transport and trading centre; this 
in t urn probably depends upon restoring as much as 
possible of the previous economic unity of Austria-
Hungary despite its political dismemberment.3 
POLICIES OF THE PARTIES 
Socialist emergency role. Destitute Austria traveled 
Rteadily down the path to economic bankruptcy throughout the 
Socialist a~~inistration of 1919 and 1920. During its tenure, 
the Socialist government concentrated on stopgap emergency 
relief--food was the most urgent problem. To Austria's basic 
economic weaknesses, Socialists saw but a ~ingle solution--
An~chlus~. They, accordingly, stres sed palliative rather than 
curative measures. Subsidies were used to keep food costs 
down. Laws requiring employers to keep \'ororkers on their pay-
rolls whether or not their labor was required were ineffectual 
3Text of the 11 Ste.tement of the Commission Hegarding the 
Desperate Position of Vienna and German Austria with Recommen-
dations for Relief, 11 Almond and Lutz, QJ2.. cit., Document 48 
( b ) ' pp. 91 f • 
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in the battle again~t unemployment. The government gave doles 
to the unemployed. The Socialists also effected some basic 
~ocial reforms, such as institution of the eight-hour day and 
the two-week vacation with pay. However, when they lost their 
parliamentary majority in autumn, 1920, the economic chaos was 
worse than it had been the year before. 
Such cheerless economic vistas gave ill omen for the 
future, yet by 1938, the year of the Anschluss, Austria's 
national budget was balanced, her trade balance was favorable, 
agricultural readju stment had made her a dairy exporter and 
Vienna, whi le not regaining her Hapsburg era supremacy, was 
the paramount Central European capital. For this salutory 
state of affairs, the Christian Socialists can take credit, 
and Socialists are not loath, the~e days, to give it to them. 
Karl Renner, present Socialist president of Auetria, acknowl-
edges that Austrian inter'\'rar recovery was largely due to the 
rival party. 4 
Parties' economic polarization. In,economics, as in 
politics, a basic dichotomy between the Christian Socialists 
and the Socialists soon became evident in interwar Austria. 
The latter studiously championed the 11 underdog, 11 stressing 
passage of measures to aid the consumer and worker. The 
Christian Socialists bent their efforts toward basic capital 
4Renner, 11 Aus tria: Key for ~'iar and Peace, 11 QQ. cit. , 
p . 597. Renner gives credit to Seipel for his role in Austri~ 
economic reconstruction. 
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improvements in Austria's economic structure. More truly than 
the Christian Socialists, the Socialists were a "class" party. 
Their core of support came from the industrial 1o1orkers of 
Austria , and the Socialists assiduously pressed forward the 
interests of these workers. Contrarily, a mixed following 
backed the Christian Socialists--peasants , small bourgeois, 
big business interests and the monarchial aristocracy. 
War root of early economic difficulty . For a fair 
appraisal of the Socialist role in Austria's economy, one 
cannot judge the party by its 1919 to 1920 tenure, any more 
than one can judge the Christian Socialists by the equally 
chaotic 1920 to 1922 period. War, rather than the Socialists, 
must bear the responsibility for the economic derangements of 
these four years. Austria's economic fortunes turned upward 
only after the successful negotiations for the Geneva loan 
of 1922. 5 
The specter of national bankruptcy faced the Christian 
Socialist government on its assumption of power in 1920. 
Short of extraordinary foreign aid, there seemed to be no 
hope of balancing the budget. Doles to the unemployed and 
food subsidies constituted a daily drain on the budget, the 
government eventually reluctantly discontinuing the latter in 
an attempt to husband dwindling reserves. In 1921, more than 
fifty per cent of the national budget went to salaries of 
5 s ee also Chapter III. 
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government employees, pensions and food subsidies. 6 
THE 1922 LOAN 
However, the 1922 League of Nations loan sustained 
Austria through the crisis, and the national budget was bal-
anced by 1925. 7 An austerity program made this achievement 
possible. Reduction of the Austrian civil service received 
primacy in the League reform program, its contraction working 
a considerable hardship. Civil service firings passed the 
80 1 000 mark before League control ended in 1926. 8 
6Austria had a huge civil service, with twelve per cent 
of the population dependent upon civil service income. Immed-
iately after the war, some attempt was made by the new 
Austrian government to absorb the civil service of the dual 
monarchy, but there was a vast difference in the bureaucratic 
requirements of 50,000,000-person Austria-Hungary and 
6,000,000-person Austria. Actually the governmental bureau-
cracy was not as large as the twelve per cent mentioned by 
Van Sickle would indicate. In Austria, railroad workers, 
school te achers, salt and tobacco industry workers were on 
the government. payroll. (John Van Sickle, Direct Taxation in 
Austria. Cambri~ge: Harvard University Press, 1931, p. 74; 
Prochnik, ~- cit., pp. 22 f.) 
7For more details on the loan, see Chapter III. 
8Forty-Second Report by the Commissioner General of 
the League of Nations for Austria, (Period May 15th to 
Jule 15th, 1926), Official Journal of the League of Nations, 
Seventh Year, No. 9, september, 1926, p. 1157. 
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Another result of League aid was its stabilizing effect 
on Jmstria' s currency, ;...rhich became known as the Alpine dollar. 
Increasing bank deposits, and falling wholesale price indexes 
testified to Austria's gradual recovery. 9 
THE POSITION OF VIE~lliA 
The approaching recovery made dolorous visions of 
Vienna as a ruined city seem at least premature.10 The prob-
lem of Vie nne.-- 11 a giant head on a dwarf 1 s body 11 - - fascina ted 
Austrians and foreigners alike. Baron Haupt, Austrian minister 
to Switzerland, believed that 
Vienna is going to be the big loser by the war. 
It is inconceivable that it will ever regain its 
one-time lustre as an imperial city. If Austria 
joins Germany, Vienna will become a provincial 
appendage to Berlin, and, even if the Danube con-
federation becomes possible, the capital can never 
hope to have its earlier status.ll 
The Allied Commission for Relief of Austria put its finger on 
the apparent cause of Vienna's difficulty: 
9Details on Austria's recovery can be gleaned from the 
monthly reports of the commissioner general submitted to the 
League of Nations Council and published in the Official Journal 
of ~ League of Nations. 
lOA contemporary Austrian novelist 'lrlrote a "prophetic 11 
story of the Vienna of 1950 in the early 20's, picturing the 
city as a specter of its former self, with grass growing in the 
streets and a plague-ridden populace scrounging for food. 
(Fodor, on. cit., p. 7.) 
11The New York Times, January 7, 1919. 
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••. It (Vienna) is an enormous head on the body of 
a dwarf •.. The principal industry of Vienna wa s the 
manufacture of clothing and ornaments. Its import-
~ lay in its position ..§:!! .§ center of government, 
culture, finance, commerce and transuort. For~ 
of these services to be rendered £1 Vienna is there 
at present any demand. It is not clear to what 
extent t~e world will have a use for Vienna in the 
future.l 
Another non-Austrian, Geographer lval ter Fitzgerald, also 
13 
confirmed the opinion that Vienna wa s too large for Austria. 
VIENNA AS A CENTER OF FINANCE~ Undeniably, Vienna' s 
role a s the financial capital of Central Europe suffered a 
critical blow 'trJ'hen the empire broke up. To understand the 
difficul tie!=! confronting Austrian bankers after tli'orld 'var I, 
one must recall Hapsburg Vienna's far-flung financial system. 
In Austria-Hungary, capital was rare, credit indispensable. 
Vienna formed the hub of a vast credit system. Although she 
became incidentally one of the two highly developed industrial 
areas of t he dual monarchy, Vienna's prime place in the 
empire's economy rested on the city's banki ng and insurance 
institutions and on its position as headquarters for the 
numerous Austro-Hungarian cartels. 14 
12Almond and Lutz, .Q:Q· cit.; •statement of the Commission 
Regarding the Desperate Position of Vienna, 11 p. 91. Italic s 
mine. ~~'tt'lalter Fitzgerald, The New Euroue, An Introduction to 
its Political Geograuhy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1946), p.llD. 
14Fifty-six cartels functioned in Austria-Hungary before 
1913. , apart from international cartels a nd cartels ouerating i~ 
either Austria or Hungary exclusively. (Jaszi, QQ. cit . , p. 20~) 
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Effect of treaty. The network of new frontiers created 
by the Treaty of Saint G-ermain severed long-~tanding commercial 
ties bet1r1een Vienna and the re~t of the empire. The ne'tv state~ 
most of them more backward industrially and financially than 
Austria, establi~hed their own credit institutions and pro-
tected them by legislation discriminating against, or actually 
liquidating, Viennese-controlled ban..'k:s. Vienna, thus , was 
left a detentacled octopus. 
But Ahe wa s also an octopus with regenerative powers. 
Viennese banks still had that indispensable accessory to credit 
transaction~, contacts, contacts which the financiers and 
business leaders of the new nations lacked. So, although the 
great lending houses of Vienna were temporarily ~hut off from 
the Danubian financial market , palliating forces slowly changed 
the picture. Vienna banks circumvented many restrictive reg-
ulations enacted by the Succe s sion states, according to the 
testimony of one Viennese bank manager. Vienna banks, he 
said, reorganized their branche~ in Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Yugoslavia under nationals, but 11 These nel.v ba nlm are, of 
course, to a certain extent controlled by their mother insti-
tutions which hold a considerable portion of their shares and 
have ..• special arrangements with them. 11 15 Thus control from 
Vienna, ostensibly ousted through the front door, re-entered 
15rv1ax Sokal, "Austrian Banks, 11 · Austria of Toda;y:, QQ. I cit., p. 35. 
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the succession ~tates by the back door. 
Postwar fi~cal boom. Moreover, confusion attending dis-
solution of t he empire and e~tabli9hment of the new republics 
temporarily increased the business of the Vienna credit hou~es. 
An Austrian ~conomist described the situation: 
The countless barriers, discrepancies and frictions 
between the new states made it more necessary than 
ever to have a central point •.. Every traveler must now 
continually change his money because he has to pass 
a new frontier every few hours. The trader can not 
send money freely to any place without the assistance 
of a bank •.. Under such circumstances, Vienna has be-
come a gigantic clearing house, central market and 
meeting point for the Succession states ••. The Vienna 
banks are dealing every day with fantastic amounts 
of foreign exchange -and the stock exchange is 
see thing with loJild speculation •.• The very multi tude 
of trade and traffic difficulties •• . induce foreign 
merchants to consign their goods to Vienna which 
serves as a sort of free port and as a distribution 
center for the whole of former Austria-Hungary ... l6 
Banks ~ comeback. Once the postwar boom ended, 
Viennese credit institutions began in earnest the long climb 
back to primacy in Central and Eastern European markets. They 
regained in large measure their lost ground, but were not 
called upon to finance the 11 safe 11 investments they had ser-
viced before 1918. Then, they had virtually no serious compe-
tition. After the empire ' s partitioning, local credit insti-
tutions, not Viennese, received the first opportunity to 
l6Friedrich Hertz, forward to Austria of Today, QQ. ci~ 
p. i X. 
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finance the safe, tariff-protected new industries of the 
Succession nations. 17 Nevertheleqs, Viennese institutions 
again dominated, although they could not dictate, the Central 
European credit market. 
VIENNA AS A TRAN~PORT CENTER. Transport activity, 
another pillar upon which Viennese economic primacy depended, 
also quickly revived after the complete breakdown in 1919. The 
division of the empire had dis~ected the rail system of the 
old monarchy, leaving entire railroad sections without term-
inals, points of junction, roundhouses or repair shops.l8 
The Austrian Ministry for Transport and Traffic declared that 
postwar Austrian railroads vJere merely a 11 torso 11 of a once 
united system•l9 Additionally, checking points sprang up at 
the new frontiers, all but halting the traffic flow. Immed-
iately after the Armistice most of the Succesqion states 
refused to allow their boxcars to enter a neighboring country, 
fearing such rolling stock would be confiscated. Consequently, 
haulers had to break freight at every border, considerably 
retarding service. 
Readjustment to the transport problem came about 
17K. W. Rothschild, Austria's Economic Development 
Between the Two Wars (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd. 1947), 
p. 55. 
18Prochnik, op. cit., p. 20. 
19Ministry for Transport and Traffic, 11 Traffio and 
Transport in Austria," Austria of Today, Q:Q. cit., p. 40. 
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rapidly, ho't'Jever. In 1923, Sir tvilliam Acworth, Briti sh 
railroad expert, found chances excellent for Vienna to regain 
her position as the commercial center for the Danube Basin. 20 
Vienna originally became an important city largely because of 
her position at the crossroads of Eastern and tvestern Europe. 
Though the fortunes of war went against her, Vienna did not 
lose her favored transport position when Austria lost the 
empire. The Vienna Gap remained the only break in a mountain 
chain extending from the Gulf of Liguria to the Black Se a , 
and the Danube still intersected the ancient Baltic-Adriatic 
trade routes at Vienna. The Danube valley provided a corridor 
between Central Europe and Asia. Minor and a link between the 
great industrial European Northwest and the granaries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.21 At Vienna, the east-west 
traffic of the Danube met the north-south rail lines connect-
ing Germany 't·Ji th Adria tic and Medi terranean seaports, a cir-
cumstance of political as well as economic import. (Renner 
once remarked that without the Brenner Pass, the Axis would 
have been only t't.;o disconnected wheels. 22) Because Vienna 
thus held a key position on a world thoroughfare, the postwar 
20New York Times, August 24, 1923. 
2l~u. trany, Q.P. cit. , p. 177, and Andrew Gyorgy, Govern-
ments of Danubian Europe (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 
1949 ) ' pp. 7 f. 
22Renner, 11 Austria: Key for t'lar and Peace, 11 Q.P. cit~, 
p . 601. 
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continued downward, bu~iness seemed slack. 23 Seipel, confined 
to bed by a wound from a would-be-asqassin's bullet, judged 
the recession natural and temporary, an inevitable swing in 
the pendulum after the great progress toward recovery during . 
1923 and early 1924. However, the Sociali~t pre~~ charged 
that the League loan (which the Socialistq opposed becau~e of 
its anti-An~chluss proviso) had demon~trably failed except in 
balancing the national budget. 24 Throughout the recession, 
dismis~al of state employees continued, giving some credence 
to the criticism that the League reform time schedule rather 
than the welfare of Austrians occupied the prime place in 
Zimmerman's program.25 
Layton and Rist renort. In April, Chancellor Ramek 
asked the League of Nations to appoint a committee of experts 
to study Austrian industrial and commercial problems. 26 In 
response 1 the League sent Economists William Layton and 
Charles Rist to conduct an inquiry. Their report, submitted 
23"Twenty-Fourth Report by the Commissioner General of 
the League of Nations for Austria," Official Journal of the 
League of Nations, Sixth Year, No. 3, March, 1925, p. 355. 
24New York Times, April 16, 1925. 
25There are scattered referenceq to dissatisfaction 
over Zimmerman's policy in many periodical~ of the early 20 1 ~. 
For specific discussions, ~ee New~ Times, December 10, 
1925; Eugene Bagger, 11 Dilemma of Austria," Century, III:620-7, 
March, 1926, p. 623. 
26 NetJ York Times, April 16, 1925. 
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to the League in October, 1925, concluded, albeit cautiously, 
that Austria possessed the means for economic viability. They 
pointed out that Austria was the first Central European nation 
to achieve a stable currency, that the Austrian National bank 
rested on a firm economic foundation and that agricultural 
production had virtually regained its 1913 level, although 
industrial output was still only eighty per cent of the 1913 
figure. Layton and Rist cited the high tariff walls of 
Austria' s neighbors as the chief obstacles to her recovery. 27 
The report drew mixed notices in Austria. The Social-
i s t press, nose distended, said that the report conclusions 
could well have been written before any investigation began 
because the League would hardly disclose any conditions indi-
cating a need for Anschluss. Socialist critici sm mellowed 
somewhat, however, in face of the report's approval of the 
Vienna tax program.28 The Christian Socialist press, on the 
other hand, commended the report as a vindica tion of the 
Christia n Sociali s t administration~ . 
Zimmerman's role in Austri a . In 1925, Zimmerman's 
'tvork in Austria 't~Ta s drawing to a clo11e. His record prompted 
some dissatisfaction on the grounds that his ex treme economic 
ortho doxy prevented use of lo a n funds for extensive industrial 
27-b.d 
..:!:...._1;_ • , 
28Ibid. 
October 20, 1925 . 
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pump priming. He evidently conceived his mission to be the 
balancing of the Austrian federal budget and, admittedly, 
attained his goal. . Sometimes the target of Au~trian crit-
ici~m, Zimmerman did not heRitate to retaliate and criticize 
Au~tria as the occasion arose: 
While drawing attention to the obstacles to 
trade in Central Europe, that is to say, to the 
international factors which affect the ~ituation, 
I have always pointed out that, side by side 
with these influences, which it is not in the 
power of Austria to control, there are others for 
which she is herself responsible.29 
League control ended in 1926. Austria, on her own, con-
tinued to make progresFJ tov.rard her recovery, but the progress, 
in part, was based on sand. 
THE DEPRESSION OF THE 30 1 S 
For Austria, a~ for mo~t other nation~, the high-tide 
of prosperity came in 1929. Au~tria, however, somewhat ~ooner 
than other European Rtate~, tumbled from that year's economic 
apex into a slough almo~t aR deep, but not a~ intrinRically 
chaotic, a~ that of 1919-1922. The cri~is broke with seeming 
suddenness on May 12, 1931, when tie Austrian government 
announced the failure of the Credit Anstalt. That bank re-
ported its los<1es at eighty-five per cent of itFJ total capital---
29"Twenty-Eighth Report by the Commissioner General of 
tbe League of Nations for Austria , 11 Official Journal of the 
League of Nations, Sixth Year, No. 6, June, 1925, p. 793. 
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and went out of bu~iness. 
The National bank crisis. The failure of the Credit 
Anstalt had greater economic overtones than just the failure 
of an important bank.. Seventy per cent of the Austrian trade 
and industry depended upon the solvency of the Credit Anstalt~C 
Charles Gulick, contemporary Austrian historian, opines that 
"Its liquidation would have been a liquidation of the Austrian 
economy. 11 31 The government stepped in, -v-vi th the Socialist 
minority's cooperation for a change, and a~~umed the obliga-
tions of the Credit Anstalt.32 However, the public was not 
reassured, and a run on the national bank ensued. Foreign 
investors called in loans rapidly. A 150,000,000-schilling 
advance from the Bank of England and one of 100,000,000-
schillings from the Bank of International Settlements miti-
ga tee. rather than ended the drain on the bank. The bank crisis 
plunged the Austrian government, which had been in the black 
since 1924, deep into deficit financing. Then, in a renewed 
3
°K. i'i. Rothschild, .QQ. cit., p. 55; Charles A. Gulick, 
QQ. Q.ll. , pp . 930 f. 
31G 1· k it 931 U J.C , Ql2 • .£..._;.., p. • 
32Gulick declares that socialist support of government 
reconstruction of the bank is proof that the Socialists were 
not a revolutionary party. If they were, he says, they 11 would 
have welcomed the outbreak of an acute crisis and exnected--
as had Karl Marx in 1857--that the economic cataclysm would 
deRtroy the despised capitalistic economy, create revolution-
ary possibilities, and open up the road to the new order of 
Socialism. 11 (Gulick, QI2. cit., p. 933.) 
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flight of capital, Germany and Hungary suspended foreign 
payments, and additional timorous Central European investors 
made haste to wi thdra't-.r their money while they could. 
Appeal to the League. In August, crisis-racked Austria 
again turned to the League of Nations, requesting an examina-
tion of her economic and financial difficulties. She under-
stated her ca8e thusly: 
The international economic crisis, coupled with 
the special difficul t ies inherent in Austria's 
economic position, h~s involved the coun~ry in an 
extremely difficult financial situation.u3 
Austrian representative Johann 5chober voiced his country's 
appeal at the League Council sessions in September, 1931. He 
recalled with gratitude the previous aid Austria received 
from the Lee.gue and assured the Council Austria would do 
everything she could in the present crisis in the way of self-
help.34 Dr. Pflugl, another Austrian representative, ex-
pounded to the Council the reasons for Austria's -dilemma: 
•.• owing to a falling off in revenue and the 
financing of investments by short term borrowing, 
the Austrian government i s faced with a deficit 
and with the repayment of short-term debt obliga-
t ions ~rhi ch canna t be paid from the Treasury 
33 "Lette~ dated August 7th, 1931, from the Austrian 
Government Requesting an Examination by the League of Its 
Economic and Financial Difficulties," Annex 1314 to the Min-
utes of the 64th Session of the Council Held at Geneva from 
Tuesday, September 1st to Monday, September 14tn, 1931, 
Official Journal of the League of Nations, Twelfth Year, No. 1 
November, 1931, p . 2121. 
34Ibid ., p. 2033. 
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35 re<:!erve~. 
Dr. Pflugl, thus , put hi~ finger on one of the more 
basic weakne~~eq of the Austrian financial sYRtem. Au~trian 
lending houc.e~ , dependent upon short term credit, nonetheleRs 
financed long-term investments . As a resul t, during times of 
economic stress when Austria ' s creditors called in their in-
vestments, Austrian b anks found themselves ill-prepared to 
meet the obligati ons. 
Exchange control in t roduced. Meanwhile in October , 
1931--~Jhen foreign exchange reserves of the Austrian national 
bank had fallen to 359 , 000,000 schillingq from 856 , 000 1 000 
schillings the previous May--Austria introduced exchange con-
trol to l ay the specter of devaluation.36 The artifically 
maintained schilling brought problems as well as benefits. It 
encouraged imports, i'IThile , at the same time, Austrian export-
ers found competition in foreign markets difficult. 
3511 Report of the Financial Committee on the Re queet by 
the Austri an Government for an Examination by the League of 
Nations of its Economic and Finanqia_l Difficulties, 11 Minutes 
of the 65th Session of the Council Held from saturday , Septem-
ber 19th to Thursday, December lOth, 1931, Official Journal 
of the League of Na tions , Twelfth Year, No. 12, December, 1931, 
p . 2275. 
36Austria, a very shy child after the holocaust caused 
by inflation in 1919-1922 , fea.red inflation above all else. 
Devaluation would al~o increa ~e the foreign debt burden. 
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I mport quo tas e <=Jtabli shed. The ~olici ted Le ague aid was 
slow in coming, a nd Aus tri a could not afford to wait for it if 
she was to aver t bankruptcy. Early in 1932, she .arranged for 
a moratorium on mo s t of her banking debt s . 37 In Maw , 1932, 
11 in spi te of the gravest apprehension, 11 she 11 re solved to 
establish i mport prohibitions in order to reserve her means 
and her credit for •.. essential requirementA. 11 38 A drastic 
reduction in Austrian f oreign trade follo,,.red; hotv-ever, vJOrld 
t rade also dropped sharply during the same period. 39 
The Lausanne loan. Finally, in mid-1932, spurred by 
the recomme ndation of the League financial committee, by a 
British state me nt that Au Atria possessed "special clai ms " on 
external aid, by Austri a 's own plaint in July, 1932, that 
11 EV'er since l as t Sep tember, when the Financial commit tee first 
recommended it (the loan) the Aus trian government has been 
awaiting action," a League grant of 250,000,000 ~chillings was 
37nt.vork of the Financ ial Committee: AuAtria , 11 i\1on thly 
s ummary of the Leagu~ of Nation~, April, 1932, p. 121 . 
38 11 Letter Dated J.vlay 9th, 1932, from the Austrian Govern-
men t to the Secretary Genera l" ~of the League of Nations Coun-
cil), Annex 1378 to the Minute~ of the 67th Session of the 
Council held at Geneva from Monday, May 9th to Friday, July 
15th, 1932, Official Journal of the Le ague of NationA, Thir-
teenth Year , No. 7, July, 1932 p . 1448. 
39In 1931, the fisc a l value of world trade was nineteen 
per cent lo li>m r than in 1930, which year was t wenty-eigh t per 
cent under 1929. The fiT~t half of 1932 showed a thirty-three 
ner cent r eduction from the fir~t half of 1931. The volume of 
worl d trade decreased as well as its value. (League of Nations 
11 Revi ew of i'iorld Trade, 1931 and 1932, 11 Monthly Summar of the 
Le ague of Nations, 12:365-366, December, 1932, p . 365. 
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made to Austria.40 The Lausanne Protocol~, under which the 
a~sistance was provided, made the loan conditional on Austrian 
abstinence·from Anschluss.41 Guarantors included Belgium, 
the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, France and Italy. The 
League named Ro~t van Tonningen, a Netherlander who had been 
Zimmerman's secretary from 1923 to 1926, as League adminis-
trator of the loan~2 
In spite of Austria's economic straits, the loan rat-
ification barely squeezed through the Nationalrat with a two-
vote margin. Socialists based their oppo~ition on encroach-
ments of Austrian sovereignty implied by League jurisdiction. 
Like the Geneva loan, the Lausanne grant's stabilizing effect 
became evident immediately. By December, 1932, the budget 
40League of Nations Information Section, 11 Financial 
Situation of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece, 11 N.onthly 
summary of the Le ague of Na tions, 12:148-153, ~ay, 1932, 
p. 149~ Al~o, 11 Le tter Dated May 9th, 1932 etc. 11 Q2. cit., 
p. 1448. 
41Austrian Protocol, Annex 1383 to the Minute~ of the 
67th Ses~ion of the Council held at Geneva from Monday, May 
9th to Friday, July 15th, 1932, Official Journal of the League 
of Nations, Thirteenth Year, No. 7, July, 1932. Preamble to 
protocol, p. 1461. At thi8 time the AnschlusA again wa~ an 
urgent quegtion because of itq appearance in the guise of a 
propo~ed Austro-German customs union. (See chapter VII.) 
42League of Nations Information Section, 11 The Financial 
Situation of Austria," Monthly summary of the League of Na-
tions, 12:227-229, p. 229. 
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situation had 11 greatly improved. 1143 Hard-up Austria actually 
seems to have been no harder up than many another depression-
struck country. However, Rhe possessed a more narrow margin 
of safety than, for instance, the United States or Germany--
the latter, the Socialists felt, being a more pointed instance. 
LEAGUE AID RECAPITULATION 
Although timeR were difficult for Austria from 1919 to 
1938, they were not easy for any European state. A frequent 
argument used by those maintaining that the Saint Germain 
boundaries were economically untenable pointed to the League 
assistance as the rea~on for Austria's survival and sta ted 
that Austria could exist only as a mendicant nation. However, 
the Lausanne loan, 111ihich helped Austria through the depression 
of the 30 1 s, and the Geneva loan, whi ch stabilized her economy 
in the chaos which followed the first world war, actually 
totaled only $170,000,000--or twenty-six do.llars r:e r capita. 
The two lo ans, in the main, provided marginal assistance in 
the balancing of the federal budget. Income from state enter-
prises pledged as security for the loans usually ran as ·high 
as four times over the interest payments , certainly an 
4311 Report of the Financial Committee:·; General Financial 
Situation of Austria and Letter of July 1st, 1932, from the 
Trustees of the Austrian Government Guaranteed Loan of 1923-43," 
Minute R of the Sixty-Ninth Session of the Council, Part II, 
Held from Monday, October 3rd to Monday, December 19th, 1932, 
Official Journal of the League of Nations, Thirteenth Year, 
No. 12, December, 1932, p. 1929. 
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indication of Austrian vitality. 44 League aid, while perhaps 
indispensable, corresponded to the transfusion, not the vi tal 
blood stream. 
Austria always met her loan obligations except during 
the crisis-ridden early 30 1 s, when "owing to a falling off in 
revenue •.• (and) ..• short term borrowing," the country faced a 
deficit for the first time since the early 20 1 s. 45 Thus, in 
1931, Austria interrupted her foreign repayment8, noting, 11It 
was particularly regretted that it was impossible to exclude 
from this interruption of payments · abroad the service of the 
League of Nations loan of 1923 •.. 1146 However, Austria was not 
alone in foreign repayment difficulties. Hungary suspended 
44A. R. Zimmerman, Speech to the League of Nations 
Council, June 9, 1926, ' Minutes of the Fourth SeRsion of the 
Council held at Geneva June 7th to June lOth, 1926 , Official 
Journal of the League of Nations, Sevent~ Year, No. 7, July, 
1926. 
45Report of the Financial Committee on the Request by 
the Austrian Government for an Examination by the League of 
Nations of Its Economic and Financial Difficultie~, Minutes 
of the 65th Session of the Council, held from saturday, 
September 19th to Thursday, December lOth, 1931, Official 
Journal of the League of Nations, Tv-1elfth Year,· No. 12, 
December, 1931. 
46comrnunique of the Austrian government dated August 
25th, 1932, Annex 1401 to the Minutes of the .Sixty-Ninth 
Session of the Council (Part II) Held from Monday, October 
3rd to Monday, December 19th, 1932, Official Journal of the 
League of Nations, Thirteenth Year, No. 12, December, 1932. 
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repayments even earlier, and soon the payment of all war debt8 
became passe. 
The loans were necessary, but the amounts involved were 
not great . As much as any thing else, their .moral effect made 
a great contribution in restoring confidence within Austria. 
Thus, after the Geneva loan was negotiated, the bank deposits 
in Austrian banks increased, even though the loan was not 
actually floated until nearly a year after the agreement was 
signed. The Lausanne loan had a similar effect. 
INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY 
Industrial recovery followed in the wake of the Lau~anne 
loan. Austrian production , at depres~ion's nadir in 1932, 
climbed to approximate full recovery by 1937. In 1934 her 
recovery rate was faster than that of Czechoslovakia or the 
United Sta te·s, although slower than that of Hungary and_ 
47 England. After Dollfuss introduced an authoritarian regime 
in 1934, industrial production accelerated. However, this 
increase Fternmed more from rearmament and public works programs 
than from gains in consumer production. The latter lagged, 
although tvaterpm..rer use and production of paper, cellulose, 
steel and iron ore mounted. 
47In 1934, Austrian production was seventy per cent of 
1929's; Czecho.s1ov.akia's, sixty-seven per cent; the United 
States, 1 sixty- ~i x per cent, and Germany's, eighty ~r cent. 
(K. \•l. Rothschild , ..Q:Q. cit., p. 65.) 
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Effect of empire dismemberment. The original wound 
dealt Austrian industry came in 1919, when the empire was 
sundered. Just as the new frontiers cut Austria's credit 
arteries , so did they separate industrial plants from their 
administrative headquarter8, raw materials or .distribution · 
centers . For instance, in 1920 Austria had sufficient spinning 
mills but not enough looms for her textile industry. Her 
tanneries could obtain no hides. 48 Coal, the most urgently 
needed commodity, was now located in a foreign country, 
Czechoslovakia. The new Austria could supply only t"t-Jelve per 
cent of her coal requirements, and coal shipments from her 
normal sources, Czechoslovakia and German Upper Silesia, cou ld 
not be obtained due to transport and political difficulties.49 
The wheels of readjustment turned but slowly. 
Banking and business relationship. Another bar to 
industrial expe~sion was the close link between industry and 
banking--banks o1.vned much of Austrian industry--a situation 
peculiar to Austria. This relationship introduced an element 
of exaggera ted caution in the field of industrial expansion. 
Dr. Zimmerman judged that 11Industry is .•. handicapped by high 
interest, heavy taxation, and a too far-reaching social 
48seigmund Schild.er, 11 The Manufactures of the Republic 
of Auf'1tria, 11 Austria of Today , .212.· cit., p . 46. 
49Rudolf Klosq, 11 The Coal Supply of Austria," AuQtria 
of Toda~ , QP· cit., p. 40. 
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legislation."50 The high interest, at lea~t, Rtemmed from 
these banking-industry ties. To get a better return, banks 
fixed a wide margin between intereRt rates paid to depositors 
and those charged to borrowers--a margin varying from seven 
and a half to nine and a half per cent. I n 1925, the interest 
rates were down to a lush fifteen and a half per cent from 
twenty-t\'JO per cent in 1924. Additionally, since banks largel 
controlled Austrian industry, they could dictate policies, 
quite often subordinating indus trial interests to financial 
considerations. They avoided risks in industrial expansion. 
Sale of capital goods in the poRtwar panic may also have 
handicapped the Austrian economy con<:!idera.bly. The Alpine 
Montan Company, huge steel combine and the largest busines!"l 
concern in Austria , went into foreign hands in the early 20 ' s. 
Austria ' s resources~ ootential v.realth. Still, .there 
seemed to be no inherent rea8on for Austria's industrial 
laggardness. Dhe possesRed rich resources. Austria's steel 
industry , temporarily deprived of coal to ~toke the furnaces , 
was not unique in its need of import. Many countries acutely 
lacked one or the other of the basic, twin resources, coal and 
iron. Austria_, moreover, possessed one potential asset com-
pensating for the coal deficiency--water power. The Alpine 
50
.A. R. Zimmerman, 11 Austria 1 s Rising Sun, 11 Independent, 
114:633-4, July 6, 1925, p. 634. 
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nation had no shortage of waterfall~, and hydroelectric power, 
relatively untapped in 1918, came into increa~ing u~e during 
the interwar year~. The government carried out a railroad 
electrification project, interwar, eliminating one coal-
consuming drain. Au~tria po~~e~~ed many other resources, many 
more than neighboring Switzerland, a country with a Teutonic 
majority from which came no erie~ for AnRchluss. Austria had 
considerable quantitie~ of salt, manganese, quartzite, lignite 
talc, arsenic, sulphur, feld~par, lead, zinc, mica, graphite, 
iron ore, china clay, oil and antimony. 51 Appreciable oil 
deposits were discovered in the interwar period, and, finally, 
Austria had scenery, a tourism asset. 
Government and opposition business programs. The 
Christian Sociali~t government undertook various programs to 
stimulate industry--the Vienna merchandi~e fair, commercial-
ization of the Salzburg music festivals and additional, 
assorted lures to the tourist trade. Meanwhile, the Social-
ists in Vienna imposed heavy taxe~ on industry for the imple-
mentation of their ~ocial reforms. 52 
5lunited States Allied Commission Austria, Rehabilita-
~ of Au~tria, 1945-47, II (Vienna: 1949), p. x111. 
52For details of the Socialist regime in Vienna, see 
Chapter II. 
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AUSTRIA'S TRADE PROBLEM 
The slowness of Austria.'~ ind.u~trial recovery affected 
Austrian trade adverAely. Before the war, there wa8 no reason 
why the nine provinces later to become the republic of Austria 
had to b a l a nce their imports and exports. They were a part 
of the Austro-Hungarian empire. At the war's end, this sit-
uation changed. Austria needed food from the outside. She 
also needed coal and other raw materials. The only WRY to 
pay for them v>Ja~ for Austria to export; thus, more than any 
other problem, her trade deficit harassed Austria. Zimmerman, 
the Layton-Ri~t report and most students of Austrian economics 
cite the dependency on imports as the basic weakness of 
Austria's position. 
Depression brings trade balance. Unpredictably enough, 
t he trade deficit disappeared during the depression of the 
30's. Then , under government-imposed import quotas, Austria 
cut her imports drastically, even more dra~tically than the 
simultaneously declining exports. By 1934, the trade gap 
closed. To.uri sm more than met Austrian naper deficits from 
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that date on. 53 
Tariff walls chief Austrian nroblem. The most formid-
able obstacle to achievement of a favorable trade balance 
lay in the restrictive trade policie~ of the other 5ucce8qion 
sta tes. Immediately after the war these countrie~ initiated 
a program of withholding export~ to obtain needed imports. 
Sometimes this unfra ternal policy backfired, e. g., Czecho-
slovakia restricted textile and iron exports to Austria only 
to have Italy capture the Austrian market in cotton goods and 
Germany take over the Austrian iron market. 
Realizing the neces8ity of free trade if she were to 
prosper, Austria kept her tariff rates do~~ during much of 
the interwar period. Ho t,rever, her neighbors, a.nxious to 
53Austria 1 s apparent trade deficits up to approximately 
300,000,000 schillings were made up by tourism and other in-
visible exports during the late 30's. According to the 1938 
Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations. 
Austrian trade balances in schillings for the years 
1923 to 1937, all negative balances, were (OOO's omitted): 
1923 1,142,000 1928 1,068,000 1933 373,000 
1924 1,486,000 1929 1,098,000 1934 305,800 
1925 919,000 1930 859,000 1935 311,200 
1926 .. 1,100,000 1931 850,000 1936 .... 298,300 
1927 1,092,000 1932 619,000 lg37 236,800 
From 1934 on, Austria enjoyed a favorable trade balance if 
invisible exports are included. 
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develop home indu~trie8, raised theirs. Hence, in 1927, 
shortly before 8he joined in a policy of protectionism, Austri 
was the only ex-Empire member which actually reduced tariffs 
from the 1919 level. Her 1927 tariff levies were thirty-three 
per cent under the 1913 figu~e, while Yugoslavi a 's were forty-
four per cent over it, Romania 's, forty per cent higher , and 
Czechoslovakia ' s, thirty-seven per cent a~ove. 54 Such tariff 
inequity made it difficult for Au!::!trian industry to compete 
successfully in foreign markets, while at the same time 
Austria 1 s o'tvn low rates in vi ted an influx of foreign competi-
tion. Austria attempted, 1-.ri th limited success , to divert her 
export flow into new markets where tariffs IIITere les!=l formid-
able. 
Throughout the interwar period , economic tension betwee 
Austria and the other Succession states persis ted. While 
cooperation among them gradually increased, however, most of · 
the succession states still bore in mind that war released 
them not only from political allegiance to the Hapsburgs, but 
also from the economic dominion of Vienna. Austria's trade 
overtures, therefore , required tact--Yugoslavia, Romania and 
to a lesser degree, Czechoslovakia, saw the threat of possible 
new Hapsburg hegemony behind moves for a Danube customs union. 
Thus , . in 1925, Seipel ~ri thdrew an ever-so-veiled suggestion 
54Rothschild, QQ. cit., pp . 41 f. 
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for a Danubian economic arrangement after hysterical comment 
by the Central European press . 
Christian Socialist policy Q!! tariffs and. trade. As 
this incident indicates, Austria's Chri ~tian Sociali~t govern-
ment espoused breaking down tariff discrimination by negotia-
tion. Typical agreements were those negotiated in 1925 be-
tween Austria and Greece, providing that conventional rather 
than the hitherto maximum Greek tariffs would apply to Austria 
products, and one betloreen Austria and Yugoslavia, providing 
for a reduction of rates on Austrian exports to Yugoslavia. 55 
There seems to be a tendency on the part of proponents 
of Austria's economic nonviability ~ to blame the country's 
unfavorable trade balance exclusively on the partition of the 
dual monarchy. Less publicity is given the f a ct that the dual 
monarchy itself, a seemingly ideal organism, economically, 
f ailed to achieve a trade balance from 190? until its demise~6 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Although Austria came out of the depression of the 
30 1 s with a favorable trade balance, one problem remained 
5511 Twenty-Ninth Report by the Commissioner-Genera l of 
the League of Nations for Austria (April 15th-lVIay 15th, 1925)," 
Official Journal of the League of Nations, Sixth Year, No. 8, 
August, 1925, p. 1065, and "Thirty- second Report by the Commi~­
sioner General of the League of Nations for Austria (July 15th-
August 15th, 1925), 11 Official Journal of the League of Nations, 
Sixth Year, No. 11, November, 1925, p.--r6I'9':" 
56Jas zi, QQ. cit., p. 210. Jaszi concludes that 11 ••• in 
1913 the Austro-RUngar1.an monarchy "t-Jas already a defeated em-
pire from the economic point of view. 11 Loc • .£..ll. 
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unsolved--unemployment. Thi ~ all-too-pervasive symptom of 
economic illnesg gripped twenty-nine per cent of all Austrian 
workers during the depression year of 1933. 57 Even in 1929 , a 
year of relative prosperity, twelve per cent of Austria ' s 
workers were jobless.58 
The necessity of cutting down the massive monarchi al 
civil service to conform with Le ague of Nations dictates , while 
it eased the strain on the national budget, added appreciably 
to jobless totals. Before League control over the Austrian 
budget ended in 1926, more than 82,000 civil servants had been 
fired . 59 Since the Austrian unemployment figure never reached 
300,000 before 1931, the 82,000 dismissed civil servants rep-
re~ented between one third and one half of the total roster of 
the joble8s . 60 
Despite Austria's high unemployment rate , Economist 
Colin Clark's index of real wages per worker over the 1925-1934 
period places Austria at the halfway mark in a tabulation of 
thirty nations. 61 \vhile the per capita income of the interwar 
57Rothschild, QQ. cit., p. 52. 
58Loc. cit. 
59"Forty-Second Report by the Commissioner General of 
the League of Nations for Austria (1-:tay 15th-June 15th, 1926)," 
QQ. cit ., p . 1157. 
60~ ollie Ray Carroll, Unemployment In~urance in Austria 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1932). The Carroll 
study ends in 1930 . Possibly during the worst years of the de-
pression, unemployment reached the 300,000 mark . It did not 
before tnat time. 
61Co l in Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress 
(London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1937), p. 41. 
142 
Austrian worker was less than that of workers in 'tvestern 
Europe, including Germany and Switzerland, it was more than 
that of workers in Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Italy , Ru~sia and Romania, among others. 6 2 In other word~, 
Austria was better off than the other Succe s~ion states in the 
real wage area. 
THE FARM PROBLEM 
Like the proletarian problem of unemployment, farm 
difficulties in Austria dovetailed with that country•s basic 
ne ed--continued-- -export. But, unlike unemployment, the farm 
problem was causal. Austria ' s soil could not grow enough to 
feed her populace, necessitating enough exports to pay for 
food imports. vVi thout industrial expansion, which would mean 
full employment, Austria coo. ld not export enough. Thus arose 
the long standing trade -deficit, disappearing, as we ha ve seen, 
only during the depression. The major Austrian economic prob-
lems--agriculture, unemployment, slo -vmess of industrial recov-
ery--were all lihked, in some manner, to her dependence on 
trade. 
Shortage of arable land. Austria attacked her farm 
problem with considerable success , achieving remarkable result 
by rationalization of production. The basic problem of 
• 
62Loc. ill· 
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Austrian agriculture lay in the shortage of arable land. 
Before World \var I, Vienna depended on garden farms for her 
daily food supply, 1.vhich after the war were in foreign co un-
trie~ . She v.ras thrown ba ck on a r a ther barren hinterla nd. 
vli th almost t"tvelve p er cent of the former dual monarchyr~ 
population to feed, Austria possessed only seven per cent of 
the empire ' s arable l a nd to do the job. 63 She lacked , par tic-
ul arly, bread grain s and potatoe~. 64 
Ce i ling price policy ~ grain importa tion. 11oreover, 
Socialist policies in the first ye ars aft er the war diqcour-
aged ag ricultural effort. In 1919, the Socialist government 
imposed ceiling price s on farm produce in an effort to feed 
urban wo rkers--but prices \,Jere pegged below production costs , 
and the recalcitrant peasantry rebelled. Irked farmers re-
fused to deliver grain to Vienna; governors often prohibited 
farm products from leaving the provinces . The Soci ali s t 
national government tried to counteract the food shortage by 
importing grain. The Central Board for the Pro ·tection of the 
Inter est s of Agriculture and 'EoreRtry commented: 
p . 2. 
It goes without saying that every importation 
of gr a in to meet the requirementR of the Austrian 
popula ce means an enormous burden for the public 
finances of Austria , in view of the present rate 
of the kronen exchange. That is why the government 
contin~s to control the production and the trade 
in grain, even though such control doubtless means 
63United States Allied CommiR~ i on Au~tria, ~~. ~. 
6~oc. cit. 
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B serious. impediment to the revival of agriculture 
since it compels the farmers to deliver a great 
percentage of their crops at government price~ 
which are f ar below those on the foreign markets. 
It is only natural that the pea san tr.~ regard ~gvern­
ment control as a grave injustice and peril. 
These p rice controls, probably as much a.8 a nythi ng el se, 
caused pe asant disaffection with socialism. 
Austria achieves a dairy surplus . After the initial 
po st·Nar food crisis, the situation improved. 66 During tbe 
20 1 s and 30 1 s the government encouraged better farm practices , 
parti cularly stresRing greater emphasis on dairying. Dairying 
suited the rugged Austrian terrain, and p roduction r ose to tbe 
point where 1923 negative trade balances in milk, butter , 
cheese and condensed milk were . converted to positive balances 
by 1936.67 So it was tha t Austria in part met her need to 
import grai n by exporti ng anothe r farm commodity. 
Possibly Austri a will e.lways have to import food; how-
ever, this f ac t alone seems in~ufficien t r eason for a s serting 
the country is economically unviable. If Austria can export 
65central Board for the Protection of the Intere sts of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 11 The Present St a te of Agriculture 
and Fore s try in the Republic of Austria , 11 Austria of Today, 
on. cit., p . ?. Italics mine. 
66Congiderable food relief went to Austria during the 
first months after the war. For details and documents on 
Austrian re l ief , see Almond and Lut z, QQ. cit., ~)p . 8?-111. 
67 s chuschnigg , MX Austria, QQ. cit., p. 29?. 
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enough to pay for her food AUpplement~ and her raw ma terials, 
~he can look forward to a Round economy. Many nations depend 
on import8 for a large part of their nece~sary foodstuffs. 
Austria actually has fifty per cent more productive soil per 
capita than Switzerland. 68 
Ivioreover , it scarcely seems reasonable to list Austria. 1 ._ 
scant arable le.nd as an economic handicap 1,.rhen thirty-eight 
per cent of her acreage, simultaneously, yields an important 
Austrian export--timber. 
CHRISTIAN SOCIALIsT ACHIEVE1-1ENTS 
On the whole , the Christian Sociali st~ accomplished an 
almost phenomenal feat in the restoration of Austria. Under 
their tenure, achi evement s included a balanced national budget, 
stabilized currency, more profitably directed farm economy, 
progress in repayment of foreign loans, hydroelectric develop-
ment and patient negotiation of innumerable pacts aimed at 
lowering economicbarriers a.gainst Austrian exporters. Perhaps 
the only valid criticism of the Christian Socia.list economic 
policy was that the program did not provide enough stimulus 
to business to solve the unemployment problem. However, the 
nightmare of the 1919-1922 economic chaos probably deterred 
all but the most orthodox ventures on the part of the govern-
ment. The twin specters of inflation and deficit financing, 
68Hertz, forward to Austria of Today, op. £1!., p . vii. 
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'tvhich, in measure, h2.un ted the immediate postwar period, 
robbed Christian Socialist economic policies of much ini tia ti v 
SOCIALIST POLICIES 
The economic policy of the bocialist party is more 
difficult to assess because the party was out of power from 
1920 on. Certainly, however, one facet of . the party p~ogram 
8tands out--the Socialist concern for the consumer and for 
the working cla~ses. The highest tax rates under the Social-
ist afuninistration in Vienna were applied to the banks. The 
party opposed the dismissal of civil servants and fought for 
increased doles to the jobless while, a t the same time, 
Christian Socialist attention centered on ba lancing the fed-
eral budget, hence cutting down the civil service and keeping 
down unemployment compensation. 
Chief point of economic contention between the two 
part~s was the stringent Socialist rent control act in 
Vienna.69 However, this difference was not purely a differ-
ence in economic policies. Both the Christian Socialist 
concern for the landlord and the Socialist concern for the 
renter stemmed from political as well as economic motives. 
The Christien Socialists calculated , possibly rightly, that 
the virtually free rents in Vienna comprised the main font 
of 5ocialist strength in the capital. But certainly the 
69see Chapter II. 
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workers felt cheated when they Rtarted paying normal rentR 
after the February, 1934, revolution. They con8idered that 
they had themselveR built the model apartment houses and now 
were paying tribute on their own property to a government 
which in no way represented them. 
Socialiqt Farm Program. The Socialists possessed an 
almost completely proletarian following, but they realized that 
they could never obtain a majority on tha t basis alone and ~o 
added a middle-road farm progre.m to their advocacy of trade 
unioni~m and nationalization of industry . The Socialist party 
congres~ of 1925 accepted an agricultural program featuring 
socialization of large estate~ only, improvement of agricul-
tural methods , alleviation of excessive farm indebtedne8s and 
reform of agri cultural taxes. They propo ~ed. a state monopoly 
on the import and export of grain, flour and bran and stressed 
the cooperative movement and free and individual ownership of 
70 land. 
Socialist onpositon role. Socialistsopposed the 
Lauqanne and Geneva loans , probably because of the party 
adherence to Anschluss, but they cooperated with the govern-
ment during the Credit Anstalt crisis. Their national role, 
economically, was primarily one of chipuing away at Christian 
Socialist policies--policies which they might have resorted 
70Gulick, QQ.~., pp . 1381 f. 
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to them~elves had they been in power. (Even before the 
Socialist defeat in 1920, Renner as(!erted 11 ive mu(!t look to t.te 
t·rest," and , unlike many socialistf'l , favorec1 close liaison 
with the Succesqion ~tates as well aR with Germany.) But the 
3ocialist role, even if the party did not have a chance to 
implement its nationalization program, wac; more than negative. 
Largely beca11se of the militant Socialist minority, the re-
public of Austria Raw that it at least had a responsibility 
to the underprivileged citizen; . Hapsburg days may have. been 
the good old days, but not for the masses of Austrians , as 
even such a critic of the Socialists as Germain~ afunits. The 
republic had its crises and its problems , but the monarchy 
did not even consider it a problem that two-thirds of its 
people were badly housed. 71 
SUMMARY 
From the vantageous viewpoint of hindsight, it does 
C!eem that the 3ocialist contention of doom for Austria without 
union ,,rith Germany is lesR valid than Christian socialist 
propounding of Austria's will and ability to ~urvive independ-
ently. 
In reviewing the facetR of the Austrian interwar 
economy, Austria 's high unemployment total is the only di s-
concerting item to one defending that nation's economic 
?lcee Chapter II. 
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managed to surmount moqt of her pressing economic difficult-
ies. Ghe balanced her budget , reduced her foreign debt , 
effected a high degree of industrial re covery and achieved a 
stable currency and a favorable trade balance. 
Anschlus~ sentiment in Au~tria, always high, wa~ moqt 
intense in periods of economic stress. But in 1938, Austria 
wa~ v.rell out of her overly-exploited monetary wo ods and well 
on the road to'tv-a rd economic prosperity. It wou ld seem, then, 
that the economic factor was a negligible one in the fi nal 
Anschluss. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PATHOPOLITICAL FACTORS AND THE ANSCHLUSS 
Interwar Austria provided a Rhowcase for the patho-
political conditions of the continent. In that country, 
nationalism, fascism, militarism and anti-Semitism commingled. 
And from the unhealthy focal point where they met aro~e 
Austrian Nazism, Germany's gift to a not entirely unsuspecting 
little brother, Germany's gift to a Germany in microcosm. 
NATIONALISM 
Like the other Succession states, Austria was rife with 
strains of nationalism. Unlike the others, however, the 
Austrians' nationalism was not focussed on their own country. 
Instead it was a twisted, halved sentiment containing varied 
local patriotisms and a warm feeling toward neighboring 
Germany. Very little patriotism,· ce.ntered on the republic of 
Austria, which many considered the onetime "executive head-
' quarters" of the Hapsburg monarchy rather than as a nation in 
1 its own right. For some time after the eetablishment of 
the republic, Tyrolians referred ·to their fatherland as Tyrol, 
lw. Walter Crotch, "Whither Austria?" .Ql2. _ill., p. 410. 
and Styrians to their homeland a~ Styria. 2 
Pan-Germanism ghown ~ many. Austrians of varied 
political hues and varied attitudes toward An~chlu~ s in their 
writings emphasized the German heritage of Austria. The pro-
Anschluss Seitz, the moderate Renner, the anti-Anschluss 
Schuschnigg, the Socialistic younger Adler--all were profound~ 
ly conscious of their Germanic heritage. Scholarly Josef 
Redlich, former member of the imperial government, ~howed 
racial resentment at the Allied ban on Anschlus~: 
Hence the German ' Empire ••• mu~t be prevented 
from uniting with one of the oldest and racially 
pures~ components of the whole German gation, 
that of the Austrian Alpine countries. 
While this was a far cry from Hitler's passionate assertion 
that men of a common blood belong to a common realm, it 
emphasized the racial justification given for Anschluss. 4 Race 
consciousness is well-nigh universal, well-nigh eternal in 
Austria. A current manifestation of this consciousness is 
Dr. Friedrich Adler's assertion, "We are both Austrian and 
German. 11 5 Bauer commented that " ••• the antagonism between 
Austrianism and Germanism persisted in the soul of the Austria 
2Julius Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria (London: 
Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1948); p~ 105 f. 
~edlich, "Austria and Central Europe, 11 .QJ2. cit., 
pp. 340 f. Italics mine. 
4Adolf Hitler, Mein Kamyt (New York: Stackpole Sons 
publisher ~ , 1939), p. 19. 
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people. 116 
~ Anschluas opponent~ sympathetic to Germanx. Tho~e 
persons, additionally, who most opposed Anschlu~s never con--· 
sidered the terms Austrian and German mutually exclusive. 
Even the catchphrage that was used to ral ly the Au~trians 
against Nazi aggression . emphasized the Germanism of Austria: 
11 True German and red-white-red (Austria's colors) until we 1re 
dead. 117 Schuschnigg 1 s decision not to use force again at 
Germany gained sustenance not only from his conviction of the 
futility of such force, but also from his pro-German sympathy. 
He said: 
One cannot risk many lives to save a few--
especially when the eventual outcome of such a 
contest was not even doubtful, as in our case. 
But above all, Hitler was not Germany--at least 
not from a historical point of view, and 
National Socialism was not the German people, 
even though they might Aay so a thou~and times. 
It was perhaps a German fate--but certainly not 
the German future.8 
German policy bars alliance with France. Austria's 
allegiance to Germany precluded, Schuschnigg felt, a French-
Austrian line-up: 
6 Bauer, QQ. cit., p. 270. 
?This i~ a quote from Schuschnigg 1 g speech at a Feb-
ruary 24t~ 1938, special ses~ion of the Au~trian Federal Diet~ 
held after the Berchtesgaden meeting with Hitler. The speech 
reaffirmed Austria's intention nevert~ yield her independence 
voluntarily. (Austrian Requiem, QQ. cit., p. 33.) 
8Ibig., pp. 44 f. 
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For u~ Austrian~ it wa~, in ~pite of our iden-
tical view~ with France •.. impossible to rely ex-
clusively on French support ••• we had to realize 
that Austria could not in the long run exist on 
the difference~ between France and Germany. No 
government could have maintained itself on that 
ba~ie in Austria. It was one of those situations 
where political imponderabilia play a decisive 
part: sentimental, historical and ideological 
11 ifs 11 and 11 buts 11 which are difficult to express 
in so many words. Austria was opposed to National 
Socialism and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler. 0 But Austria was not and never could be anti-German.v 
Even the 1934 constitution, promulgated by Auqtria 1 s 
premier martyr to Naziqm, Dollfuss, proclaimed Austria to be 
a German as well a~ a Christian and authoritarian state. In 
its embryo stage, the Au~trian republic was officially known 
as German Austria, a name dropped only upon the insistence of 
the victorious Allies. 10 
Nationalist trends inexplicable. The enigma of Aus• . 
trian Germanism seems not entirely explicable by the fact 
that Austrians are Germans ethnically or by the fact that the 
two nations were part of the Holy Roman Empire for some time. 
German-Austrian ties in the Holy Roman Empire were very weak, 
and Austria i~ scarcely more German, racially, than Switzer-
land, the coupling of which country with Germany in Anschluss 
seems ludicrous. 
9Ibid., p. 150. 
10Almond and Lutz, QR. £1!., pp. 248-53. 
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FASCI SM11 
Mushrooming at like pace with pan-GermaniAm in Austria 
was a political propen~ity for fascism. In the main, fascist 
elements drew their support from those groups finding the 
small republic a drab place compared with the empire of Haps-
burg days. An Austrian wrote: 
What the Austrian mourns for and wants back is 
his comfort and leisure, the refinements and adorn-
ments ot his every day life; these are infinitely 
more important to him than the lost provinces.l2 
But there were relatively few adornments for Austria in the 
II hard-bitten 20 1 s and 30 1s--the way of Gemutlichkeit was a 
difficult one for such lookers-backward, without money and 
with an eight-hour day to make workingmen impertinently artic-
ulate. Many persons who had never earned a living were 
forced to by the reversals that accompanied military defeat 
in 1918, such reversals as the loss of their fortunes and the 
decreasing number of plush civil service jobs. There was less 
time for coffee house conversation, less money for leisurely 
living. These discontented elements attained some measure of 
comfort in monarchist movements, but the more vigorous, real-
izing that the Hapsburg candle had gone out forever, turned to 
llThis discussion of Austrian fascism deals only with 
its roots. Interwar development of fascism has been discussed 
in Chapters In and IV. . 
12Andreas Latzko, 11 The Hooked Cross in Austria," Helen 
Woljeska, translator, The Freeman, 7:85-7, p. 86. 
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fascism. 
The Heimwehr and allied movements provided the politica 
home for disconsolate former officers of the Hapsburg regime. 
G. E. R. Gedye lays the Heimwehr growth in part to upper class 
adherence to fascism: 
The malcontents with the Republic--the young 
men of the professional, semi-professional and 
official classes--deprived of their prospects of 
a career since the collfBse of the monarchy, 
rushed to the 11 colors." 
Austria 1 s limited parliamentary background may be 
another reason why authoritarianism took root. The old Aus-
trian Reichsrat rarely met, and suffrage in the dual monarchy 
wa s limited. The experiment in republicanism initiated in 
1919 lacked precedent. Institutions which in the t'lest took 
centuries to flower were acquired by semi-feudalistic Central 
Europe full-blown. 
MILITARISM 
Much has been written on the subject of the peace-
loving Vienne~e. Perhaps the favorite of all pro-Anschlu9 s 
arguments postulates the good effect Austrian inclusion in the 
Reich would have in neutralizing Prussian militarism. 
11 Austria today is one of the most democratic countries in the 
1311Austria--Enter Fascismo, 11 .2.12.• ~·, p. 586. 
15? 
world •.• Austria will form a natural counterweight to Prussia," 
wrote an English journalist. 14 Friedrich Hertz, Austrian 
economist, declared that German nationalists opposed Anschluss 
because they knew they could never count on Austrian support 
in a war of revenge. 11Austria. votes for peace and democracy, 11 
he wrote.l5 Renner, too, claims that "had the Catholics and 
Socialists of' Austria voted in the German Reich in 1925, 
Hindenburg would almost certainly not have been elected.nl6 
Private armies bely placiditY. However, this felicit-
ous concept of' Austrian placidity is indefensible in view of' 
the alacrity with which Austrians joined the paramilitary or-
ganizations and the sanguine week-end excursions of' the 
groups. Although the Austrian army had less than 30,000 
troops, a.pproximately 350,000 men flocked to the ranks of 
rightist or leftist private armies. Austria cannily evaded 
conflict with any outer foe, but Austrians were not averse to 
battling one another. 
The German character. Perhaps Au~trian militarism 
blended with and was accentuated by the nostalgia for the good 
old Hapsburg days. 
14Bagger, ~· £1!., p. 626. 
1511 Austro-German Union, 11 Nation, 127:696-7, December 
19, 1928, p. 696. 
1611Austria: Key for War and Pe~ce, 11 ~· .£1!., p. 593. 
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The following ·.'passage dealing with Germany and the Nazis 
written by a British diplomat, could as well have been said 
of Austria and its Nazis and Heimwehr: 
When I returned to Berlin early in 1921, it 
was a shabby, miserable, half-star~ed city shorn 
of all its imperial pomp and splendor. There 
were no more swanking monocled officers in 
gorgeous many~colored uniforms ••• Altogether 
soldiers were few and far between. Germany had 
become outwardly demilitarized. It was now a 
civilian nation, and one could not help noticing 
how badly dressed it looked •.• For some occult 
reason •.• (German) tailors, who knew how to cut a 
smart uniform As well as any in the world, never 
discovered the a rt of turning out a well-fitting 
lounge suit. Whether this was the fault of the 
cutter, or whether the German body like the German 
soul could only adapt itself to the stiff garments 
of regimentation, I was never able to decide. But 
the Nazis followed the national instinct when they 
put everybody back into uniform •.. By pandering to 
the innate German love of parade and decoration 
they struck a shrewd blow at the drabnees and dull-
ness of the civilian republic, which had always 
been one of its chief weaknesses. The German 
always felt slightly ashamed of himself in mufti, 
a little bit lost and forlorn, as if to find him-
self just a solitary individual, his own master 
instead of a unit in a disciplined throng, gave 
him a chilly sense of isolation and bewilderment. 
Put him into uniform, however, and his chest 
swelled, his self-esteem was restored, he was part 
of an organized mass ••• l7 
Perhaps significantly, the tome of the Heimwehr matinee idol, 
Prince Starhemberg, includes six photos of him~elf in uniform 
and one in civilian dress.l8 
17Harold Butler, QQ• cit., pp. 101 f. 
18The only other picture in the book is one of Dollfuss, 
also in uniform. (Between Hitler and Mu~~olini, QQ. £1!.) 
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For sartorial reasons or not, Austrians flocked to the 
Heimwehr and Schutzbund. Monsignor Seipel once defended the 
Heimwehr on the grounds that it was simply an organization 
of veterans and a good deal like the British Legion. 19 The 
British Legion, however, didn't threaten putsches, didn't 
store arms illegally and didn't play week-end war with other 
military organizations during the interwar period. There 
seems, on the .whole, faint semblance between Heimwehr-Schutz-
bund activities and those of the British or even the American 
Legion. 
ANTI-SEMITISM 
The peace and republican life bored Austrians, . not be-
cause life under the republic was peaceful and democratic, 
but because such existence brought so many drab and ugly 
neces~ities~ This feeling of ennui provided fuel for a fourth 
Austrian pathological· complex, anti-Semitism. Opines Gedye: 
The anti~Semites fell into line--indeed, they 
and the class last mentioned (profe~eional and 
semi-professional groups) are largely identical, 
for as the corresponding social orders do in 
Germany, they allude to Austria as the 11Juden 
Republik 11 and attribute all the sufferings con-
sequent on defeat and dismemberment to the same 
cause to which their ancestors 'in the days of 
Margarethe Maultasch, "the Ugly Duchess" attrib-
. uted the plague--to the Jew.20 
19Gedye, Betrayal in Central Euroue, QQ. cit., p. 31. 
20
uAustria--Enter F 1 11 it 286 asc smo, Q£. £__., p. . 
160 
Origin~~ prewar growth of anti-Semitism. Austria's 
interwar anti-Semitism was not a new development, but merely 
a latterday manifestation of an Au~trian pathological strain 
reaching back into the nation'~ history. Anti-Semitism was 
always strong in Austria. 21 PosAibly, its firqt manife~te.tion 
1-ras the medieval restriction impo!!!ed on Jews, preventing them 
from owning land and from entering guilds, many industries 
and commerce. Jews were left to ply a few specialized pro-
fessions such as that of lapidary and mone y lender, the latter 
being left them because a church ruling forbade Chrigtians to 
seek loan interest. The Jews' unfavorable position was re-
versed with the break-up of feudalism as the economy basiR 
changed from land to capital. 
By Maria Theresa's time, Jews had won a secure place in 
Austria's economic life but were still subject to numerous 
restrictions. The revolution of 1848 brought full equality to 
Austrian Jews, opening many professions to them for the initia] 
time. They became prominent in the new fields, securing a 
near monoploy in law and journalism before the first world 
war.22 
Jews became so prominent, in fact, that anti-Semitism 
became a popular political motif. Dr. Karl Lueger, Viennese 
mayor for fifteen year~ until his death in 1910, built the 
21Braunthal, QQ. cit., p. 61. 
2~acartney, ~· ~., p. 229. 
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Christian Socialist organization into a major party using anti 
Semi tism as the lure. Lueger himself had Jewish friend.s and 
autocratically announced, 11 I decide who ig a Jew.n23 He bled, 
verbally, in campaign rallieA for the worker being ground 
under the 5emite heel. 
Jews' uolitical allegiance divided. After World War I, 
Austrians used anti- Semitism in simultaneous attackR on Social 
ists and on reactionaries. Many socialist leaders were Jewish, 
as were many industriali s ts and bankers, who backed for the 
most part the Christian Socialists. This Jewish support 
diverted and submerged the anti-Semitism of the Christian 
Socialist~. In one election campaign, Socialist posters 
caricatured porcine Jews sitting on money bagR, while opposi-
tion placards portrayed lean Jews misleading workmen. Macart-
ney, an English author, commented, 11 A genuine anti-Semite 
mus t be sorely perplexed.n24 
Oddly, some Jews supported the Heimwehr, branches of 
which were openly anti-Semitic. G. E. R. Gedye maintained 
that Jewish intere s ts used the Heimwehr as a threat to the 
Socialigts and that the Heim~rehr' s thoroughly anti-8emi tic 
character came as an unpleasant shock. 25 Vienna's Heimwehr 
chief, Major Fey, depended on Jewish support and always 
23Braunthal, QR. £1!., p. 65. 
24 Macartney, QR. ~., p. 236. 
2511Au9tria--Enter Fascismo, 11 .QJ2 • ..Q.ll., p. 586. 
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avoided any involvement with anti-Semitic activity. Heimwehr 
membership rules left the door open for acceptance of Jewi~h 
financial aid. Only Germans could be Heimwehr members, but 
26 
anyone--no racial distinction--could subscribe funds. 
Early postwar ~-Semitism. A Jewish influx from 
Galicia after World War I and from Hungary after the fall of 
the Communist Bela Kun appreciably increaged Vienna's Jewish 
population. Many of the~e jobleAs newcomers turned to prof-
iteering, thereby fomenting anti-Semitism in direct proportion 
to their succes~. In spite of the fact that some Socialist 
factions were themselves anti-Semitic, a wave of hatred for 
Jews is consklered to have helped defeat the Social Democrats 
at the polls in 1920. 27 During the 20 1 s, anti-Semitism con-
tinued to grow. In 1923, when Vienna Polytechnic college 
announced a restriction in the number of foreign Jewish stu-
dents to be admitted, the liberal pre~~ and the public as a 
whole protested.28 By 1929, student groups themselves were 
infected by anti- Semitism. Vienna University suspended classe . 
for five days to prevent anti-Semitic rioting after one of 
many brawls involving Heimwehr and Jewish ~tudents. 29 
Anti-6emit1c agitators advocated the expulsion of Jews 
26New ~ Times, April 8, 1929. 
27Lang~am, QP. cit., p. 469; Starhemberg, £g. ci t., 
pp. 119 f. . 
28New IQrt Times, March 8, 1923. 
29Ibid., November 8, 1929. 
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from Austria as early aq 1923, asserting that efforts to re-
generate the German people would not succeed until Jews were 
ousted from dominant positions in economic life, art, the stag 
and the ~ess. 30 The same year, during a Jewish pathologist's 
lecture in Vienna, a mob of 2,000 anti-Semites set fire to the 
crowded lecture hall and, when the panicked audience emerged, 
attacked the~ stabbing many. 31 
Hakenkreuzler activities. Two of the paramilitary 
groups were flagrantly anti-Semitic--the Hake~kreuzler and tbe 
Frontkampfer. The first of these, the most obstreperous, was 
mad.e ::up of youths between tre agel=! of fifteen and twenty 
imbued with Hitlerian notions. The Hakenkreuzler embarked on 
such stunts as invading Jewish restaurants and attacking 
diners. 32 Another favored pastime was offering Jews 
Hakenkreuzler newspapers and beating up those who refused to 
buy. 33 The Hakenkreuzler 1 s activities became annoying enough 
34 in 1925 to prompt an exodus of tourists from Vienna. 
The Zionist congress of 1925. The mo~t spectacular 
pre-Hitlerian manifestation of Austrian anti-Semitism occurred 
in 1925 in Vienna while a world Zionist congress wa~ being 
30Ibid., January 23, 1923. 
31Ibid., February 6, 1923. 
32New York Times, July 19, 1925. 
33 Ibid., July 17, 1925· 
34 A Ibid., ugust 1, 1925. 
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held there. Prior to the convocation, the Hakenkreuzler at 
several mass meetings had protested the Zionist meeting's 
being held in Vienna and sent a delegation to ask Austrian 
Chancellor Ramek to revoke permission for holding the congress. 
Ramek, a Christian Socialist, gave the delegation but scant 
sympathy, bru~quely warned it against terrorism and threatened 
vigorous measures if the Zionists were molested. 35 The entire 
Viennese police force was called out to protect the visiting 
Jews. Mounted policemen were at every corner, and unmounted 
guards formed a shoulder-to-shoulder cordon around the con-
terence halls. Downtown Vienna cafes and hotels were barri-
caded, and Zionist leaders were requested not to hold outdoor 
demonstrations. Even with these precautions, anti-Semitic 
mobs attempted to storm the conference hall, stoned the police 
cordon and attacked streetcars and ttaxis in a 11Jew hunt. 11 
Zionists on a Danube river excursion were stoned. On the 
whole, however, there were few injuries, but property damage 
$ 36 mounted to more than 4 1 000,000. 
~-~emitism spurs nan-Germanism. Anschluss adherents 
promoted pan-Germanism by appealing to Austrian anti-Semitism. 
Andreas Latzko, Austrian corre~pondent, claimed that Germany 
was more eager ' for Anschluss than Austria and that "desiring 
Austria to join her, Germany had to innoculate these 
35Ibid., August 1, 1925. 
36Ibid., Augugt 18 and 19, 1925. 
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presumptions (racialism) artifically and the powerful serum 
used was anti-Semitism. 1137 Latzko maintained that the war 
defeat was not as much of a fe~tering point for the average 
Au~trian as for the German and that the Austrian mourned the 
los~ of his pleasant prewar life rather than his loss of 
European power. He says: 
To Austria the Hooked Cross does not stand for 
revenge and renewed war. The fact that the move-
ment has been spreading here too; that each little 
town has its Hooked Cross organizations; ••• that in 
the demonstration parade one sees, besides the 
usual half-grown boys and noisy rabble, a surpris-
ing number of serious, mature men in good standing; 
all this does not prove that pan-German aggression 
and vindictiveness have taken root here too. It 
means something altogether different. Austria, 
although willing to forget the war, is not willing 
to forget the drabness and sordidness and impoverish-
ment which peace has· brought her; and for this "an 
infamous, unpatriotic, Jewish" invention is blamed: 
Socialism! ••• People wear the emblems, repeat the 
catchwords Germany furnishes--but only because they 
are directed against the Jews and everything is 
welcome that adds to the list of their sins.38 
Latzko was also among those noting the division of allegiance 
among the Jews themselves: 
It is indeed the great achievement of the Hooked 
Cross that it has managed to direct the hatred 
engendered by unscrupulous Jewish capitalists against 
the Jewish idealists who sacrifice comfort and career 
to fight the battle of the disinherited.39 
37L atzko, on.~., p. 85. 
38 Ibid., p. 86. 
39Loc • .£1!. 
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PATHOPOLITICS AND ANSCHLUSS 
Sometimes separately, sometimes conjoined, present in 
varying degrees and in all political parties, the pathopolit-
ical factors of pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, fascism and 
militarism prepared the way for Hitler's coming. One cannot, 
of course, indict the whole of the Austrian nation as anti-
semitic, militaristic, race-conscious and authoritarian any 
more than one can so indict the whole of Germany. On the 
whole, however, Austria provided a ripe womb for the monstrous, 
bewarped embryo of Nazism. 
Po s ges8ing most of Germanyts pathopolitical traits, and 
already under a fascist government, Austria did not have much, 
morally, beyond her territorial integrity to defend when the 
Nazis moved in March 11, 1938. Democracies fight, when 
attacked, to defend an ideal, as well as their position and 
power. Dictatorships sometimes initiate a war because of a 
mission, spurious or real, fancied or not. But Austria did 
not fight when attacked. She had lost her liberty before the 
aggression. The conquering brother was big, and he tolerated 
such censorable manifestations as anti-Semitism, racialism 
and authoritarianism. Austria was small, but she also toler-
ated these cancerous growths in the body politic. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FINIS FOR AUSTRIA 
Broken is the wineglass, only memorie1 live today. So 
bemourn the lyrics of a laterday Vienne~e waltz in lamenting 
the Hitlerian occupation of 1938. The har~h saga of conque~t 
began March 11, 1938, and by nightfall that March 14th 
Chancellor Schuschnigg was impriAoned, the systematic elim-
ination of Jews from public life was well on itg way and myr~l 
political refugees disguised as vacationers were attempting 
to ski out of Austria. The Viennese suicide rate soared to 
unprecedented heights, and Hitler shrieked from a Viennese 
" balcony that Germans from Konigsberg to Cologne and from 
Hamburg to Vienna were resolved from that day to be united 
forever. 1 Blood, ae well as wine, flowed during the next 
few weeks. Austria, at last, attained its Anschluss, but the 
only Austrians who wanted it when it came were the Austrian 
2 Nazis and their sympathizers. 
Anschluss fervor ran deep in Austria's interwar history; 
nevertheless, it took the threat of armed invasion to bring 
lNorman H. Baynes, editor~ The S¥eeches of Adolf Hitle~ 
A~ril ~-Au§uat, ~~ II (Lonuon:-ox ord University Pres~, 1 4Z), p. 1~2 • 
2Austrian Nazis numbered some 700,000 according to a 
postwar e~timate. Probably some per~ons inciuded in tfie es-
timate became Nazis after the German occupation. (Chrietian 
Science Monitor, October 27, 1949.) 
about the union. Even if Austria had not been qhot through 
with pan-Germani~m, anti- Semitism, fa~cism and militarism, even 
if Austria had been able to face Germany with a popularly elec~ 
ed government on March 11th, in all likelihood the Austrian 
chancellor would still have been clapped into jail, and Nazis 
would have forced educated Jews to scrub Vienna's streets and 
clean her public latrines, while political refugees attempted 
escape and Hitler mouthed racial incitements to a noisome mob 
on March 14th. Certainly the independence of a smail country 
is never an absolute but always a relative, as Dr. Schuschnigg 
has pointed out, and a qmall couhtry 1 q independence is relati~e 
to the strength and intentions of itq more powerful enemies 
and all ies. 
Austria's territorial integrity depended on two condi-
tions-- a nonaggressive Germany and/or the willingness of the 
. West to back Austrian independence with political prestige 
and .military might. From 1918 until 1933, both conditions 
prevailed, and Austria remained secure from external aggres-
sion. But after Hitler seized power in Germany, he early 
gave evidence of his aggressiveness, leaving Austria with 
only one safeguard--the backing of the We stern pol~ers. To-
gether, Italy, France and England presented a formidable 
obstacle to German revisionist ambitions. From 1933 until 
1935 Austria received repeated assuranc~ of western support. 
In 1935, however, Italy spiritually left the western community. 
Her conquest of Abyssinia so alienated France and England as 
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to shatter the three-power unity upon which Austria depended. 
Isolated, Mussolini turned to Germany. In 1934 Italy massed 
troops at the Brenner pass when a Nazi assassinated Dollfuss, 
but in 1938 when Hitler marched into Austria, the Duce sent 
him his best wishes . 3 Not one of Austria's powerful friends 
ra~sed more than an eyebrow over Hitler's bloodless conquest. 
The nations that had forced Austria to remain independent when 
above all else she wanted union with Germany did not move a 
muscle to help_her when she wanted, above all else, to retain 
her independence. 
Austrian and Western desires ran counter from 1918 to 
1933. Austria then wanted Anschluss, and the West wanted an 
independent Austria. Austria and the West, however, saw eye 
to eye on Austrian independence from 1933 to 1938--Austria 
wanted her independence, and the West wanted her to have it, 
but not enough to do anything about it. The West 1 s policy 
ruled from 1918 until 1938, Austria remaining independent. 
Then Austria's 1918 policy ultimately succeeded-- she achieved 
her Anschlus~. However, the West allowed Austria to lose her 
independence when Austrian integrity was most critically 
needed for European security, and, by the time the long-
deferred AnschluAs came, Austria no longer wanted it. 
3Hitler 1 s response to Mussolini was effusive: "I 
shall never forget this. 11 Baynes, .2.l2.· cit., p. 1422. 
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FRANCE's DEFECTION 
When World War I ended, France saw a Europe which for 
the first time in decades might be shaped a~ she wanted it. 
Austrian Anschlus~ sentiment constituted a flagrant impediment 
to attaining this brightly gleaming vista, and France, the 
only nation actively agitated by the Anschlugs possibility, 
converted England and America to her view at Saint Germain. 4 
The Anschluss ban in the Saint Germain treaty represents a 
purely French diplomatic triumph. The reasons for French 
objections to Anschluss were many and, from France's point of 
view, sufficient. France was determined that defeated Germany 
should not gain from a war which weakened the whole of Europe. 
The acquisition of Austria would constitute a gain. The area 
of Germany, post-Versaille~, was les~ than that of France, but 
with Anschluss, the reverse would be true. The combined 
Reich-Austrian populations would be nearly double the French 
population. Anschluss would give Germany direct contact with 
the Balkans and would erect a solid German bloc acroqs central 
Europe, weakening the Franco-Czech and Franc-Yugoslav 
4The majority of the American delegation at Saint 
Germain favored Anschluss. (E. M. Hou~e and Charles Seymour, 
editors, ~Really Happened at Paris, The Story of the 
Peace Conference, 1918-191~ New York: scribners, 1921, p. 108. 
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alliances. 5 
When the enfant terrible of the Alps negotiated with 
Germany for the e~tablishment of a customs union in 1931, the 
European protest was general, but the French press protest 
was loudest. France saw Anschluss behind every Austrian and 
every German diplomatic move, with war the eventual Anschluss 
result . 6 
5During the interwar period, France built up a network 
of alliances with Germany's neighbors. She was, more or less, 
the sponsor of the Central European Little Entente. Some 
authorities on Danubian Europe consider the Little Entente 
the only cohesive, stable force in Central Europe between 
1919 and 1934. Entente Members Czechoslovakia, Yugo~lavia 
and Romania attributed their liberation from the Hapsburg 
yoke largely to France. (Gyorgy, QR• cit., p. 16.) 
6The diplomatic timing of the 1931 customs union pro-
posal would seem to substantiate the popularly conceived thesis 
that in good times eighty per cent of the Austrians were 
against Anschluss and twenty per cent for it, with the pro-
portion directly reversing in bad times. In 1931 times were 
very bad for Austria. German Foreign Minister Curtius and 
Austrian Chancellor Schober handled the custom~ negotiations 
and expre~Aly took into account Austrian obligations under the 
Treaty of saint Germain and Protocol One of the Geneva loan 
agreement. The custom~ union agreement was so framed as to 
evade violations of the two agreements. Thus, article one of 
the propo~ed customs agreement expressly provided for the in-
dependence" of each nation and voiced a willingness to enter 
negotiations with any other European power for a similar 
customs union. Article five provided for separate German and 
Austrian customs administrations, article nine provided for 
the right of each nation to conclude commercial treaties with 
a third state in its own behalf, article eleven set up an 
arbitration commission with each country equally represented 
and article twelve provided for treaty cancellation upon a 
year's notice by either party. 
The customs union question came up before the League 
of Nations Council in May, 1931. Schober, representing his 
government before the League, declared that "Austria doe~ not 
intend to interpret the firqt Geneva Protocol with (cont .. . ) ' 
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Yet by 1938, when Austria no longer wanted An~chlu~~ and 
Anschlu~~ more than ever before threatened French security, 
6(cont.) mental reRervations. She does, however, feel 
herself entitled to oppose any extensive interpretation which 
might impair her liberty." He pointed up the propoRed agree-
ment's provisions which were inserted to in9ure independence. 
But Briand, speaking for France, wa!=! not Roothed: "Disregard 
of international obligations solemnly contracted, infringement 
of the economic independence of at least one of the parties, 
the risk of political developments which might seriously im-
peril European peace--these are, briefly, the aspects under 
which the French government and nation viewed, and, in spite 
of subsequent explanations, still view the conclusion of the 
Austro-German agreement." The matter . was put before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, but even before the 
eight-seven decision against the customs union, Germany and 
Austria, in the face of widespread opposition, dropped the 
plan. The question put before the court was 11 Would a regime 
established between Germany and Austria on the basis and 
within the limits of the principles laid down by the Protocol 
of March 19, 193l, •.• be compatible with Article 88 of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain and with Protocol No. 1 signed at 
Geneva on October 4, 1922? 11 (see Appendix for text s .) The 
majority opinion, that the customs union would constitute a 
~pecial regime contrary to Austria' s commitments, has been 
criticized on the grounds that it was purely political in 
motivation. A separate concurring opinion, that of Judge 
Anzilotti of Italy, frankly declared that such a. union 11 might 11 
some day lead to political union. The majority opinion itself 
admitted that no single article of the customs union protocol 
viola ted Austrian indepe·ndence, yet maintained that the whole 
of it threatened he r i ntegri ty. The eight majority votes 
were ca!=!t by the Ju~ges from Salvador, Poland, France, Spain, 
Colombia, Romania, Cuba and Italy. The seven minority votes 
were cast by judges from ·Japan, the United States, Belgium, 
Great Britain, Germany, Holland and China. (Text of the 
Austro-German Protocol for the E~tablishment of a customs 
Union, Annex 1283 11 a 11 in the Official Journal of ..!ill! League 
£! Nations, Twelfth Year, No. 7, July, 1931, pp. 1160-1163; 
11 Minutes of the 63rd Session of the Council held at Geneva 
from May 18th to May 23rd, 1931, 11 Official Journal gf the 
League of Nations, Twelfth Year, No. 7, July, 1931, pp. 1608ft; 
11 Austro-German Protocol for the Establishment of a Customs 
Union: Extract from the Minutes of the First Meeting of the 
Fourth session of the Commi~~ion of Enquiry for European (cont) 
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the French did nothing to stop Hitler. France in the late 
30's wa~ in what Diplomat Harold Butler called her "Munich 
mood. 11 Some writers even imply that Chautemp~ re ~igned, thus 
upsetting the French government, because he got wind of 
Hitler's invasion plans and wished to evade responsibility for 
taking any action. True or false, the fact remainA there was 
no French government the day Hitler took Austria. 
ENGLAND 
England's 1938 efforts in behalf of preserving 
Austria's integrity were al~o perfunctory. England, too, wns 
in a Munich mood by then. Although she joined with France 
and Italy in three pronouncements affirming the integrity of 
Austria--one on February 1?, 1934, another September 2?, 1934, 
and the third at the conference of stresa in April, 1935--in 
1938 England remained silent, aside from an eleventh hour 
? protest to the German government late the day of the invasion. 
6(cont.) Union,n Annex 1319 to the Minutes of the 64th 
ses~ion of the Council held at Geneva from Tuesday, september 
1st to Monday, September 14th, 1931, Officia6 Journal of the 
League of Nations, Twelfth Year, No. 11, November, 1931, 
pp. 2186-2190.· see also Edwin M. Borchard, "The Customf! Union 
Advisory Opinion," American Journal of International Law, 
25:?11-?16, October, 1931) 
7The February 1?, 1934, statement" issued by the French, 
Italian and British governments was as follows: The Austrian 
Government ha~ requested the Governments of France, Great 
Britain and Italy to express their opinion on a dossier which 
has been compiled in order to note a German interference in 
the inner affairs of Austria and tranf!mitted to the afore 
named Governments. The consultations which the three (cont.) 
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Foreign Minister Eden, who favored a vigorous demarche to 
Berlin reasserting British backing of Austrian independence, 
resigned ehortly before the Nazi invasion of Austria, 
allegedly because of Chamberlain's opposition to such a 
stiffened policy . 8 
THE LITTLE ENTENTE 
As England, France and Ite.ly did, the Little Entente 
opposed Anschluss during most of the interwar period and also, 
as England, France and Italy did, at the crucial moment the 
?(cont.) 
are convinced of 
and integrity of 
treaties. 
Governments carried on ••. have shown that they 
the necessity to maintain the independence 
Austria in agreement with the respective 
The three powers declaration of September 27, 1934, 
reaffirmed the February statement: "After a renewal discus~ion 
of the foreign situation of Austria, the repreAentatives of 
Great Britain, France and Italy, in the name of their govern-
ments, have unanimously noted that the declaration of February 
17, 1934, concerning the necessity to maintain the independence 
and integrity or Austria in accordance with the existing 
treaties continues to exist in full force. This declaration 
will, also in the future, determine their joint policy. 11 
The Conference of Stresa e~tabli~hed the principle of 
mutual consultation among France, Italy and England in the 
case of a threat to Austrian independence. (Text of the Triple 
communique of February 1?, 1934, Text of the Three Power ~ 
Declaration of September 27, 1934, and Text of the Stresa 
Resolution on Austria, April 13, 1935, Red-wbite-B£S Book, 
Ju~tice for Au~tria, De~oriptions, Document~ and Proofs to the 
Antecedents and History of the Occupation of Austria, First 
Part• Vienna: Austrian State Printing House, 1947, pp. 58-59; 
Charle~ A. Gulick, QQ. cit., pp. 1673 f.) 
8 
. Gulick, QQ. £il., p. 1800. For a di~cus~ion of 
divided Briti sh opinion on the que~tion of Austria policy, see 
Gulick, pp. 1828-1834. 
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Little Entente abandoned this policy. Until 1938, the Little 
Entente was 11 again~t HapRburg restoration, against Anschluss, 
9 
against all revision. Czechoslovakia, which considered the 
Geneva protocol banning Anschluss the "Magna Charta of Central 
European politics," whose President Benes had asserted that 
Anschluss would be a casus belli, bartered away Austria's 
independence in 1938 for a specious promise that German troops 
would always be kept at least t"torenty miles from the Sudeten 
border. 10 
ITALY 
Austria relied more upon Italy for aid against Germany 
than upon either France or England. And for qome time this 
dependence seemed justified. Mus~olini rushed four divisions 
to tbe Brenner Pass when Nazis assassinated Dollfuss in 1934, 
and his telegram of condolence to Starhemberg over the killing 
9Eduard Benes, 11 A New Pha~e of the Struggle for 
European Equilibrium," Address delivered July 2, 1934, at 
Prague before the Chamber of Deputies and the senate, Inter-
national. Conciliation, No. 302, September, 1934, pp. 245 f. 
1°Eduard Benes, "The Problem of Central Europe," · Speech 
delivered March 21, 1934, before the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the Czechoslovak Parliament, International Conciliation, 
No. 300, May, 1934, p. 165. Benes favored 11 the absolute in-
dependence and integrity of Austria under European guarantee." (1£!g., p. 166.) Of the Austrian problem he declared, "In 
the struggle as to whether Austria i~ to be German, Italian, 
French, Little Entente or Hungarian the truth must finally 
emerge that Austria must remain Austrian." (~., p. 167.) 
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wa~ outspoken: 
The independence of Austria, for which he 
(Doll fues) fell, is a principle that has been 
defended and will be defended by Italy even more 
strenuously in the~e exceptionally difficult times 
••.. Hi~ memory will be honored not only in 
Austria, but everywhere in the civilized world, 
which has already smitten with its r~ndemnation 
the direct and distant instigators. 
But Mussolini 1 s pro-Austrian stand came too soon. The 
year 1935 was a new and fateful one for Europe and Austria, f 
that year Germany took over the Saar, establiqhed the Luftwaffe 
and introduced general conscription. Even more ominous for 
Austria, 1935 was also the year Mussolini embarked on his con-
quest of Ethiopia, alienating England and France and thus 
sundering the three-power backing on which Austria's integrity 
rested. The two conditions necessary for maintenance of 
Austrian independence--a nonaggressive Germany and a united 
West willing to defend Austria--had both vanished by 1935. 
Thus was Austria abandoned by all who, whether from 
friendliness or enmity, had long defended her independence. 
Isolated by the appeasement wave which swept Europe at the 
precise time Germany was rearming, rendered politically im-
potent by civil war, Austria faced Germany alone. She could 
llNew York Times, July 2?, 1934. Mussolini did not hav 
a pre-1938 purely pro-Austrian record. In February~ 1928, the 
verbally virile dictator, angered by a Seipel speecn claiming 
discrimination again~t Germans i n Italian South Tyrol, asked 
rhetorically in the Italian chamber: 11 What is Austria, and 
who is she? 11 He gave his own answer, forthrightly: 11 5he is a 
miserable spi toon ...• " (Fodor, .Q12. cit., pp. 1 ?6 f. ) 
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only acquiesce in providing Hitler an aperitif prior to his 
main repast, which wa~ to include a swath of Europe reaching 
from the shores of the Atlantic to the purlieus of Moscow. 
GERMANY 
The early political beginnings of the Austrian Nazi 
party were inauspic~ous. The first time the party entered 
candidates in a national election, in 1930, it failed to win 
a single seat. By 1932, however, Nazi strength increased, 
and the party made phenomenal gains in the provincial elections 
that year. 
Hitler's assumption of power in Germany in 1933 spurred 
Brown Shirt activity in Austria. The Au~trian Nazis penetrated 
the police force and the Heimwehr, which split into two fac-
tions because of the Nazi leanings of one branch. In turn, 
purges by Dollfuss· cleared the Austrian police and civil 
service of many Nazis, forcing some to flee into Germany, 
where they formed the Austrian Legion, which was armed and 
drilled by German--Nazis. 
Hitler•~ Anschluss views. Hitler, himself an Austrian, 
was long obsessed with the Anschluss idea. The opening page 
of Mein Kampf asserts: 
..• German Austria must return to the great German 
Mother country, not for reasons of any economic con-
siderations. No. No: Even if thie union seen from 
an economic angle were indifferent, nay even if it 
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were detrimi~tal, it would nevertheless have to 
take place. 
One of_ Hitler's early attempts to force Austria into 
the German orbit made use of an economic weapon--a thousand-
mark tax was impo~ed on Germans visiting Austria. To a country 
so dependent on tourism, this constituted an e!'fective blow. 
Dollfuss countered with reduced railway rates to German tour-
ist~. Germany, additionally, closed the Austro-German border 
several times, with resultant damage to Austrian export trade. 
Dollfuss tried to divert Austrian exports to other countries, 
particularly Italy. The Rome Protocols of 1934 provided for 
close economic cooperation among Austria, Italy and Hungary. 
Dollfuss assassinated. In 1933 a ,Nazi campaign of 
terrorism was initiated in Austria and reached a peak during 
the early months of 1934. On July 25th, 1934, Austrian Nazis · 
staged an abortive putsch which ended the life of Dollfuss and 
brought Italian troops to the Brenner Pass. The putsch fail-
ure disconcerted Hitler, and he halted his anti-Austria pro-
13 gram momentarily. 
12Hitler, QR. ~., p. 19. 
13Hitlerian complicity in the putsch was apparent. Most 
incriminating was a press release received by the German press 
three days before the putsch, which included pictures of Doll-
, fuss and Dr. Anton Rintelen, whom the Nazis had slated to 
succeed Dollfuss. Rintelen's photo wa~ captioned, "former 
Austrian minister in Rome is negotiating in Vienna concerning 
the reorganization of the government. 11 Dollfuss' picture was 
labeled "Chancellor Dollfuss suffered severe injuries in the 
struggle in the Chancellory which proved fatal." (Document 13, 
Red-White-Red book, Justice for Austria, ~· cit., p. 53; 
see also Ball oo. cit. • ~0 t.) - - -
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Following Schuschnigg 1 s accession to the chancellorship, 
the campaign against the Austrian Nazis, initiated by Dollfuss, 
increased in intensity. Dismissal of Nazis in the civil 
service, gendarmerie and police continued. The government 
refused to let contracts to firms headed by Nazi~. As had 
Dollfues, Schuschnigg depended heavily--and futilely--upon 
14 Italy for moral support against Nazi Germany. 
~ July Pact. Then in the summer of 1936, t'llio years 
after the assassination of Dollfu~s, Germany made tenuous 
overtures, aimed at restoring normal Austro-German relations. 
In July, 1936, the two countries signed a friendship pact. 
Schuschnigg seized upon the rapprochement gratefully, and 
later said of this agreement which became Austria's kiss of 
death: 
Of course I knew that Hitler did not consider 
himself bound by any treaty. But the mere appear-
ance, the ten per cent chance, was better for us 
than nothing. Besides, it looked then as if 
Hitler would prefer a peaceful solution of the 
Austrian Pfgblem, which meant a breathing spell for 
Austria •.• 
Terrorism renewed. The pact recognized the full 
sovereignty of Austria, provided for an amnesty of imprisoned 
Austrian Nazis, a propaganda truce on the part of each 
14schuschnigg, Au~trian Requiem, Q2. Sl!., pp. 103-129. 
15Ibid., p. 197. 
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country, the appointment of a . National Socialist. to the 
Austrian cabinet and the lifting of the Nazi tax on German 
tourists to Austria. For a time Austria enjoyed her dearly-
purcha~ed breathing ~pell, but by the end of 1937, Nazi terror 
ism wa~ again at a feverish pitch, abetted by the reieased 
Nazis. Reported Schuschnigg: 
Telephone booths exploded, tear gas bomb~ were 
thrown, and mass demonstrations were arranged in 
order to induce the Austrian police to intervene. 
Once the police dispersed the crowds, Berlin pro-
tested that we did not keep our share of the bargain 
and allowed the persecution of National Socialism.l6 
Berchtesgaden. Early in 1938, Franz von Papen, German 
diplomat, approached Schuschnigg and suggested a visit to 
Berchtesgaden. Schuschnigg stipulated that he be informed 
ahead of time of the conference agenda and that the visit be 
kept strictly secret until wording of a press communique was 
agreed on. Von Papen informed Schuschnigg that 
The suggested di~cuasion will deal with such 
misunderstanding~ and points of friction as have 
persisted after the agreement of 1936. This agree-
ment ~hould be reaffirmed. This visit would demon- 17 strate the unchanged continuation of this agr~ement. 
16Ibid., p. 9. 
17Ib 4'd 10 
----:!:!.- • , p • • 
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On February 12, 1938, Schuschnigg went to Berchtesgaden 
for his now famous interview with Hitler. 18 The actual agree-
ment which Schuschnigg signed embraced the~e main provisione: 
The Austrian government was to appoint the Nazi 
seys~-Inquart a~ mini~ter of public security with 
full control of the police. 
Dr. Fishboeck, also a Nazi, was to be federal com-
missar in charge of Austro-German economic relations. 
All Nazis still serving sentences, including par-
ticipants in the July, 1934, revolt in which Dollfuss 
had been killed, were to be set free within six days. 
All Nazis diecharged from state positions were to 
be reinstated. 
Austrian Nazis were to be left free to profes~ the 
National Socialist creed and were to be admitted to 
the Fatherland Fron~ organization on an equal basie 
with other groups.l · 
The document closed with a hollow reaffirmation of the agree-
ment of July 11, 1936, recognizing Austria 1 e sovereignty. 
Schuschnigg call~ plebiscite. 5chuschnigg returned to 
Vienna mentally and spiritually exhau~ted, but felt that 
neither he nor Austria were yet beaten. He called the Austrian 
Federal Diet into se~~ion the evening of February 24th and 
gave a rallying speech before it, closing with the affirmation 
that Austria could and would live, that it would never 
18Good accounts are those of Dorothy Thompson, forward 
to~ Austria, 2P· £!!., and Martin Fuchs, Showdown in Austria 
(New York: G. P. Putnam, 1939), pp. 194-99. 
19schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 21 ff. 
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voluntarily give up its independence and that its watchword 
remained 11 True German and red-white-red until we're dead."20 
Popular response to the speech wa~ immense, and, reassured by 
it, Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite putting the 
que~tion of An~chlu~s squarely before the Austrian people. The 
plebiscite que~tion was to be: "Are you for a free and German, 
independent and social, Christian and united Augtria • . • ? 11 
Promised labor support, the chancellor scheduled the election 
for March 13th. 21 On March 11th, fatefully, Hitler moved into 
Austria. 
The d~ of Anschluss. Early the morning of the 11th, 
Schuschnigg .was notified at hi~ home that the Austro-Gcrman 
border had been closed by Germany. At the Austrian chanceller 
aeyss-Inquart told 6chuschnigg that the plebiscite must be 
called off within an hour, or Germany would act accordingly, 
the implication being a German invasion. As Schuschnigg and 
President Wilhelm Miklas conferred on this ultimatum, they 
heard sound trucks in the streets announcing that the plebi-
~cite was postponed, that Schuschnigg had resigned and that 
Anschlus~, at last, wa~ at hand. 
Anxious to avoid bloodshed, Schuschnigg acquiesced in 
the demand that tbe plebiscite be foregone and was confronted 
with new demands: that he himself resign and that Dr. eeyss-
20 
.ll?19,.' p. 33. 
21Gulick, ~· cit., pp. 1810-1813, pp. 1816-1821, 
1 PP• 1837-38. 
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Inquart be appointed chancellor. He was warned that "If' 
these conditions are not fulfill ed, the German armies will 
move on AuAtria.tt22 
The original two-hour time limit on this new ultimatum 
was stretched through the day until shortly past midnight, a~ 
President Miklas withstood demands that he name Seys~-Inquart 
chancellor. Towards evening, with Gestapo agentA already in 
the chancellery, schuschnigg took his farewell of Au~tria: 
•• • We have to cede to violence ••• Thus I take 
leave in thi~ hour from the people of Austria with 
a German word and heartfelt wish: God protect 
Au~tria.23 
The 5eys~-Inquart government, appointed near midnight by Miklas 
considered that its mo!!'lt urgent task was 11 to re-establish calm 
24 
and order" and invited German troops into Austria. 
Anschluss was at hand. 
22schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, Q12. cit., PP. 45 f. 
This was Goering's message, transmitted to Schuschnigg by 
Seys~-Inqua.rt. 
23 11Farewell of the Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg, 
to the Austrian people on March 11, 1938 at 20 hr~, 11 Red-White-
Red book, 212 • cit., p. 69. 
24 Ibid., p. 69. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SOME CONCLUSIONS, SOME COMMENTS 
In many ways Austria served as the weathervane of 
Eur ope during the period from 1918 until 1938. Mo~t of the 
thing~ that happened to the rest of Europe happened to Aus tria 
jus t a bit sooner. Austria's po~twar depres s ion was one of 
the most severe in Europe. The failure of the Vienna Credit 
Anstalt in 1931 presaged the world-wide depression of the 
30 1 s. Austria wa~ the first nation to receive the benefit 
of concerted League financial aid . ehe was the first country 
to fall to Hitler. 
Many of the recent European political ideologies racked 
Austria in turn. Italy had its fascism, Germany its Nazism, 
Hungary its ineffectual monarchism, Weimar Germany its social-
ism and France and England their capitalism. But Au stria 
took a whirl at them all. More than a Germany in microcosm, 
Au~tria was a preview of coming distractions for all of Europe, 
and because of this diversity in Austrian political and 
economic experiences, Austria becomes a laboratory for the 
political scientist . She provides him with case studies in 
nationalism, geopolitics, racialism, religious splits, 
economic systems and constitutional structures. The Anschluss 
==j 
I 

Christian Socialist contribution. The Christian 
Socialists, hampered by the conservative, the reactionary and 
the nostalgic elements of the old monarchy, while offering a 
positive creed of patriotism for Austria, while expounding , the 
dogma of her separate miRsion from Germany, introduced to 
Austria a near-replica of the government Hitler instituted in 
Germany. The party suppressed the socialist party, which was 
the mo~t intellectually vigorous element in Austria and which 
commanded the loyalty of forty per cent of the Austrian pop-
ulation. The Christian socialists washed their hands of 
parliamentary democracy and proceeded to rule with what even 
an apologist for Schuschnigg conceded to be an "authoritarian 
government watered down with a kind of tolerant carelessnes~.·~ 
Dr. Kllr' t von Schu~chnigg, the second high priest of 
Austrian fascism, acknowledges failings of the regime, while 
at the same time defending it: 
That the New Constitution (the authoritarian con-
stitution of 1934) turned out to be deficient goes 
without saying. That is why its coming reform was 
proclaimed in 1937. The question is whether Austria 
could have survived the year 1934 with the old one. 
Some think yes, I think no. Some clas~ified the 
New Regime:--Clerical Totalitarianism. Which is 
stupid. some Clerico-Fascism; which is untrue and 
poorly superficial. (Since 1933 no Priest or Min-
ister served in Austrian active politics. And the 
only one official Italian abroad I met during this 
period who had been a vigorous and most outspoken 
Antifascist was the Papal Nuncio in Vienna.) Some 
lR. · K. Sheridon, ~ :!Q.!! Schuschnigg (London: The 
English Univer·sities Press Ltd. 1942), p. 121. 
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label the regime as a 11 Burocratic and Semi-
Dictatorship." This may approach the truth even 
when a minor prerequisite quite definitely wa~ 
lacking--there was actually no dictator.2 
Critique Qn Schuschnigg view~. Some of Schuschnigg 1 s 
remarks here can possibly be themselves criticized as super-
ficial. The charge of "clerical totalitarianism" is not 
entirely without foundation even though the Catholic hierarchy 
largely took no part in anti-democratic activities. 3 The 
political policies of a priest, Seipel, led to the corporative 
regime, the constitution itself proclaimed the "religious" 
nature of the new state and the government attempted to im-
press religion on the people. The admiring biographer, 
Sheridon, relates that Schuschnigg 1 s government ordered Vienna 
·libraries to throw out half of their fiction and sub!=!ti tute 
works of theology, meditations and lives of the saints. How-
ever, the only noticeable reeult of this move to spiritualize 
Viennese life was a seventy-five per cent drop in the library 
circulation. 4 
Schuschnigg 1 F~: dismiseal of the term 11 fascist 11 as 
applied to his government, a dismissal made on the basis that 
the only Italian in Vienna was antifascist, is specious at the 
p. 597. 
2Kurt von Schuschnigg, Letter to this writer, QQ. ~· 
3Renner, '2\u!!!tria: Key for War and Peace, 11 .Ql2 • ..91.l., 
4sheridon, .2l2· cit., p. 126. 
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least. The term fascist, by exten~ion, has traveled far from 
its Italian place of origin. Austria had an authoritarian 
state and was aiming at establishing a corporative state be-
tween 1934 and 1938. If such is not fasci~m in Schuschnigg'e 
dictionary, it remains so in mo~t. 
Pathopolitics. The authoritarian state established by 
the Christian Socialists and the pan-Germanism of the Social-
ists, however, were not alone in preparing Austria for Nazism. 
Militarism, racialism, anti-Semitism, catalytic agents in the 
growth of Nazism in Germany, had a similar effect in Austria. 
Although Austria is almost totally absolved in the world's 
mind from the stigmas _attached to Nazi Germany, her postwar 
record of anti-Semitism, pan-Germanism, and militarism--the 
latter, of cour~e, entirely domestic--compare~ with Germany's 
own • . All these tendencies found a spiritual home in Austria's 
own Nazi movement. 
s trangely enough, the militarism of Austria does not 
also imply expansioni~m. After she signed the Treaty of Saint 
Germain, Austria never made a move to regain lost territories. 
Austrians suffered relatively little heartyearning, even over 
the 5udeten territories and the South Tyrol, with their large 
German settlements. Austria's leaders, sensibly enough, re-
jected war as a means of righting presumed wrongs made in 
1 treaty territorial awards. Too small to engage in anything 
except the defense of her own borders, Austria found an outlet 
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for militarism in domegtic paramilitary establishments. In 
many ways, her militarism resembled the belligerency of a 
child playing at war. Austrians possessed a prediliction for 
uniforms, sword brandiAhing, marching and demonstrating. 
Role of external factors. The land's political and 
moral peculiarities, however, did not cause the 1938 Anschluss. 
The facts of international life would be more simple if 
ideologies alone divided peoples, but politics makes strange 
enemies as well as strange bed fellows. The present Belgrade-
Moscow disaffection may be termed a case · in 'point. The 
Austrian resistance to Nazism was another. The so-called 
fascist elements in Austria fought Nazism vigorously, cannily--
and futilely. 
The Christian -Socialist-eocialist polarization that 
ripped Austria apart, that allowed the unhealthy growth of 
anti-Semitism and racialism, irreparably weakened Austria. 
This polarization did not, however, bring on the final 
Anschluss. Austrian doom came from without. One of these 
external factors was the rise of Nazi Germany and its pattern 
for conquest, the other was the painfully negative policy of 
the West, which although it had valiantly resisted union of 
an economic-riven, democratic Austria with Weimar Germany, 
stood by when Nazi Germany swallowed the economically Rtronger 
Austria of 1938. 
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COMMENTS 
German preparedness questioned. Perhaps the most ex-
aRperating aspect of the We~t 1 ~ apat~y lies in the possibility 
that so slight an action aA a forceful demarche to Berlin 
would have halted Hitler. Transcripts of telephone conversa-
tions between Goering and German diplomats in London and Rome 
on the day of Anschluss show Hitler's extreme anxiety over the 
attitude of France, England, Italy and Czechoslovakia. 5 The 
Germans even worried about the negligible resistance Austria 
herself could offer. Again and again Germany extended the 
two-hour ulti matum given Austria for the establishment of a 
government under Seys s-Inquart, until the Nazis could be sure 
of complete capitulation. 
G. E. R. Gedye maintains that the gauche German war 
machine which moved into Austria could not have with~tood even 
a modicum of resistance. He avers that the Wehrmacht, which 
was to overrun Poland, Belgium and France, literally stumbled 
over its own feet on its way into Austria • . Although unopposed, 
tanks broke down, blocking roads. Hitler, due in Vienna 
March 12, did not arrive until March 14. Well to the rear of 
his possibly bumbling war machine, he spoke in Linz March 12, 
5Appendix, Austrian Requiem,~- cit., pp. 29?-314. 
191 
visited his parents• grave at Leonding March 13. 6 Gedye's 
version of the invasion arouses refreshingly ludicrous pictures 
of the frustrated stop-watch German soul, of labors to grease 
the tanks of war in order to present an orderly show for the 
Vienna parade. 
In his March 12 Linz speech, Hitler dropped the pre-
tense, maintained until then, that the Seyss-Inquart govern-
ment was an Austrian government: 
If Providence once called me forth from this 
town to be the leader of the Reich, it must, in so 
doing, have charged me with a mission, and that 
mission Qould be only to re~tore my dear homeland 
to the German Reich. I have believed in this 
mission, I have lived and fought for it, and I 
believe I have now fulfilled it.? 
The next day Hitler announced the incorporation of Austria 
into the German Reich. 8 Affronted sensibilities of the West 
were somewhat .. soothed by a subsequent plebiscite in which 
99.75 per cent of voting Austrians approved incorporation with 
Germany. 9 · Yet Hitler could not risk Schuschnigg 1 s plebiqcite. 
6Toynbee states that Hitler's parents 11 had providently 
had themselves buried, years in advance, almost in the fairway 
of their son 1 9 predestined triumphal march. 11 (Arnold Toynbee, 
survey .Qf International Affairs, 1938, I London: Oxford Univer-
1 
sity Pres~, 1941, p. 211.) 
7 Baynes,~· cit., p. 1422. 
8Ibid., p. 1423. 
9Ibid., p. 1459. Hitler said that the vote exceeded al 
his expectations, that llFor me this is the proudest hour of 
my life. 11 
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The economic angle. Anschluss brought expanded pro-
duction and full employment to Austria, although at the possi-
ble cost of exhausting the nation's resources. The postwar 
Austrian government has built up an elaborate case showing 
how the Austrian economy suffered during the union with 
Germany. While, on the whole, the German occupation helped 
Austria, in development of hydroelectricity and oil resources, 
actually the full production and full employment in occupied 
Austria does not validate the position of those favoring 
Anschluss on economic grounds. Greater Germany geared herself 
to a war economy. Conditions from 1938 to 1945 were not nor-
mal for either Germany or for the Austro-Germany combine. 
Conclusions, therefore, as to the benefits of peacetime 
Anschluss cannot be drawn. 
Although immediately after the first world war Anschlus 
adherents advanced the economic factor as the prime reason for 
their stand, this factor actually had less to do with the 1938 
Anschluss than either Austria's politics or national character 
did. Economically, Austria simply did not need Anschluss by 
1938. What Austria needed after the first world war, and what 
she needs now, is a seemingly unattainable world--a world at 
peace, a world of free trade. She must export. In normal or 
slightly adverse circumstances, she can do this. Austria's 
cardinal problem, highlighted now by the four-power occupation, 
is that her geographic position makes her a political as well 
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ultimatum, wrote to schuschnigg . a~king that he be named 
chancellor if Schuschnigg considered that such a move would in 
any way deter the Nazi~. Schuschnigg did nothing, and the 
matter was dropped. 
Danubt an Union. A more ba~ic omis~ion from this study 
of interwar Austria is any extended discussion of a Danube 
economic union, considered by many to be the ideal solution for 
all the problems of Central Europe. Such a discu~gion has been 
avoided largely becau~e its achievement rest9 in the field of 
political ideals, not of pos9ibilitiee. Aside from a tew 
economists, no one in interwar Central Europe displayed any 
enthusiasm for a Danubian union which would include Austria 
and Hungary. Such inclusion smacked of all that the other ex-
monarchy states thought they were well rid of. One political 
observer commented, "However desirable the ••• (Danube) solution 
it suffers from the drawback that nobody cares to choose it.nl3 
This seemed to be the case. Actually, if Austrians wanted to 
join anything, they much preferred German Anschluss to Danube 
Federation. Bagger estimated that ninety-five per cent of the 
Austrians were ardent adherents of union ·~¥th Germany. 14 
RED ANSCHLUSS? 
And the Anschlus~ problem may not have been altogether 
13Eugene Bagger,~· cit., p. 620. 
14Loc cit 
--· .............-.• 
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solved by the actual experience of German occupation. Robert 
Strausz-Hupe~ writing postwar, says of the continuing intimate 
relationship between Germany and Austria: 
••• their fortunes are not merely analogous: they 
are inextricably mixed. Within the frame of 
traditional European politics and economics there 
is no ~afe alternative to tbat special Austrian-
German relationship and its unpalatable (though 
not illogical) realization: Anschluss, except with 
the indefinite extension of t~g present regime of 
occupation in both countries. 
Right now, occupation looks indefinite, due to Russian 
dilatory tactice on an Austrian treaty. so, in spite of 
Austria's innate disinterest in communism, the Ru~~ian problem 
is a big one for that nation. Rus8ia, in emerging from her 
state of obscurity and of purely potential power, in rising to 
Grossmachte stature with a Weltanschauung inimically counter 
that of a West to which Austria is oriented, has become the 
prime menace to an easy solution of Austrian occupation. 
The Soviet role makes effort~ at prognosticating 
Austria's future futile. Ru~sia may well render ineffectual 
Schuschnigg's aim of the "Anschluss of all Austrians to Austri 
may well render sterile Seipel's hope for an Au~trian role in 
a united Europe, may well bani~h for an eternity the Au~trian 
Socialists' long-cherished dreams of democratic republicanism 
and social equity. Austrian Anschluss with Russia is somethin 
15 I Btrausz-Hupe, QQ· cit., p. 311. 
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no Austrian, no non-communist anywhere want~. NonethelesR, 
at the moment the possibility of such is greater than that of 
another Anschluss with brother Germany. Anschluss with 
Germany seems a dead issue now. 
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APPENDIX 
ARTICLE 88: TREATY OF SAINT-GERMAIN-EN-LAYE 
The independence of Austria is irrevocable, unle~~ the 
Council of the League of Nations should consent to a modifica-
tion. Therefore Austria undertake~ the obligation to refrain--
excepting with the consent of the said couneil from any action 
which indirectly or directly or by any means whatsoever, par-
ticularly--until her admittance as a member of the League of 
Nations--might endanger her independence. 
GENEVA PROTOCOL NO. I 
The Government of the Republic of Austria--undertakes 
in accordance with the wording of article 88 of the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain not to give up its independence; it will ab~tain 
from every economic or financial obligation which would be 
calculated to impair this independence either directly or 
indirectly. 
This obligation leave~ to Austria, while safe-guarding 
the provision of the Treaty of Baint Germain, her liberty with 
regard to customs tariffs, trade and financial agreements and 
in general with regard of her entire economic system and her 
commercial relations; supposing always, that Austria hereby 
doe~ not touch her economic independence by granting to one 
state a special system or exclusive advanta.ges, which would be 
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calculated to endanger this independence. 
PROTOCOL OF LAUSANNE 
In view of the fact that the Federal Government of the 
Republic of Austria had addres~ed a request for help to the 
League of Nations for the purpose of being assisted in the 
maintenance of the economic and financial work of reconstruc-
tion, which was undertaken in consequence of the resolution of 
the Council of the League of Nations of October 4, 1922, and 
the signature of the three protocols of the ~ame date; 
•.. that the governments of Belgium, of the United King-
dom •.• of France and Italy are ready to grant Austria new 
assi s tance for this purpose; 
that the aforementioned governments including the 
Austrian government declare that they base this assistance on 
protocol I of Geneva dated October 4, 1922 •.. 
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LETTER TO \¥RITER FROM DR. KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG: 
I certainly shall be glad in an~wering your letter from 
Jan. 31 to give you the required information at the best of my 
knowledge. 
1./ (Response to query as to what Schuschnigg conceived to be 
tbe purpose of the Sturmscharen which he organized.) My 11 own 
troop9 11 --0stmaerki~che sturmscharen (oss) founded about 1929 
in Innsbruck as kind of a Political Youth Movement of the 
christian-social Party, independent as to their organi~ation. 
Originally not on ' a paramilitary basi!ZI they were thought of 
and felt necessary as an an-tidote to the Heimwehren with their 
radical trends that proved in a general atmosphere of political 
distrust and despair most attractive to broader strata of .;he 
younger generation, including parts of the industrial workers. 
There was a definite trend among the Youth on both sides--
right and left--towards antiparlamentarian r adicalisms. During 
the later 20-ies the Heimwehren combined radical nationalist 
as well as Austrian conservative elements, both united in 
denouncing the political parties. Soon after the coming into 
existence of the oes with definite antinationalistic, political 
conservative Austrian and social reformatory trends--exactly 
in 1932--the Heimwehren were split into a radical anticlerical 
nationalist and a deliberate Austrian branch--Austrian in the 
sense of defending the independence of an Austrian nation . 
The former branch joined soon the Nazis and became outlawed. 
The latter joined the Govmnt. coalition. The leader of the 
former had been among others Mr. Rautter, later on to become 
sS-Governor in Holland and there hanged a.fter trial in 1949. 
In this period the inner conflict mainly between the ••• right 
and left became very much accentuated. For a better under-
standing please compare the percentage of the vote~ in parla-
mentary elections: 
192?:--.Soc.-Dem. 
(Marxists):- 42%; antisocialists:-58% (49% out of them 
(were) Christian-Socials who had polled 36% 
of the vote~ in 1919, 42% in 1920, 45% in 
1923;--the re~pective socialist f~ures for 
the same period had been: 41%, 36%, 40%, 42%. ) 
1930:-Soc.-Dem. 41%; Antimarxists: 54% (36% out of them (were) 
(Marxists):- Chri~tian-socials, 6% Heimatblock (part of the 
Heimwehren), 12% moderate Nationals. 
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I ncidentally the corresponding f igure~ are for 
1945: socialists about 45%, Communists about 5%; 
1949: " " 39%, " " 5%; 
about , 44 % and Union of Independents about 
Peoples Party 
about 50%; 
PeopleR Party 
12%. 
This means ... no political group--organized as 
usual in Europe along strictly ideological lines--
ever succeeded •.• (in polling) ..• a 51% majority. 
With all the consequences of coalitions and 
coalition-regimes that never will make the parties 
involved more popular in the long run. 
When the inner conflict t hroughout the country became sharpenec 
mainly because of German-organised Nazi Sabotage acts and 
terrorism (1933) the official police and military cadres provec 
to be insufficient for an adequate defense. General con~crip­
tion was forbidden to Austria by her international obligations 
as a "defeated power. 11 Therefore also parts of the oes became 
enrolled as government control Auxiliary Police-forces, called 
Schutzkorps, under the command of regular Police and Army 
officers, (like the Heimwehren). 
Police and Military authorities called on this Schutzkorps 
during the February revolt of 1934. oes-Groups in Vienna 
had no direct part in the fighting although they did protective 
police service in public buildings, on bridges, communication-
lines and on the main ••.• roads. They were involved in bitter 
fighting in some places in styria and Carinthia, where they 
had, under Command of t he regular Agencies for protecting 
Public Security, to defend County-Offices (Bezirkshauptmann-
~chaften), Police-Barracks etc. against heavy assaults from -
the insurgents. The commanding and disposing officers ..• 
(belonged) to the Gendarmerie-Corps (Federal Police in the 
open country). 
The 06S like all the other organisations of similar 
kind (incl. Heimwehren) were dissolved in Springtime 1936, 
when general conscription of the regular army was reintroduced 
by a federal law and the former army cadre~ from about 25,000 
men were brought to over 50,000 men in active Rervice. 
2./ (Response to query on length of Socialists leaders 1 
incarceration.) After outbreak of the revolt of February 
1934 the members of the presiding board of the former Soc. dem 
Party were taken into custody on order of the judicial author-
ity pending an investigation because of High-Treason. 
According to Austrian Penal Law any attempt to overthrow the 
existent legal order by means of force and violence is High-
Treason. The Constitutional Supreme Court had rendered 
decision~ that the Government had acted within its constitu-
tional powers, before outbreak of the revolt. 
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Furthermore according to Austrian procedural law confinement 
of the suspected person pending an investigation because of 
alleged High-treason is obligatory. Remains the question 
whether there had been ..• {founded) •.. su~picion or •.• not. 
The Schutzbund (organisation which had launched the revolt) 
wa~ commonly known and recognized as part of the Soc. dem. 
Party. The party proclaimed a General Strike. It goes with-
out saying that such a general strike under the existing cir-
cumstances meant a deadly danger not so much for the govmt. 
but for the country as such, with Hitler ante portas. The 
leaders of the Revolt (Dr. Bauer, Dr. De utsch) belonged to the 
leaders of the party. The presiding board 'of the party had in 
a similar situation in 1927 proclaimed its solidarity with 
their armed party forces. High-treason matters are always and 
everywhere a highly political matter; the accused get either 
a prison term, often even it gets worse--or a shining monument. 
The government was rather interested in accelerating than in 
delaying the investigation and abstained from interference 
with the independent judicial procedures. Anyhow the investi-
gation lasted for the presiding board members of the Soc. dem. 
from 9 to 12 months. Then it became clear that they were not 
directly , connected or responsible for the outbreak of the most 
unfortunate events, and they were freed. 
3./ (Response to query as to Schuschnigg 1 s opinion of 1934 
constitution and whether or not his views on it had changed 
between 1934 and 1949.) The new Constitution wa9 promulgated 
on May 1, 1934. I think today pretty exactly the same way as 
I did then about this matter. A look at the geographic and 
political map of Europe in 1934 will make it sufficiently clear 
what I mean. The constitution is to be explained as an emer-
gency measure, expected to fit best the needs of the then 
existing inner and foreign pressure. Who is thrown into rough 
water and remains unanswered with his SOS-calls, is hardly 
fairly to be blamed for neglecting the correct style of 
swimming. There was no other way to avoid · (a) new parlament-
ary elections (b) A German-sponsored victory of the Nazis in a 
quasi-legal way. That is exactly what e. g., also the Czechs 
experienced--despite their Model Constitution--in 1939 as well 
as in 1948. 
That the New Constitution turned out to be deficient goes with-
out saying. That is why its coming reform was proclaimed in 
1937. The question is whether Austria could have Burvived the 
year 1934 with the old one. Some think yes. I think no. 
Some classified the New Regime:-Clerical Totalitarianism. 
Which is stupid. Some Clerico-Fasci ~ m: which is untrue and 
poorly superficial. {Since 1933 no Priest or Minister served 
in Austrian active Politics. And the only one official 
Italian abroad I met during this period who had been a 
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vigorous and most outspoken Antifa~cigt wa~ the Papal Nuncio . 
in Vienna.) 
Some label the regime as a 11Burocratic semi-Dictatorship." 
This may approach the truth, even when a minor prerequisite 
quite definitely was lacking--there was a_ctually no dictator. 
Perhaps it would have been better when--for a limited period--
there had been one. Although the final is~ue was not decided 
in Vienna and could not be anything more than merely post-
poned by Austrian forces. The issue was decided in Berlin and 
London. 
4./ (Response to query on whether Schuschnigg intended to 
return to Austria.) A good deal of the men respon~ible new in 
liberated Austria, as far as they belong to the present 
majority party, in the Government offices and elsewhere, in-
cluding the parlament, are former members of the oss and 
participated actively in the struggle for Austrian exisitence 
until March 1938. I think they are doing an excellent job. 
I am not planning to go back to Austria. At least not for a 
foreseeable future. Who tries to forsee the future without 
coming dangerously near to a charlatan? 
This is not an apology. Nobody ~hould be sure that he 
must be right. But everybody is entitled to speak a piece of 
his mind. Maybe I am wrong. But I do not think so. 
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AB STRACT 
ABSTRACT 
When World War I ended in 1918, Austria-Hungary, a 
dual-monarchy embracing a heterogeneou~ a~qortment of peopleq, 
found itself in the proce~~ of breaking up. Hungarian 
1-iagyar~ and Au~trian German!=! had domina ted, under the empire, 
a conglomerat e miscellany of peopleA ranging from Poles and 
Czechs to Ruthenian~ and CroatR. - TheRe peoples seized the 
dua.l-monarchy 1 s reverses in vvorld War I a·c; an opportunity 
to eRtablish their ' independence. 
Three entirely new states were carved out of the old 
a.omain, and large portions went to f our other nations. One of 
the new states was Austria itself, core of the former empire 
and seat of its onetime capital, Vienna. The new Austria con-
stituted herself a republic and set off on what was to be a 
turbulent twenty years of independence. 
The Treaty of Saint Germain gave Austria only one-
seventh of the land of the old dual monarchy, a nd, for some 
time, it ~eemed that Austri~ could not exi s t, economically, 
under the~e circumstance~. It was a~ if Austria's head had 
been cut off from her body, leaving the body with regenerative 
powers and the ability to grow new heads, but with no way for 
the ·old, giant head to develop new members. 
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Gradually this condition was alleviated, and, through 
two League loans and strenuous efforts on the part of the 
AustrianA themselves, the economic condition of the country 
became, in some ways, more healthy than it had ever been 
before. 
Meanwh1le, amidst the anarchy following the war and 
the economic disruptions appearing in the war's wake, the 
Austrians turned to Anschlugs-union with Germany as a cure for 
all their ills. This step, however, was forbidden by the 
Treaty of Saint Germain, but Anschlus~ agitation continued 
throughout the interwar period. Thus, tvhile Austria regained 
her economic health, ~he never achieved a robu~t political 
life. 
Austria was torn between the right and the left, the 
forces of the right being those of the Christian Socialist 
party and the left, tho~e of the Social Democrats. Both 
partieA espou~ed policie~ which predispo~ed Austria for 
Anschluss as it finally came--in the form of Hitlerian invasion 
in 1938. The Socialists fought for An~chlus~ it~elf, foment-
ing Austrian pan-Germanism and keeping alive an issue which was 
to attract many Austrians to the Nazi party. The Christian 
Socialists resorted to faqcist method~ of government , le~s 
severe but similar to those of Germany. Although the two 
parties cooperated in the postwar crisis . of 1919 and 1920 and 
although t he suppressed Socialist leadership affirmed it~ 
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willingne~~ to defend Au~tria against Germany ~hartly before 
the 1938 Anschlu~q, the parties did not, seemingly could not, 
cooperate betwee n 1920 and 1938. Conflict between them became 
~o bitter that in 1934 it finally erupted in civil war, and the 
Socialists were effaced from Au~trian political life. Thus, 
Austria faced Germany irrevocably divided and fatally unpreparec 
spirituall~, to combat the Nazi menace. 
In addition to the intransigence of the parties , 
Austria's interwar life was also rent with unhealthy political 
and social manifeste.tions--anti-Semi tism, mill tarism, fasci~m. 
Anti-Semitism in Austria was in many ways as virulent a~ in 
Germany itself, and, while Austria had no territorial ambitions 
she was nevertheless militaristic--witness her eight interwar 
paramilitary organizations which engaged in bloody ,.,reekend 
romps. \vhen Germany marched in on March 11, 1938, Austria 
already had a fascist government, a milder one, it is true , 
than the tight dictatorship in Germany, but nevertheless one 
not responsible in any way to the Austrian electorate. 
Austrians aq a whole were pan-German, as the continuing inter-
war popularity of Anschluss exhibited and as did the Teutonic 
consciousness of many who did not espouse Anschluss and who 
hated Nazi sm. 
It is true of course that even had Austria been polit-
ically and socially sound, she would have been unable, ulti-
mately, to defend herself against Hitler. Her final doom came 
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with the rise of an aggressive Nazi Germany and with the 
failure of the \vest--'t.,hich had demanded her abstinence from 
Anschluss at Saint Germain and made it a condition of League 
loans--to defend Austrian independence in 1938. Hitler 1 s 
An~chlu~q, then, was inevitable. It came to a people who had 
um..ri ttingly prepared for it and iti'ho, 1..rhen it came, no longer 
wanted it. 
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